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Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.

DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE

DISTINCTIO I.

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Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

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The Four Books of Sentences

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES

ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD

DISTINCTION 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 26-28.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Cap. I.

Omnis doctrina est de rebus vel de signis.

Veteris ac novae Legis continentiam diligenti indagine etiam atque etiam considerantibus nobis praevia Dei gratia innotuit, sacrae paginae tractatum circa res vel signa praecipue versari. Ut enim egregius doctor Augustinus ait in libro de Doctrina christiana:[1] « Omnis doctrina vel rerum est, vel signorum. Sed res etiam per signa discuntur. Proprie autem hic res appellantur, quae non ad significandum aliquid adhibentur; signa vero, quorum usus est in significando ». Eorum autem aliqua sunt, quorum omnis usus est in significando, non in iustificando, id est,[2] quibus non utimur nisi aliquid significandi gratia, ut aliqua Sacramenta legalia; alia, quae non solum significant, sed conferunt quod intus adiuvet, sicut evangelica Sacramenta. « Ex quo aperte intelligitur, quae hic appellentur signa, res illae videlicet, quae ad significandum aliquid adhibentur. Omne igitur signum etiam res aliqua est. Quod enim nulla res est, ut in eodem Augustinus ait, omnino nihil est; non autem e converso[3] omnis res signum est », quia non adhibetur ad significandum aliquid. Cumque his intenderit theologorum speculatio studiosa atque modesta, divinam Scripturam formam praescriptam in doctrina tenere advertet. De his ergo nobis aditum ad res divinas aliquatenus intelligendas, Deo duce, aperire volentibus disserendum est; et primum de rebus, postea de signis disseremus.

Chapter I

Every doctrine concerns things and or signs.

While considering the contents of the Old and New Law again and again by diligent chase [indagine], the prevenient grace of God has hinted to us, that a treatise on the Sacred Page is [versari] chiefly about things and/or signs. For as Augustine, the egregious Doctor, says in the book <u>on Christian Doctrine</u>:[1] « Every doctrine is of things, and/or signs. But even things are learned through signs. But here (those) are properly named things, which are not employed to signify anything; but signs, those whose use is in signifying ». But of these there are some, whose every use is in signifying, not in justifying, that is,[2] which we do not use except for the sake of signifying something, as (are) some Sacraments of the Law [legalia]; others, which not only signify, but confer that which helps inwardly, as the evangelical Sacraments (do). « From which it is openly understood, what are here named signs: those things namely, which are employed to signify something. Therefore every sign is also some thing. For because it is no thing, as Augustine said in the same (book), it is entirely nothing; but conversely[3] not every thing is a sign », because it is not employed to signify anything. And since the studious and modest speculation of theologians is intent upon these, it turns toward the Sacred Page to hold the form prescribed in doctrine. Of these, therefore, there is to be

an orderly discussion [disserendum est] by us who want, with God as (our) leader, to open an approach towards understanding to some extent the things divine; and first we would discuss in an orderly manner things, afterwards signs.

Cap. II.

De rebus quibus fruendum est, vel utendum, et de his quae fruuntur et utuntur.

« Id ergo in rebus considerandum est, ut in eodem[4] Augustinus ait, quid res aliae sunt, quibus fruendum est, aliae, quibus utendum est, aliae, quae fruuntur et utuntur. Illae, quibus fruendum est, nos beatos faciunt; istis, quibus utendum est, tendentes ad beatitudinem adiuvamur et quasi adminiculamur, ut ad illas res, quae nos beatos faciunt, pervenire eisque inhaerere possimus. Res vero, quae fruuntur et utuntur, nos sumus, quasi inter utrasque constituti », et Angeli et Sancti.[5] « *Frui* autem est amore alicui rei inhaerere propter se ipsam; *uti* vero id quod in usum venerit referre ad obtinendum illud, quo fruendum est; alias abuti est, non uti. Nam usus illicitus abusus vel abusio nominari debet ».[6] « Res igitur, quibus fruendum est, sunt Pater et Filius et Spirtus sanctus. Eadem tamen Trinitas quaedam summa res est communisque omnibus fruenitibus ea, si tamen res dici debet et non rerum omnium causa, si tamen et causa. Non enim facile potest invenire nomen, quod tantae excellentiae conveniat, nisi quod melius dicitur Trinitas haec unus Deus ». Res autem, quibus utendum est, mundus est et in eo creata. Unde Augustinus in eodem:[7] « Utendum est hoc mundo, non fruendum, ut *invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciantur*,[8] id est, ut de temporalibus aeterna tantum sunt, quibus fruendum est, quae aeternae et incommutabiles sunt; ceteris autem utendum est, ut ad illarum perfruitionem[9] perveniatur ». Unde Augustinus in libro decimo de Trinitate:[10] « Fruimur cognitis, in quibus ipsis propter se voluntas delectata conquiescit; utimur vero eis quae ad aliud referimus, quo fruendum est ».

Chapter II

On the things which one is to enjoy, and/or to use, and on those which enjoy and use.

« Among things, therefore, it must be considered, that as (St.) Augustine says in the same (book),[4] there are some things, which one is to enjoy, others, which one is to use, others, which enjoy and use. Those, which one is to enjoy, make us blessed; by those others, which one is to use, as ones tending towards beatitude we are helped and, as it were [quasi], propped up, so that we can arrive at those things, which make us blessed, and cleave to them. But between both things, which are enjoyed and used, we have been constituted, as it were, as both Angels and Saints.[5] « Moreover *to enjoy* is to cleave to any thing by love on account of its very self; but *to use* (is) to refer that which has come to be used to obtain that, which one is to enjoy; otherwise it is abusing, not using. For an illicit use ought to be named abuse [abusum] and/or an abuse [abusio] ».[6] « The things, therefore, which one is to enjoy, are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. However the same Trinity is a certain most high thing and common (property) to all enjoying It, if however It ought to be called a thing and not the Cause of all things, if however even a cause. For it is not easy to find a name, which convenes with so great an excellence, which is better said except this Trinity one God ». Moreover the things, which one is to use, are the world and the created things in it. Whence (St.) Augustine in the same (book):[7] « This world is to be used—not enjoyed—so that *the invisible things of God, understood through those things which have been made, may be perceived* [conspiciantur],[8] that is, as from temporal things there are only eternal ones, which one is to enjoy, which are eternal and incommutable; but the all others one is to use, so that one arrives at the thorough fruition[9] of these ». Whence (St.) Augustine in the tenth book On the Trinity:[10] « We

enjoy things cognized, in which very things the delighted will takes rest for its own sake; but we use those things which we refer to the other, which one is to enjoy ».

Cap. III.

Quod sit frui et uti.

Notandum vero, quod idem Augustinus in libro decimo de Trinitate,[11] aliter quam supra accipiens uti et frui, sic dicit: « Uti est assumere aliquid in / facultatem voluntatis; . . .

Chapter III

What is it "to enjoy" and "to use"?

But it must be noted, that the same (St.) Augustine in the tenth book On the Trinity,[11] accepting "to use" and "to enjoy" in another way than above, speaks thus: « To use is to assume something into / the faculty of the will; . . .

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[1] Cap. 2 n. 2; hic et proximo loco, sed multis a Magistro omissis et nonnullis additis ac mutatis.
[2] Vat. et ed. 4 non bene omittunt *id est*.
[3] Vat. et edd. 4, 6 *e diverso* pro *e converso*.
[4] Libr. I. c. 3. n. 1.
[5] Omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 6, 8 *Angeli sancti*. Pro utraque lectione militant rationes; unde nihil immutavimus. Lectio *Angeli sancti* comprehendit sub *nos sumus* omnes homines bonos, sive sint in via, sive in patria; et addit *sancti* ad *Angeli*, ut excludantur daemones, sum damnati nullo modo Deo fruantur. Altera vero lectio ex una parte ponit *nos*, qui soli stricto sensu constituti sumus inter res, quibus fruendum, scil. Deo, et quibus utendum ut mediis ad Deum, ex altera parte beatos *Angelos* et *Sanctos*, qui proprie fruuntur Deo nec indigent uti mediis ad ultimam finem, sed tamen aliquo modo creaturis uti possunt ad alios fines.
[6] Aug. loc. cit. c. 4. et proximus locus, qui incipit: *Res igitur*, ibid. c. 5.
[7] Libr. I. c. 4. et proximus locus ibid. c. 5.
[8] Rom. 1, 20.
[9] Vat. et edd. 1, 2, 4 *fruitionem*, contradicentibus textu Augustini et codd. cum aliis edd.
[10] Cap. 10. n. 13. — Vat. cum cod. A et omnibus edd., excepta 8, in principio propositionis: *Idem* loco *Unde Augustinus*.
[11] Cap. 11. n. 17. — In fine textus cod. B, ed. 1 et originale habent *appetivit* pro *appetit*.

[1] Chapter 2, n. 2; here and in the next passage, but with many words omitted by Master (Peter) and not a few added or changed.
[2] The Vatican text and edition 4, not so well, omit *that is*.
[3] The Vatican text and editions 4 and 6 have *diversely* in place of *conversely*.
[4] Book I, ch. 3, n. 1.
[5] All the codices together with editions 1, 6 and 8 have *holy Angels* [Angeli sancti]. Reasons favor each reading; whence we have changed nothing. The reading *holy Angels* [Angeli sancti] comprehends, under *we have*, all good men whether they are wayfarers, or in their fatherland; and it adds *holy* to *Angels*, to exclude the demons, since the damned in no manner enjoy God. But the other reading in one way posits *us*, who have alone been constituted in the strict sense between things, which are enjoyed, that is God, and those to be used as means towards God; in another way (it posits) the blessed *Angels* and *Saints*, who properly enjoy God and do not need to use means towards the last end, but however in some manner use creatures towards other ends.
[6] (St.) Augustine, loc. cit., ch. 4 and the next passage, which begins: *The things, therefore . . .*, ibid., ch. 5.
[7] Bk, I, ch. 4 and the next passage ibid., ch. 5.
[8] Rom. 1:20.
[9] The Vatican text and editions 1, 2 and 4 have *fruition*, in contradiction to (St.) Augustine's text and the codices, together with the other editions.
[10] Chapter 10, n. 3. — The Vatican text with codex A and all the editions, except 8, has at the beginning of the proposition: *Likewise* in place of *Whence (St.) Augustine*.

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facultatem voluntatis; frui autem est uti cum gaudio non adhuc spei, sed iam rei; ideoque omnis, qui fruitur, utitur; assumit enim aliquid in facultatem voluntatis cum fine delectationis. Non autem omnis, qui

the faculty of the will; but to enjoy is to use with a joy no longer of hope, but already of a thing; and for that reason everything, which is enjoyed, is used; for one assumes something into the faculty of the will for the

utitur, et fruitur; si id quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit, non propter ipsum, sed propter aliud appetit ».

purpose [cum fine] of delectation. Moreover not everything, which is used, is also enjoyed; if that which is assumed into the faculty of the will, is desired [appetit] not for its own sake, but for the sake of another ».

Et attende, quod[1] videtur Augustinus dicere, illos frui tantum, qui in re gaudent, non iam in spe; et ita in hac vita non videmur frui, sed tantum uti, ubi gaudemus in spe, cum supra dictum sit, frui esse amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se, qualiter etiam hic multi adhaerent Deo.

And attend, that[1] (St.) Augustine seems to say, that those only enjoy, who rejoice in a thing, no more in hope; and thus in this life we do not seem to enjoy, but only to use, where we rejoice in hope, since it has been said above, that to enjoy is to cleave to any thing by love for its own sake, in which manner many even here adhere to God.

Haec ergo, quae sibi contradicere videntur, sic determinamus dicentes, nos et hic et in futuro frui, sed ibi proprie et perfecte et plene, ubi per speciem videbimus quo fruemur; hic autem, dum in spe ambulamus, fruimur quidem, sed non adeo plene. Unde Augustinus in libro decimo de Trinitate:[2] « Fruimur cognitis, in quibus ipsis voluntas propter se delectata conquiescit ». Idem in libro de Doctrina christiana[3] ait: « Angeli illo fruentes iam beati sunt, quo et nos frui desideramus; et quantum in hac vita iam fruimur vel per speculum vel in aenigmate, tanto nostram peregrinationem et tolerabilius sustinemus et ardentius finire cupimus ».

Therefore these things, which seem to contradict themselves, we thus determine saying, that we both here and in the future enjoy, but there properly and perfectly and fully, where through sight [per speciem] we shall see, what we enjoy; but here, while we walk in hope, we indeed enjoy, but not fully to that extent. Whence (St.) Augustine in the tenth book On the Trinity:[2] « We enjoy things cognized, in which very things the delighted will takes rest for its own sake ». Likewise in the book On Christian Doctrine[3] he says: « The Angels, enjoying Him, are already blessed, whom we also desire to enjoy; and as much as in this life we enjoy (Him) through a mirror and/or in mystery, so much more shall we both more tolerably sustain our pilgrimage and more ardently desire to finish (it) ».

Postest etiam dici, quod qui fruitur etiam in hac vita non tantum habet gaudium spei, sed etiam rei, quia iam delectatur in eo quod diligit, et ita iam rem aliquatenus tenet. Constat ergo, quia[4] debemus Deo frui, non uti. « Illo enim, » ut ait Augustinus,[5] « frueris, quo efficieris beatus et in quo spem ponis, ut ad id pervenias ». De hoc idem ait in libro de Doctrina christiana: « Dicimus ea re nos frui, quam diligimus propter se, et ea re nobis fruendum esse tantum, qua efficimur beati; ceteris vero utendum ». « Frequenter tamen dicitur *frui* cum delectationem secum gerit. Si tamen per eam transieris et ad illud, ubi permanendum est, eam retuleris, uteris ea et abusive, non proprie diceris frui. Si vero inhaeseris atque permanseris, finem in ea

It can also be said, that he who enjoys even in this life, not only has the joy of hope, but also of a thing, because he already delights in that which he loves [diligit], and thus he already has the thing to a certain degree. It is therefore established, because[4] we ought to enjoy God, not use (Him). « For Him, » as (St.) Augustine says,[5] « you enjoy, by whom you shall be made blessed and in whom you place (your) hope, to arrive at that ». Concerning this the same says in (his) book On Christian Doctrine: « We say that we enjoy that thing, which we love for its own sake, and that thing alone is to be enjoyed by us, by which we are made blessed; but all others (are) to be used ». « Frequently, however, one says *to enjoy* when it bears delectation with itself [secum]. If, however,

ponens laetitiae tuae, tunc vere et proprie frui dicendus es; quod non est faciendum nisi in illa Trinitate, it est, summo et incommutabili bono ».[6]

you would pass over through this (delectation) and refer it to that, where one is to thoroughly remain, you are using it and you will be said to enjoy not properly, but in an abusive sense [abusive]. But if you cleave (to it) and thoroughly remain (in it), placing the end of your gladness in it, then truly and properly you are said to enjoy; which is not to be done except in that Trinity, that is, in the most high and incommutable Good ».[6]

Cum autem homines, qui fruuntur et utuntur aliis rebus, res aliquae sint, quaeritur, « utrum frui se debeant, an uti, an utrumque ». Ad quod sic respondet Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana:[7] « Si propter se homo diligendus est, fruimur eo; si propter aliud, utimur eo: videtur autem mihi propter aliud diligendus. Quod enim propter se diligendum est, in eo constituitur beata vita, cuius etiam spes hoc tempore nos consolatur. In homine autem spes ponenda non est, quia *maledictus est* qui hoc facit. Ergo si liquide advertas, nec seipso quisquam frui debet, quia non se debet diligere propter se, sed propter illud quo fruendum est ». Huic autem contrarium videtur quod Apostolus ad Philemonem[8] loquens ait: *Ita, frater, ego te fruar in Domino*. Quod ita determinat Augustinus:[9] « Si dixisset tantum *te fruar*, et non addidisset *in Domino*, videretur finem dilectionis ac spem constituisse in eo; sed quia illud addidit, *in Domino* se finem posuisse eodemque frui significavit ». « Cum enim, » ut idem Augustinus ait, « homine in Deo frueris, Deo potius quam homine frueris ».

Moreover since men, who enjoy and use other things, are (themselves) other things, it is asked, « whether they ought to enjoy, or use themselves, or both »? To which (St.) Augustine responds thus, in (his) book On Christian Doctrine:[7] « If a man is to be loved [diligendus est] for his own sake, we enjoy him; if for the sake of another, we use him: but it seems to me that he (is) to be loved for the sake of another. For what is to be loved for its own sake, in this is constituted the blessed life, hope for which consoles us even at this time. But in man hope is not to be placed, because *accursed is he* who does this. Therefore if you clearly advert, no one ought to enjoy his very self, because he ought not love himself for his own sake, but for the sake of that, which one is to enjoy ». But what the Apostles says, speaking to Philemon,[8] seems contrary to this: *Thus, brother, do I enjoy you in the Lord*. Which (St.) Augustine determines thus:[9] « If he has said only *I enjoy you*, and had not added *in the Lord*, it would seem that end or hope of delectation was constituted in him; but because he added that, he placed (his) end *in the Lord* and signified that he enjoys Him. » « For when, » as the same (St.) Augustine says, « you enjoy a man in God, you will enjoy God rather than man ».

Sed cum Deus diligat nos, ut frequenter Scriptura dicit, quae eius dilectionem erga nos multum commendat, quaerit Augustinus,[10] quomodo diligit, an ut utens, an ut fruens, et procedit ita: « Si fruitur nobis, eget bono nostro, quod nemo sanus dixerit; ait enim Propheta:[11] *Bonorum meorum non eges*. Omne enim bonum nostrum vel ipse est, vel ab ipso est: non ergo fruitur nobis, sed utitur. Si enim nec

But when God loves us, as Scripture frequently says, which much commends His love toward us, (St.) Augustine asks,[10] in what manner does He love, whether as one using, or as one enjoying, and he proceeds thus: « If He enjoys us, He is in want of our good, which no sane (person) would say; for the Prophet says:[11] *Thou are not in want of my goods*. For He Himself, and/or from Him, is our every good: therefore He does not

fruitur nobis nec utitur, non invenio, quomodo diligat nos ». « Neque tamen sic utitur nobis, ut nos aliis rebus. Nos enim res, quibus utimur, ad id referimus, ut Dei bonitate perfruamur; Deus vero ad suam bonitatem usum nostrum refert: ille enim miseretur nostri propter suam bonitatem, nos autem nobis invicem propter illius bonitatem; ille nostri miseretur, ut se perfruamur, nos vero invicem nostri miseremur, ut illo fruamur. Cum enim nos alicuius meseremur et alicui consulimus, ad eius quidem facimus utilitatem eamque intuemur, sed et nostra fit consequens, cum misericordiam, quam aliis impendimus, non reliquit Deus sine mercede. Haec autem merces summa est, ut ipso perfruamur ».[12] Item: « Quia bonus est, sumus, et inquantum sumus, boni sumus. Porro quia etiam iustus est, non impune mali sumus, et in quantum mali sumus, in tantum etiam / minus sumus.

enjoy, but uses us. For if He neither enjoys nor uses us, I do not find, in what manner He loves us ». « And He does not so use us, as we use other things. For we refer the things, which we use, for this, that we thoroughly enjoy the goodness of God; but God refers our use to His own goodness: for He has mercy on us for the sake of His own goodness, but we have mercy on one another [nobis invicem] for the sake of His goodness; He has mercy on us, so that we may thoroughly enjoy Him, but we have mercy on one another, to enjoy Him. For when we have mercy on anyone and look to the interests [consulimus] of anyone, we indeed work for his utility and look at it attentively [intuemur], but the consequence is also ours, since the mercy, which we spend upon others, God has not left without it recompense [mercede]. Moreover this is the highest recompense, that we may thoroughly enjoy Him ».[12] Likewise: « Because He is good, we are, and inasmuch as we are, we are good. Furthermore, because He is also just, we are not without impunity evil, and inasmuch as we are evil, to that extent [in tantum] we also / are less.

[1] Vat. cum codd. B C et edd. praeter 6 et 8 *quia*.
[2] Cap. 10. n. 13. — Integrum textum posuimus ex cod. D et ed. 1. Vat. cum ceteris edd. et codd. *fruimur cognitis, in quibus voluntas est*. Suspicamur autem, pro *est* legendum esse *etc*. Nomen *Augustinus*, quod deerat post *Unde*, suffectum est ex codd. C D et edd. 1, 8.
[3] Libr. I. c. 30. n. 31. — Scripturae locus, quem hic respicit Augustinus, est I. Cor. 13, 12.
[4] Solummodo edd., exceptis I, 8, legunt *igitur quod*. Tum Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 post *frui* addit *et*.
[5] Libr. I. de Doctr. christ. c. 33. n. 37; proximus locus ibid. c. 31. n. 34.
[6] Loc. cit. c. 33. n. 37. — In fine huius auctoritatis codd. omnes et edd. 1, 8 adiiciunt *in* ante *summo*; sed infra circa finem in eodem S. Aug. loco solummodo cod. B cum iisdem duabus edd. Cum autem *in* desit in orginali, nihil immutavimus.
[7] Libr. I. c. 22, sed plura secundum sensum excerpta sunt. — Insuper mss. omnes et edd. 1, 8 male et contra textum Augustini omittunt *nos* ante *consolatur*. Verba, quae sequuntur: *In homine* etc., alludunt ad Ierem. 17, 5.
[8] Vers. 20. — Immediate ante Vat. cum edd. 4, 7 contra codd. et ceteras edd. *videri non debet* pro *videtur*.
[9] De Doctr. christ. c. 33. n. 37, ubi in originali: Inde ad Philemonem Paulus: *Ita frater*, inquit *ego te fruar in Domino*. Quod si non addidisset *in Domino*, et *te fruar* tantum dixisset, in eo constituisset spem

[1] The Vatican text, together with codices B C and the editions, excepting 6 and 8, has *because*.
[2] Chapter 10, n. 13. — The whole text we have taken from codex D and edition 1. The Vatican text, together with all the other editions and codices, has *we enjoy things cognized, in which there is a will*. Moreover we suspect, that the reading of *there is* [est] must be *etc.* [etc]. The name *Augustine*, which is lacking after *Whence*, is supplied from codex C and D and editions 1 and 8.
[3] Bk. I, ch. 30, n. 31. — The passage of Scripture, to which (St.) Augustine here refers, is 1 Cor. 13:12.
[4] Only the editions, excepting 1 and 8, read *that therefore*.
Then the Vatican text, against the codices and editions 1 and 8, before *not* add *and*.
[5] On Christian Doctrine, Bk. I, ch. 33, n. 37; the next passage ibid., ch. 31, n. 34. [Trans. Here in both the Latin and English this phrase has been offset from the passage quoted by quotes, seemingly omitted in the Quarrachi edition by a typographical lapse.]
[6] Loc. cit., ch. 33. n. 37. [Trans. Again, the quote at the beginning of this passage, omitted from the Latin text, by typographical lapse, is restored in both the Latin and English texts].— At the end of this quote all the codices and editions 1 and 8, have *in* before *the most high*; but below, near the of the same passage from St. Augustine only codex B, with the same two editions has this. But since *in* is lacking in the original, we have changed nothing.

beatitudinis suae. — In fine huius loci codd. A C D bene *eodemque se frui*. — Proximus locus habetur ibidem.
[10] De Doctr. christ. c. 31. n. 34. — Mox. Vat. *diligat* pro *diligit* contra textum Augustini, codd. et fere omnes edd. Postea verbis *si fruitur* hic et paulo infra post *nec fruitur* additum est *nobis* ex cod. D et edd. 1, 8.
[11] Psalm. 15, 2. — Mss. A B C E cum edd. 1, 8 *indiges* pro *eges*, sed repugnate Augustino cum Vulgata.
[12] Ibid. c. 32. n. 35; in quo textu post *misericordiam quam* codd. A B E et edd. 1, 8 pro *aliis* legunt *alii*; cod. D *alicui*; et mox pro *perfruamur* Vat. cum paucis edd. *fruamur*.

[7] Bk. I, ch. 22, but very many words have be excerpted according to the sense. — Next, all the manuscripts and editions 1 and 8, badly and against the text of (St.) Augustine, omit *us* at *consoles*.
[8] Verse 20. — Immediately before this, the Vatican text, together with editions 4 and 7, against the codices and all other editions, has *ought not seem* in place of *seems*.
[9] On Christian Doctrine, ch. 33, n. 37, where there is had in the original: For that reason (St.) Paul (says) to Philemon: *Thus brother*, he said, *do I enjoy you in the Lord*. Which if he had not added *in the Lord*, and had only said *I enjoy you*, he would have constituted in him the hope of his beatitude. — At the end of this passage, codices A C and D have *and . . . he enjoys the same.* — The next passage is had from the same place.
[10] On Christian Doctrine, ch. 31, n. 34. — Next the Vatican text has *He loves* in place of *does He love*, contrary to the text of (St.) Augustine, the codices, and nearly all the editions. After this, to the words *If He enjoys*, here and a little below after *if He neither enjoys*, there has been added *us* from codex D and editions 1 and 8.
[11] Psalm 15:2. — Manuscripts A B C and E, together with editions 1 and 8, have *does not need* in place of *are . . . in want of*, but this departs from (St.) Augustine and the Vulgate.
[12] Ibid., ch. 32, n. 35; in which text after *the mercy which* codices A B E and editions 1 and 8 in place of *upon others* [aliis] reads *others* [alii]; codex D reads *on another*; and then in place of *we may thoroughly enjoy*, the Vatican text, together with a few of the editions, reads *we may enjoy*.

P. 28

minus sumus. Ille igitur usus, quo nobis utitur Deus, non ad eius, sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur, ad eius vero tantummodo bonitatem ».[1]

are less. Therefore that use, by which God uses us, is referred not to His, but to our utility, however only to His goodness ».[1]

Hic considerandum est, utrum virtutibus sit utendum, an fruendum. Quibusdam videtur, quod eis sit utendum et non fruendum. Quibusdam videtur, quod eis sit utendum et non fruendum, et hoc confirmant auctoritate Augustini,[2] qui, ut praetaxatum est, dicit, non esse fruendum nisi Trinitate, id est, summo et incommutabili bono. Item dicunt, ideo non esse fruendum eis, quia propter se amandae non sunt, sed propter aeternam beatitudinem. Illud autem, quo fruendum est, propter se amandum est. Sed quod virtutes propter se amandae non sint, immo propter solam beatitudinem, probant

Here one must consider, whether one is to use virtues, or enjoy (them). To certain ones it seems, that one is to use them and not to enjoy (them), and this they confirm with the authority of (St.) Augustine,[2] who, as has been discussed [praetaxatum], says, that one is not to enjoy (anything) except the Trinity, that is, the most high and incommutable Good. Likewise they say, that for that reason one is not to enjoy those things, because they are not to be loved [amandae] for their own sake, but for the sake of eternal beatitude. Moreover, that, which one is to enjoy, is to be loved for its

auctoritate Augustini, qui in libro decimo tertio de Trinitate[3] contra quosdam ait: « Forte virtutes, quas propter solam beatitudinem amamus, sic persuadere nobis audent, ut ipsam beatitudinem non amemus; quod si faciunt, etiam ipsas utique amare desistimus, quando illam, propter quam solam istas amavimus, non amamus ». Ecce his verbis videtur Augustinus ostendere, quod virtutes non propter se, sed propter solam beatitudinem amandae sint. Quod si ita est, ergo eis fruendum non est. Aliis vero contra videtur, scilicet quod eis fruendum sit, quia[4] propter se petendae et amandae sunt. Et hoc confiirmant auctoritate Ambrosii,[5] qui ait super illum locum Epistolae ad Galatas: *Fructus autem spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pax, patientia* etc.: « Haec non nominat opera, sed fructus, quia propter se petenda sunt ». Si vero propter se petenda sunt, ergo propter se amanda. Nos autem harum quae videtur[6] auctoritatum repugnantiam de medio eximere cupientes, dicimus, quod virtutes propter se petendae et amandae sunt, et tamen propter solam beatitudinem. Propter se quidem amandae sunt, quia delectant sui possessores sincera et sancta delectatione et in eis pariunt gaudium spirituale. Verumtamen non est hic consistendum, sed ultra gradiendum. Non hic haereat dilectionis[7] gressus, neque hic sit dilectionis terminus, sed referatur hoc ad illud summum bonum, cui soli omnino inhaerendum est, quia illud propter se tantum amandum est, et ultra illud nihil quaerendum est; illud est enim supremus finis. Ideo Augustinus dicit, quod eas diligimus propter solam beatitudinem, non quin[8] eas propter se diligamus, sed quia id ipsum, quod eas diligimus, referimus ad illud summum bonum, cui soli inhaerendum est, et[9] in eo permanendum finisque laetitiae ponendus; quare virtutibus non est fruendum. Sed dicet aliquis: Frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se ipsam, ut praedictum est; si ergo virtutes propter se amandae sunt, et eis fruendum est. Ad quod dicimus: in illa descriptione, ubi dicitur *propter se ipsam*, intelligendum est tantummodo, ut scilicet ametur propter se ipsam tantum, ut non referatur ad aliud, sed ibi ponatur finis, ut supra ostendit

own sake. But that the virtues are not to be loved for their own sake, not even for the sake of beatitude alone, they prove with the authority of (St.) Augustine, who in the thirteenth book of On the Trinity[3] says against certain men: « Perhaps the virtues, which we love for the sake of beatitude alone, do dare to persuade us, so as not love beatitude itself; which if they do, we at any rate desist in loving them themselves, when that, for the sake of which we have loved them, we love not ». Behold with these words (St.) Augustine seems to show, that the virtues not for their own sake, but for the sake of beatitude alone are to be loved. Which if it is so, therefore one is not to enjoy them. But to others the contrary has seemed, namely, that one is to enjoy them, because[4] they are to be sought [petendae] and loved for their own sake. And this they confirm with the authority of (St.) Ambrose,[5] who says on the passage from the Epistle to the Galatians: *But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace, patience* etc.: « He does not name these "works", but "fruits", because they are to be sought for their own sake ». But if they are to be sought for their own sake, therefore they (are) to be loved for their own sake. But desiring to remove from the middle of these the things that which seems[6] repugnant to (these) authorities, we say, that the virtues are to be sought and loved for their own sake, and, however, for the sake of beatitude alone. Indeed they are to be loved for their own sake, because they delight their possessors with sincere and holy delectation and beget in them a spiritual joy. Still however one must not stop here, but step beyond. Not here does the step of dilection[7] stand still [haereat], nor is here the terminus of dilection, but this is referred to that most high Good, to whom alone one must entirely cleave [inhaerendum], because It is to be loved only for Its own sake, and beyond It nothing is to be sought [quaerendum]; for It is the supreme end. For that reason (St.) Augustine says, that because we love [diligimus] them for the sake of beatitude alone, we are not[8] to love them for their own sake, but because we refer that very thing, that we love them, to that most high

Augsutinus dicens:[10] « Si inhaeseris atque permanseris, finem ponens laetitiae tuae, tunc vere et proprie frui dicendus est. Quod non est faciendum nisi in illa Trinitate, id est, summo et incommutabili bono ». Utendum est ergo virtutibus et per eas fruendum summo bono; ita et de voluntate bona dicimus. Unde Augustinus in libro decimo de Trinitate[11] ait: « Voluntas est per quam fruimur »; ita et per virtutes fruimur; non eis, nisi forte aliqua virtus sit Deus, ut caritas, de qua post tractabitur.[12]

Good, to whom alone one is to cleave, and[9] in whom one is to thoroughly remain, that He is to be placed as the end of (all our) gladness; wherefore one is not to enjoy the virtues. But someone says: To enjoy is to cleave to something by love [amore] for its very own sake, as has been said; if therefore the virtues are to be loved for their own sake, one is to enjoy them. To which we say: in that description, where it is said *for its own sake*, it must be understood in only this manner, that, namely, it is to be loved for its own sake only so as not to be referred to another, but the end be placed there, as (St.) Augustine shows above saying:[10] « If you cleave (to it) and thoroughly remain (in it), placing the end of your gladness (in it), then you are truly and properly to be said to enjoy (it). Which is not to be done except in that Trinity, that is, the most high and incommutable Good ». One is to use, therefore, the virtues and through them to enjoy the most high Good; thus we speak and from a good will. Whence (St.) Augustine says in the tenth book of On the Trinity:[11] « The will is that through which we enjoy »; thus and through the virtues we enjoy; not them, unless perhaps some virtue be God, as (is) charity, of which we will treat afterwards.[12]

Omnium igitur, quae dicta sunt, ex quo de rebus specialiter tractavimus, haec summa est: quod aliae sunt, quibus fruendum est,[13] aliae, quibus utendum est, aliae, quae fruuntur et utuntur; et inter eas, quibus utendum est, etiam sunt, per quae fruimur, ut virtutes et potentiae animi, quae sunt naturalia bona. De quibus omnibus, antequam de signis tractemus, agendum est, ac primum de rebus, quibus fruendum est, scilicet de sancta atque individua Trinitate.

Of all the things, therefore, which have been said, of which we have especially treated of things, this is the highest: that there are some things, which one is to enjoy,[13] others, which one is to use, others, which enjoy and use; and among these, which one is to use, there are also those, through which we enjoy, as (are) the virtues and powers of the spirit [animi], which are natural goods. Of which all, before we treat of signs, must be dealt with, and first of the things, which are to be enjoyed, namely, the Holy and Undivided Trinity.

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[1] Ibid.; in quo textu Vat., ordine verborum non bene inverso, legit *Porro etiam quia*, et paulo post pro *Ille igitur* eadem legi *Ille ergo*.
[2] Loc. cit. c. 33. n. 37; vide supra in medio huius capituli. — Paulo ante cod. C *confirmatur auctoritate*; cod. D *confirmant auctoritates* et paulo infra *probant auctoritates*.
[3] Cap. 8. n. 11. — Paulo ante mss. B C E *sunt* pro *sint*.

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[1] Ibid.; in which passage the Vatican text, having not so well inversed the order of the words, reads *Furthermore also because*, and a little afterwards the same text reads *Therefore that* [Ille ergo] in place of *Therefore that* [Ille igitur].
[2] Loc. cit., ch. 33, n. 37; see above in the middle of this chapter. — A little before this codex C has *is confirmed by the authority*; codex D has *the authorities . . . confirm* and a little below this *the*

[4] Solus cod. D *et propter*, sed male.
[5] Super Epist. ad Galatas c. 5, 22: « Non dixit: opera spiritus caritas est, sed fructus spiritus ». — Verba, quae sequuntur: « quia propter se petenda sunt », idem Lombardus habet Collect. in Epist. Pauli ad Gal. Patrolog. Lat. tom. C X C II, col. 160: « *Fructus autem*: quasi dicat, haec quae enumeravi, sunt opera carnis; sed ista sunt opera spiritus, quae sequuntur, quae tamen non nominat *opera*, sed *fructus*, quia propter se petenda sunt ». Ex his confirmatur lectio codd. et ed. 1: *haec non nominat*, dum ceterae edd. legunt *hic non nominat*; Vat. et ed. 4 *At hic* etc. Deinde pro *nominat* cod. D *nominantur*. Postea Vat. et edd. 2, 4, 7, 9 *ergo et propter*; omisimus *et*, postulantibus mss. et aliss edd. Denique edd. 1, 3, 8 adiungunt *amanda sunt*.
[6] Codd. A B E et edd. 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 *videntur*.
[7] Vat. perperam *delectationis*.
[8] Vat. *quod*, edd. 5, 8, 9 *qui*, sed recte codd. et aliae edd. *quin*, quia Magister hic mediam viam tenet inter negantes et asserentes, virtutes proper se amandas esse.
[9] Vat. sola praetermittit *et*.
[10] De Doctr. christ. I. c. 33. n. 37; in quo textu praeter Vat. ceterae edd. et codd. omittunt *tuae* post *laetititae*; sed retinuimus cum originali, quia supra in eodem textu omnes concorditer sic legunt.
[11] Cap. 10. n. 13.
[12] Infra d. 17. Edd. 1, 3, 8 *postea* loco *post*.
[13] Codd. omnes omittunt *est*, et item postea codd. A B C cum edd. 1, 8 post *utendum*. Denique cod. D legit *animae* pro *animi* et cum ed. 1 *dona* pro *bona*.

authorities . . . prove.
[3] Chapter 8, n. 11. — A little before this, manuscripts B C and E have *are* [sunt] in place of *are* [sint].
[4] Only codex D has *and that*, but badly [since the second clause would require the subjunctive].
[5] On the Epistle to the Galatians, 5:22: « He did not say: "the works of the spirit are charity", but "the fruits" ». — The words, which follow: « because the are to be sought for their own sake », (Peter) Lombard likewise has in Collect. in Epist. Pauli ad Gal., Patrolog. Lat., tom., CXCII, col. 160: « *But the fruit*: as if he says, these things which I have enumerated, are the works of the flesh; but those are the works of the spirit, which follow, which however he does not name *works*, but *fruits*, because the are to be sought for their own sake ». From these is confirmed the reading of the codices and edition 1: *these he does not name*, while all the other editions read *here he does not name (them)*; the Vatican text and edition 4 have *But here . . .*. Then in place of *he names*, codex D has *are named*. Afterwards the Vatican text and editions 2, 4, 7 and 9 have *therefore they also*; we have omitted *also*, at the request of the manuscripts and the other editions. Then editions 1, 3 and 8 adjoin *are to be loved*.
[6] Codices A B E and editions 2, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have *which seem* in place of *that which seems*.
[7] The Vatican text wrongly has *delectation*.
[8] The Vatican text has *that we love them . . . that we may not love*; editions 5, 8 and 9 *that we love them . . . (we) who do not love*, but rightly do the codices and other editions read *that because we love them . . . . , we ought not love*, because Master (Peter) here holds a middle position between those who deny and assert, that the virtues are to be loved for their own sake.
[9] The Vatican text alone passes over this *and*.
[10] On Christian Doctrine, Bk. I, ch. 33, n. 37; in which passage, besides the Vatican text, all other editions and codices omit *your*; but we have retained this with the original, because above in the same passage all the texts read this.
[11] Chapter 10, n. 13.
[12] Below in distinction 17. Editions 1, 3 and 8 read *afterwards* [postea] in place of *afterwards* [post].
[13] All the codices omit *one is* [est], and after this, codices A B and C, together with editions 1 and 8, do the same at *one is to use*. Then codex D reads *of the soul* [animae] in place of *of the spirit* [animi] and together with edition 1 *gifts* in place of *goods*.

S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I

Divisio libri Sententiarum et disputatio circa *frui* et *uti*.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

The Division of the Book of Sentences and The Disputation about *to enjoy* and *to use*

ARTICULUS I.

ARTICLE I

QUAESTIO 1.

QUESTION 1

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 29-32.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 29-32.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Veteris ac novae Legis continentiam etc.

While considering the contents of the Old and New Law etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

In parte ista incipit tractatus libri, qui dividitur in quatuor libros partiales. Prima pars habet duas partes. In *prima* parte venatur Magister materiam huius libri et per consequens aliorum. In *secunda* exsequitur divisionem suam, quae incipit ibi distinctione secunda:[1] *Hoc itaque vera ac pia fide* etc.

In this part of his, he begins the text [tractatus] of the Book, which is divided into four partial books. The first part has two parts. In the *first* part Master (Peter) hunts the matter of this book and consequently of the others. In the *second* he seeks out his division, which he begins there in the second distinction:[1] *And thus in this manner the true and pious faith* etc..

Item *prima* pars, in qua venatur materiam habet duas[2] partes. In prima parte venatur materiam per divisiones, et ideo *primo* ponit divisionem, per quam distinguuntur tres libri a quarto, scilicet per *res* et *signa*. *Secundo*[3] ponit divisionem, per quam distinguitur primus liber a tribus aliis, quae est per *frui* et *uti*, ibi: *Id ergo in rebus considerandum*.[4]

Likewise the *first* part, in which he hunts the matter (of the book), has two[2] parts. In the first part he hunts the matter through divisions, and for that reason he *first* posits a division, through which the three books are distinguished from the fourth, that is through *things* and *signs*. *Second*[3] he posits a division, through which the first book is distinguished from the other three, which is through *enjoying* and *using*, there (where he says): *Among things, therefore, it must be considered*.[4]

Item, *prima* pars habet tres particulas. In *prima* proponit divisionem et auctoritate

Likewise, the *first* part has three subparts. In the *first* he proposes a division and

Augustini confirmat eam, quae est, quod tota doctrina theologica est de rebus, vel de signis, id est, subiectum commune theologiae in haec duo dividitur. In *secunda* membra divisionis explanat, ibi: *Proprie autem hic res appellantur*, ostendens, quid sit res et quid signum secundum membra praedictae divisionis. In *tertia* vero particula divisionem ad propositum applicat, ibi: *Cumque his intenderit theologorum speculatio*, dicens, quod de rebus et signis sit[5] dicturus, primo tamen de rebus.

confirms it by the authority of (St.) Augustine, which is, that the whole doctrine of theology concerns things, and/or signs, that is, the common subject of theology is divided into these two. In the *second* he explains the members of the division, there (where he says): *But here (those) are properly named things*, showing, what a thing is and what a sign according to the members of the aforesaid division. But in the *third* subpart he applies the division to the proposed (subject), there (where he says): *And since . . . the speculation of theologians is intent upon these*, saying, that he is going to speak of things and signs[5], first, however, of things.

Item, pars illa, in qua ponit divisionem per *frui* et *uti*, per quam primus liber distinguitur ab aliis tribus, habet duas partes. In *prima* ponit divisionem et explanat ipsam.[6] In *secunda* quae dicta sunt epilogat, ibi: *Omnium igitur, quae dicta sunt* etc. *Prima* igitur pars habet tres partes: in prima ponit divisionem in res, quibus fruendum, et res quibus utendum: in secunda ad maiorem evidentiam assignat quasdam definitiones, ibi: *Frui autem est amore inhaerere* etc. In tertia vero proponit et determinat quasdam dubitationes, ibi: *Cum autem homines, qui fruuntur et utuntur* etc.

Likewise, that part, in which he posits a division through *enjoying* and *using*, through which the first book is distinguished from the other three, has two parts. In the *first* he posits the division and explains it.[6] In the *second* he says in addition [epilogat] what they are, there (where he says): *Of all the things, therefore, which have been said* etc.. Therefore the *first* part has three parts: in the first he posits a division among the things, which one is to enjoy, and the things which one (is) to use; in the second he assigns certain definitions for greater clarity [evidentiam], there (where he says): *Moreover to enjoy is to cleave to any thing by love* etc.. But in the third he proposes and determines certain doubts [dubitationes], there (where he says): *Moreover since men, who enjoy and use* etc..

Et in prima particula primo ponit divisionem secundum auctoritatem Augustini, secundo exemplificat, ibi: *Illae, quibus fruendum* etc.[7]

And in the first subpart he first posits a division according to the authority of (St.) Augustine, secondly he exemplifies it, there (where he says): *Those which one is to enjoy* etc..[7]

Frui autem est amore inhaerere. Haec secunda[8] particula illius partis, in qua ponit divisionem in qua distinguitur primus liber ab aliis tribus, quae est de quibusdam notificationibus, quatuor habet particulas. Primo enim ponit notificationes *frui* et *uti*; secundo applicat eas ad propositum, scilicet ad res, quibus fruendum est[9] et utendum, ibi: *Res igitur quibus fruendum*; tertio comparat ad alias assignationes, ibi: *Notandum vero, quod idem Augustinus*; quarto, quia videntur[10] sibi contradicere, movet et determinat quandam

To enjoy is to cleave . . . by love. This second[8] subpart of that part, in which he posits a division in which the first book is distinguished from the other three, which concerns certain observations [notificationes], has four subparts. For he first posits observations regarding *to enjoy* and *to use*; second he applies these to the proposed (subject), that is to the things, which one is to enjoy[9] and use, there (where he says): *The things therefore which one is to use*; third he compares it to other acceptations [assignationes], there (where

dubitationem, ibi: *Et attende quod videtur Augustinus dicere* etc.

he says): *But it must be noted, that the same (St.) Augustine*; fourth, because (these things) seem[10] to contradict themselves, he puts forward [movet] and determines a certain doubt, there (where he says): *And attend that (St.) Augustine seems to say* etc.

Cum autem homines, qui fruuntur et utuntur. Haec tertia pars, in qua movet et tractat dubitationes quasdam, habet tres partes secundum tres dubitationes, quarum[11] *prima* est, utrum homo homine debeat frui, *secunda*, utrum Deus homine fruatur, vel utatur, et hanc movet ibi: *Sed cum Deus diligat* etc.; *tertia* quaestio[12] est, utrum virtutibus sit fruendum, vel utendum, ibi: *Hic considerandum est, utrum virtutibus* etc. Et in qualibet istarum trium partium primo movet quaestionem, secundo motam determinat, tertio determinationem per auctoritatem confirmat. Et particulae in suis locis sunt manifestae.

Moreover since men, who enjoy and use. this third part, in which he puts forward and treats of certain doubts, has three pars according to the three doubts, of which[11] *the first* is, whether man [homo] ought to enjoy man, the *second*, whether God enjoys man, or uses (him), and this he puts forward there: *But since God loves* etc.; the *third* question[12] is, whether one is to enjoy virtues, or use (them), there (where he says): *Here it must be considered, whether one is to enjoy the virtues* etc.. And in any of these three parts of his he first puts forward the question, second, he determines the (question) put forward, third, he confirms the determination through authority. And the subparts have been made manifest in their own place.

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[1] Vat., post *suam* addendo *et hoc*, transponit verba *dist. 2* ante relativum *quae*; sed contra mss. et ed. 1.
[2] Vat. paulo infra, contradicentibus mss et ed. 1, tertium membrum subdivisionis adiungendo ponit hic *tres* loco *duas*; sed falso, uti ex dicendis patebit. Error editorum Vat. fore inde provenit, quod ipsi putarent, per verba immediate sequentia *In prima parte* significari primam partem subdivisionis, cum tamen revera per illa nihil aliud significetur nisi prima pars principalis, i. e. tota prima distinctio.
[3] Auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *Secundo* pro *In secunda*, postulante hac in super contextu, cum *Secundo* referatur ad *primo* paulo superius positum.
[4] Nullo adstipulante mss. nec favente ed. 1, Vat. adiungit hic *In tertia determinat dubitationes quasdam ex praemissis ortas*, ibi: *Cum autem homines, qui fruuntur* sed falso, cum haec pars sit tertia particula subdivisionis partis primae, sicuti infra expresse habetur.
[5] Contra anitquiores codd. et ed. 1 minus bene Vat. *fuerit*. Mox codd. C S cc *Iterum* pro *Item*.
[6] Fide mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *et explanat ipsam* et mox ex fere omnibus codd. cum ed. 1 post *Prima* addidimus *igitur*, pro quo codd. P et Q habet *iterum*.
[7] Ita mss. cum ed. 1; in Vat. autem subdivisio, quae incipit a verbis *Et in prima particula* usque to *Frui autem*, deest.
[8] Vat. hic interserens verbum *est*, ob variatam constructionem in fine propositionis ante *quatuor* praefixam habet particulam *et*; insuper in media propositione post *divisionem* pro *in qua* ponit *quam*, sed contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1.
[9] Fide mss. et ed. 1 addimus *est*.

[1] The Vatican text, by adding *and this* after *his division*, transposes the words *in the second distinction* before the relative *which*, but against the manuscripts and edition 1.
[2] The Vatican text a little below, contradicting the manuscripts and edition 1, by adjoining a third member of the subdivision, places *three* here in place of *two*; but falsely, as will be clear from what is to be said. The error of the editors of the Vatican text arose from this, that they thought, that by the words immediately following *In the first part* there was signified the first part of the subdivision, when, however, really there was by these nothing else to be signified except the first principle part, i. e. the whole first distinction.
[3] On the authority of the codices and edition 1 we have substituted *Second* in place of *In the second*, as demanded in the above context, since *Second* refers to *and for that reason he first* [Trans.: the initial capitals, not present in the original note seemingly by typographic lapse, are here restored in both the Latin and English text of the same].
[4] With no manuscripts supporting and without edition 1 favoring it, the Vatican text adjoins " *In the third he determines certain doubts risen from the aforesaid things, there (where he says): Moreover since all men, who enjoy*" but falsely, since this part is the third subpart of the subdivision of the first part, as is had expressly below.
[5] Against the more ancient codices and edition 1, and less well, the Vatican text has *was going to speak*. Next codices C S and cc have *Again* in place of *Likewise*.

[10] Ita plurimi codd. ut A C F G I K R T V X W Z etc. et ed. 1 necnon textus Magistri Sentent. contra VAt., quae habet *videtur*, et aliquos codd. ut H L O S, qui legunt *videtur*.
[11] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *quarum*, sicuti et paulo infra post *fruatur* substituimus *vel* pro *et*.
[12] Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit Vat. *quaestio*.

[6] Trusting the manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied *and he explains it* and next from nearly all the codices together with edition 1 we have added *Therefore* at *the first part has three parts:*, whereas codices P and Q have *Again*.
[7] Thus the manuscripts together with edition 1; But in the Vatican text the subdivision, which begins from the words *And in the first subpart* up to *But to enjoy*, is lacking.
[8] The Vatican text, inserting the word *is* here, because of the varied construction at the end of the proposition, has prefixed before *has four* the word *and (it)*; moreover in the middle of the proposition after *a division* has *through which* in place of *in which*, but the manuscripts and edition 1 contradict this.
[9] Trusting the manuscripts and edition 1 we have added *one is* [est].
[10] Thus very many of the manuscripts, as A C F G I K R T V X W Z etc. and edition 1, and also the text of Master Peter, against the Vatican text, which has *(this) would seem . . . itself*, and some of the codices as H L O S, which read *(this) seems . . . itself*.
[11] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *of which*, just as also a little below, before *uses*, we have substituted *and/or* [ve] for *and*.
[12] Not trusting in the manuscripts or edition 1, the Vatican text omits *question*.

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p. 30

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad evidentiam definitionum et aliorum, quae Magister ponit de his verbis *frui* et *uti*, sex quaeruntur in parte ista, quorum tria pertinent ad *uti*, tria ad *frui*.

De *uti* tria quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, quid sit *uti* per essentiam.
Secundo, utrum omni creato contingat uti.
Tertio, turum solo bono creato sit utendum.

De *frui* similiter quaeruntur tria.

Primo, quid sit *frui* per essentiam.
Secundo, utrum bono increato fruendum sit.
Tertio, utrum fruendum sit ipso solo bono increato.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

For the greater clarity of the definitions and other things, which Master (Peter) posits by these words *to enjoy* and *to use*, six things are asked in this part, three of which pertain to *using*, three to *enjoying*.

Concerning *to use* three things are asked.

First there is asked, what is it *to use*, essentially?
Second, whether one happens to use every created thing?
Third, whether one is to use only a created good.

Concerning *to enjoy* three things are similarly asked.

First, what is it *to enjoy*, essentially?
Second, whether one is to enjoy the uncreated Good.
Third, whether one is to enjoy only the uncreated Good Itself.

ARTICULUS I.

Quid sit uti et de utilbili.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum uti sit actus voluntatis, an rationis,

ARTICLE I

What is it "to use"? and On the usable

QUESTION 1

Whether "to use" is an act of the will, or of

vel omnis potentiae.

the reason, and/or of every power.

CIRCA PRIMUM[1] de *uti*, quid sit per essentiam, utrum sit actus voluntatis, an rationis, sic proceditur. Quod sit actus voluntatis ostenditur sic.

ABOUT THE FIRST (question)[1] concerning *to use*, what is it essentially, whether it is an act of the will, or of the reason? is thus put forward. That it is an act of the will is shown thus:

1. Ab actu utendi denominatur unusquisque bonus;[2] sed nullus dicitur bonus nisi ab actu voluntatis: ergo actus utendi pertinet ad voluntatem.

1. By an act of using every single good thing is denominated;[2] but none is called good except by an act of the will: therefore the act of using pertains to the will.

2. Item, Augustinus decimo de Trinitate:[3] « *Uti* est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis » : ergo *uti* est actus voluntatis.

2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the tenth (book) On the Trinity:[3] « *To use* is to assume something into the faculty of the will » : therefore *to use* is an act of the will.

3. Item, hoc videtur per divisionem ipsius *uti* contra alia, quia decimo de Trinitate[4] dividit Augustinus haec tria, *ingenium*, *doctrinam* et *usum*, et dicit, quod ingenium respicit, quid homo possit, doctrina, quid homo sciat, usus, quid[5] velit: ergo usus est actus voluntatis.

3. Likewise, this seems through a division of *to use* itself against the others, because in the tenth (book) On the Trinity[4] (St.) Augustine divides these three, *ingenuity*, *doctrine* and *use*, and says, that ingenuity respects, what a man can (do), doctrine, what a man knows [sciat], use, what[5] he wants: therefore use is an act of the will.

4. Item, « Opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem »;[6] sed uti et abuti sunt opposita, ergo cum abuti sit solius voluntatis, quia eius solius est peccare: ergo et *uti* similiter erit actus solius voluntatis.

4. Likewise, « There are naturally bound to be opposites about the same thing »;[6] but *to use* and *to abuse* are opposites, therefore since *to abuse* belongs to the will alone, because to it alone does "to sin" belong: therefore also will *to use* be an act of the will alone.

CONTRA: 1. Usus sive assuefactio est via in habitum acquirendum;[7] sed omnis potentia nata est acquirere habitum: ergo uti videtur esse omnis potentiae.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Use or being accustomed [assuefactio] is a way to acquire a habit;[7] but every power is naturally bound to acquire a habit: therefore *to use* seems to belong to every power.

2. Item, omnis potentia mediante operatione sua ordinatur in finem;[8] sed eo dicitur aliquid *utibile* sive *uti*, quo in finem est ordinabile; sed ordinari in finem mediante propria operatione est omnis potentiae: ergo et *uti* similiter.

2. Likewise, every power by means of its operation is ordained unto an end;[8] but for this reason it is said that anything (is) *usable* or that one *uses* it, because it is ordainable unto an end; but to be ordained unto an end by means of its own operation belongs to every power: therefore also *to use* similarly.

3. Item, sicut Augustinus dicit et habetur in littera,[9] *uti* est id quod in usum venerit referrre etc. Sed eius est referre, cuius est conferre; sed conferre est solius rationis, ergo et referre: ergo et uti a definitione.

3. Likewise, as (St.) Augustine says and as is had in the text (of Master Peter),[9] *to use* is that which comes to be referred unto use etc.. But to refer belongs to that, to which to confer belongs; but to confer belongs to the reason alone, therefore also to refer: therefore also *to use* by definition.

4. Item, ars utitur suis intrumentis;[10] sed ars

4. Likewise, art uses its own instruments;[10]

est in potentia rationali sive cognitiva, cum sit scientia: ergo cum habitus et actus sint eiusdem potentiae, si ars est in potentia rationali, et usus similiter erit in eadem.

CONCLUSIO.

"Uti" quinque modis potest intelligi: si sumitur communissime et communiter, est actus omnis potentiae; si sumiter proprie, magis proprie et propriissime, est actus voluntatis.

Respondeo:[11] Dicendum, quod *uti* quinque modis accipitur, et secundum hoc diversificatur secundum rem et secundum definitionem.

Accipitur enim usus sive uti *communissime*, secundum quod dividitur contra otium vel otiositatem, pro naturali operatione debita cuilibet rei, sive / ad quam unaquaeque res ordinatur . . .

[1] Consentientibus mss. et ed. 1, restituimus verba *Circa primum* et mox mutavimus *aut* in *an*, quod et grammatice melius est.
[2] Forsitan respicitur illud Aristot. II. Ethic. c. 3. in fine: Qui enim bene his (voluptatibus et doloribus) utetur, bonus; qui male, erit malus.
[3] Cap. 11. n. 17; vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3 in initio.
[4] Ibidem, paulo ante; et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 25.
[5] Cod. X hic iterum addit *homo*.
[6] Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis circa finem; Palam vero est, quod circa idem aut specie aut genere nata sunt fieri contraria.
[7] Idem B. Albert., S. I. tr. 2. q. 8. m. 1. his verbis exprimit: Secundo dicitur uti rei exercitium ad inducendum habitum, secundum quod dicit Victorinus in Rhetoricis suis (seu Comment. in Rhetor. Circeronis, I. c. 1-4. 25. et II. c. 59.), quod natura habilem facit, ars potentem, usus facilem. — Vide et Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1.
[8] Vide Aristot., IX Metaph. text. 16. (Ed. Paris. VIII. c. 8.). — Mox codd. C F G H K L O R S U cc et ed. 1 *utile* pro *utibile*; cod. Z *utile sive utibile quo* etc.
[9] Hic c. 2. — Faventibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, pro Vat. *ergo referre et per consequens uti*; praeferimus tamen lectionem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 tanquam distinctiorem.
[10] Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 53. (c. 3.). — Circa finem argumenti mendum Vat. ponentis *sic* pro *si* castigatur ex mss. et ed. 1. — Mox Vat. post *usus* addit *sive uti*; quod deest in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1.
[11] Plures codd. ut A I T etc. *Solutio* pro Respondeo.

but art is in the rational or cognitive power, since it is knowledge [scientia]: therefore since habit and act belong to the same power, if art is in the rational power, use will also similarly be in the same.

CONCLUSION

"To use" can be understood in five manners: if it is taken in its most common and common sense, it is an act of every power; if it is taken in its proper, more proper, and most proper sense, it is an act of the will.

I respond:[11] It must be said, that *to use* is accepted in five manners, and according to this it is diversified according to thing and according to definition.

For use or "to use" is accepted *in the most common sense* [communissime], according to which it is divided against leisure [otium] or leisure-time [otiositatem], in place of the natural operation due any thing, or / toward that which any single thing [unaquaeque res] is ordained . . .

[1] With the consent of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have restored the words *About the first (question)* and next we have changed *or* [aut] into *or* [an], which is also better grammatically [in Latin]. [Trans. Here the first refers to the items enumerated in the Treatment of Questions.]
[2] This perhaps refers to that passage of Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. II, ch. 3 at the end: For he who uses these (pleasures and sorrows) well, (is) good; he who (does so) evilly, will be evil.
[3] Chapter 11, n. 17: see above in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3 at the beginning.
[4] Ibid., a little before; and in On the City of God, Bk. XI, ch. 25.
[5] Codex X again adds here *a man*.
[6] Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. "On Opposites", near the end: But it is clear, that around either the same species or genus there are naturally bound to be contraries. [Trans.: *there are naturally bound to be*, translates nata sunt fieri, which is lit. *they are born to become*, i.e., by their nature they necessarily come into being.]
[7] The same Bl. (now St.) Albert, Summa., I tr. 2, q. 8, m. 1, expresses this with these words: Secondly *to use* is said (to be) the exercise of a thing to induce a habit, according to which Victorinus says in his Rhetorics (or Commentary on the Rhetorics of Cicero, I. chs. 1-4, 25 and II, ch. 59), that nature makes one able [habilem], art powerful, use facile. — See Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. II, ch. 1.
[8] See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. IX, text 16, (Parisian edition, Bk. VIII, ch. 8). — Next codices C F G H K L O R S U and cc and edition 1 have *utile* in place of *usable*; codex Z has *utile or usable which* etc.
[9] Here in ch. 2. — Favoring the manuscripts and

editions 1, 2, 3 and 6, we have substituted *in the text (of Master Peter)* for *below*. In the conclusion of this argument, the Vatican text has *therefore to refer and consequently to use*; we have preferred, however, the reading of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 as more distinct.

[10] Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, text 53 (ch. 3). — Near the end of the argument the mistake of the Vatican text, of placing *so* [sic] for *if* [si], is corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1. — Next the Vatican text adds *or "to use"* after *use*; which is lacking in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1.

[11] Very many of the codices, as A I T etc. have *The Solution:* in place of *I respond:*.

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p. 31

ad quam unaquaeque res ordinatur, et secundum hoc dicit Philosophus:[1] « Cuius usus bonus etc. ».

toward that which any single thing [unaquaeque res] is ordained, and according to this the Philosopher says:[1] « The use of which is good etc. ».

Secundo modo dicitur *communiter*; et sic usus dividitur contra dissuetudinem. Et hoc modo definitur a Victorino:[2] « Usus est actus frequenter elicitus a potentia », et hoc modo potest dici, quod est actus omnis potentiae nec addit super actum nisi frequentiam.

In the second manner it is said *in its common sense* [communiter]; and so use is divided against disuse [dissuetudinem]. And in this manner it is defined by Victorinus:[2] « Use is an act frequently elicited by a power », and in this manner it can be said, that it is an act of every power and that it does not add (anything) upon the act except frequency.

Tertio modo accipitur uti *proprie*; et sic dividitur contra habitus memoriae et intelligentiae, scilicet[3] contra ingenium et doctrinam. Et sic definitur ab Augustino decimo de Trinitate: « Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis», et sic dicit actum voluntatis proprie.

In the third manner "to use" is accepted *properly*; and so it is divided against the habit of memory and intelligence, that is[3] against ingenuity and doctrine. And thus it is divided by (St.) Augustine in the tenth (book) On the Trinity: « To use is to assume something into the faculty of the will », and so he calls it an act of the will in the proper sense.

Quarto modo accipitur *magis proprie*; et sic dividitur contra actum quietativum, scilicet contra *frui*. Et sic definitur ab Augustino:[4] « Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis propter aliud », et sic est actus voluntatis ut ad aliud relatae.

In the fourth manner it is accepted *in its more proper sense* [magis proprie]; and so it is divided against the quietative act, that is against *to enjoy*. And so it is defined by (St.) Augustine:[4] « To use is to assume something into the faculty of the will for the sake of another », and so it is an act of the will while (the will is) related to another.

Quinto accipitur *propriisime*; et sic dividitur contra ctum inordinatum, scilicet contra *abuti*. Et sic definitur ab Augustino de Doctrina christiana:[5] « Uti est id quod in

In the fifth it is accepted *in its most proper sense* [propriisime]; and so it is divided against the inordinate act, that is against *to abuse*. And thus it is defined by (St.)

usum venerit referre ad id, quo fruendum est », et sic uti dicit actum voluntatis relatum et ordinatum in finem.

Augustine in On Christian Doctrine:[5] « To use is to refer that which comes to be used for that, which one is to enjoy », and thus "to use" means an act of the will related and ordained unto an end.

Ratio ergo diversarum notificationum est multiplex acceptio eius quod est *uti*; et ratio multiplicis acceptionis est oppositio eius ad diversa.

Therefore the reason for the diverse observations is the multiple acceptation of what it is *to use*; and the reason for the multiple acceptation is its opposition to diverse things.

Si ergo quaeratur, cuius potentiae est[6] actus; dicendum, quod *communissime* et *communiter* loquendo, est actus omnis potentiae; et sic non loquitur Augustinus; *proprie* vero, *magis proprie* et *propriisime* actus est ipsius voluntatis.

If therefore it is asked, to which power does[6] the act belong; it must be said, that *in the most common sense* and *commonly* speaking, it is an act of every power; and (St.) Augustine does not speak in this manner; but *properly*, *in a more proper sense* and *in the most proper sense* it is an act of the will itself.

1. Et sic patet primo obiectum in contrarium, scilicet quod[7] sit omnis potentiae.

1. And so (that which is) first objected in the contrary is clear, that is, that (to use)[7] belongs to every power.

2. Quod obiicitur secundo, quod omnis potentia refertur in finem per actum suum; dicendum, quod illa potentia dicitur uti suo actu, quae est domina sui actus; et talis potentiae est *referre* suum actum, non tantum *referri*. Et quoniam sola voluntas est domina sui actus et sola est se ipsam movens, ideo ipsa sola est, cuius est active uti. Aliis autem potentiis contingit uti materialiter et passive, quia habent *referri*, et non *referre*. Et hinc est, quod ab Augustino dicitur:[8] « Uti est assumere aliquid in faculatem voluntatis »; facultas enim dicitur eius dominium, quo faciliter potest in actum suum tanquam illius princeps.

2. Because it is objected secondly, that every power is referred unto an end through its own act; it must be said, that that power is said to use its own act, which is lord of its own act; and to such a power belongs *to refer* its own act, not only *to be referred* (by its own act). And since the will alone is lord of its own act and it alone is moving itself, for that reason it is that alone, to which it belongs to use actively. But it happens that it uses the other powers materially and passively, because they have *to be referred*, and do not have to *refer*. And this is, what is said by (St.) Augustine:[8] « To use is to assume something into the faculty of the will »; for a faculty is said (to be) the dominion of that, by which it is able easily to act on its own [in actum suum] as (the latter's) prince.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rationis est referre; dicendum, quod dupliciter est referre, scilicet per *collationem* et *illationem*, sicut praemissae referuntur ad conclusionem; et hoc est rationis, et hoc non est *uti*. Et est referre per[9] *inclinationem* et ordinationem ad aliud; et hoc est proprie voluntatis, quia potest aliquid assumere

3. To that which is objected, that *to refer* belongs to reason; it must be said, that "to refer" is twofold, that is through *collation* and *illation*, just as premises are referred to a conclusion; and this belongs to reason, and this is not "to use". And (this) is "to refer" through[9] *inclination* and ordination to another; and this properly belongs to the

quiescendo ibi, vel aliud intendendo; et hoc est referre,[10] per quod definitur *uti* etc.

will, because it can assume anything by resting there, and/or by intending it; and this is the "to refer",[10] through which "to use" is defined etc..

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de arte, dicendum, quod ars dicit quod est *operationis*, et quod est *speculationis*. Secundum quod dicit[11] quod est *speculationis*, non habet *uti*, et sic est rationis; secundum vero quod dicit quod est *operationis*, sic extenditur ad voluntatem et eam regulat in utendo.

4. To that which is objected concerning art, it must be said, that art means what belongs to *operation*, and what belongs to *speculation*. According to which it means[11] what belongs to *speculation*, it does not have *to use*, and thus belongs to reason; but according to which it means what belongs to *operation*, thus it is extended to the will and regulates it in using.

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[1] Sententia: Cuius bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est, verbotenus legitur apud Boethium, de Differentiis topicis, libr. II. circa medium, in quo libro auctor proponit locorum topicorum divisiones, quae ex una parte, duce Aristotele, a Themistio, et ex altera parte a Cicerone exhibentur, earumque differentias indicat.
[2] Fabius Marius (Laurentius) Victorinus, Rhetor. († inter 370-382), qui praeter opuscula theologica contra Arianos varios confecit libros philosophicos et rhetoricos; sic transtulit Porphyrii librum de Praedicabilibus in linguam latinam (cfr. Boeth., Dialogus I. in Porphyrium) scripsitque commentarium in Rhetorica et Topica Ciceronis (cfr. Boeth. Comment. in Topica Ciceronis; et ed. Operum Cicernois per Orelli, ubi Victorini Comment. in Rhetor. invenitur). Licet definitio *usus*, de quo hic agitur, explicite non inveniatur in praenotatis Victorini operibus, colligi tamen posse videtur ex supra (argum. 1 ad opp.) allatis eius verbis una cum hac *exercitationis* definitione, quam in Comment. super I. Rhetor. Ciceronis, c. 2. proponit: Exercitatio est suscepti operis continuatio. Cfr. et ibid. c. 25., ubi de definitione *habitus* agitur, in qua ponitur *usus* sive *exercitatio*.
[3] Perturbatam lectionem Vat. *et* pro *scilicet* emendavimus ope mss. et sex primarum edd. Vide etiam supra fundam. 3, sicuti et de sequenti definitione ab Augustino data cfr. fundam. 2.
[4] Vide hic lit. Magistri c. 3. in princ. — In fine propositionis Vat. male et contra mss. et ed. 1 *relative* pro *relatae*.
[5] Vide supra in lit. Magistri c. 2, in quo textu codd. A F G H I K S X Y etc. sibi non constantes habent *venit* pro *venerit*.
[6] Codd. S Y Z satis bene *sit*. Mox Vat., reluctatntibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, post *quod* addit *duobus primis modis est actus omnis potentiae, tribus vero ultimis est actus ipsius voluntatis*; sed superflue, quia verbis immediate sequentibus idem dicitur. Dein multi codd. ut C F K L M O R S U V W X Y Z etc. cum edd. 2 et 3 post *communissime*, omissis verbis *et communiter*, transponunt ea post *Augustinus* simulque omittunt *et propriisime*, sic legendo: *Communiter vero et proprie actus est ipsius*

[1] The sentence: Of which (the use) is good, is also itself good, is found in Boethius, On Different Topics, Bk. II, about the middle, in which book the author proposes the divisions of the places of the topics, which are arranged on one side, by Themistius, following Aristotle, and on the other by Cicero, and indicates their differences.
[2] Fabius Marius (Laurentius) Victorinus, Rhetorics (&crux; between 370-382), who besides his lesser theological works against the Arians, composed various philosophical and rhetorical books; thus he translated Porphyry's book On Predicaments into Latin (cf. Boethius, Against Porphyry, Dialogue I) and he wrote a commentary on the Rhetorics and Topics of Cicero (cf. Boethius, Commentary on the Topics of Cicero; and the edition of the Works of Cicero, by Orelli, where Victorinus' Commentary on the Rhetorics is found). Though the definition of *use*, which is dealt with here, is not explicitly found in the aforenoted works of Victorinus, however it seems that it can be gathered from the above (in the argument in reply to obj. 1) mentioned words of his under the definition of *exercise* [exercitationis], which he proposes in the Commentary on the Rhetorics of Cicero, ch. 2: Exercise is the continuation of a work undertaken. Cf. also ibid., ch. 25, where the definition of habit is dealt with, in which *use* is employed for *exercise*.
[3] The confused reading of the Vatican text, which has *and* [et] in place of *that is* [scilicet], we have emended with the help of the manuscripts and six of the first editions. See also above in n. 3, and likewise for the definition given by (St.) Augustine which follows, cf. n. 2.
[4] See the text of Master (Peter) here at the beginning of ch. 3. — At the end of the proposition the Vatican text, badly and against the manuscripts and edition 1, has *in a relative manner* [relative] for *related* [relatae].
[5] See above in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2, in which codices A F G H I K S X Y etc., disagreeing with themselves, have *comes* [venit] in place of *comes* [venerit].
[6] Codices S Y and Z has the subjunctive sit instead of the indicative. Next the Vatican text, disagreeing

voluntatis; quae lectio praecedentibus manifeste contradicit. Codd. D P Q T post *propriisime* addunt *loquendo, id est tribus ultimis modis*.
[7] Supple cum cod. bb *uti*; Vat. autem praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit *uti communissime sumtum*, qua additione non quidem falsus, sed alius sensus obtinetur; in lectione siquidem mss. a S. Doctore hic non datur explicita responsio ad primo obiectum, sed breviter repetitur ipsa obiectio; e contra est in lectione Vat.
[8] Postulante maiore parte codd. F G H I R S T etc. et ed. 1, posuimus modum passivum pro activo *Augustinus dicit*.
[9] Cod. D *secundum*.
[10] Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc addit *quo vel*, quod tamen abest ab antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1.
[11] Ed. 1 hic et paulo infra *illud* loco *quod dicit*.

with the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, adds after *that* the phrase: *in the first two manners it is an act of every power, but in the last three it is an act of the will itself*; but superfluously, because by the immediately following words the same is said. Then many codices, as C F K L M O R S U V W X Y Z etc. together with editions 2 and 3, by omitting the words *and commonly* after *in the most common sense*, transpose them after *(St.) Augustine*, and at the same time omit *and in the most proper sense*, by reading: *But commonly and properly it is an act of the will itself*; which reading manifestly contradicts the preceding. Codices D P Q and T, after *in the most proper sense*, add *speaking . . . .in the most proper sense, that is in the last three manners*.
[7] Supply with codex bb *to use*; But the Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, adds here *to use, taken in the most common sense,* by which addition it obtains another, but not false, sense; indeed in the text of the manuscripts there is given, by the Seraphic Doctor, no explicit response to the first objection, but the objection is only briefly repeated; on the other hand in the Vatican text there is.
[8] As demanded by the majority of the codices F G H I R S T etc. and edition 1, we have replaced the active voice, *(St.) Augustine says* with the passive.
[9] Codex D has *according to*.
[10] The Vatican text, together with the more recent codex cc, adds *by which . . . is also*, which however is absent from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1.
[11] Edition 1, here and a little below, has *to that* in place of *to which it means*.

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p. 32

SCHOLION.

In hac quaestione antiqui scholastici satis consentiunt. Scot., I. Sent. d. 1. q. 3 et 5. in fine. — S. Thom., hic. q. 1; S. I. II. q. 16. a. 1. — B. Albert. M., hjic a. 13. 16. et 17. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1, qui doctrinam S. Bonavent. breviter repetit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic a. 1. principalis q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 8. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1.

SCHOLIUM

In this question the ancient scholastics sufficiently agree. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, q. 3 and 5, in fine. — St Thomas, here at q. 1; Summa., I. II., q. 16, a. 1. — Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, here at a. 13, 16, and 17. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 1, a. 1, who briefly repeats the doctrine of St. Bonaventure. — Richard of Middletown, here at a. 1. a. 1. — Giles. R., here at a. 1, principally q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa. a. 8. q. 1. — Durandus, here at q. 3. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here at q. 1. — (Gabriel) Biel, here at q. 1.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

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COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

ARTICULUS I.

QUAESTIO 2.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 32-33.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK I

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

ARTICLE I

QUESTION 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 32-33.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum omni creato utendum sit.

Secundo, viso quid sit uti per essentiam, quaeritur de utibili, utrum scilicet omni creato sit utendum. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.

1. Proverbiorum decimo sexto:[1] *Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Deus*: ergo omnia sunt ordinabilia in Deum: sed omne ordinabile in Deum contingit ordinare; sed ordinando ad Deum ordinabile recte utimur: ergo si omnia contingit ordinare, omnibus est utendum.

2. Item, ens et bonum convertuntur, sicut vult Dionysius;[2] sed omnia sunt entia: ergo omnia sunt bona. Sed omne bonum diligendum: ergo omne creatum est diligendum; sed non est diligendum propter se: ergo propter aliud; sed hoc est uti: ergo uti contingit omni creato.

QUESTION 2

Whether one is to use every created thing

Second, having seen what essentially "to use" is, (the second question) is asked concerning the usable, that is, whether one is to use every created thing. And that (this is) so, seems in this manner.

1. In the sixteenth (chapter) of Proverbs:[1] *All things* [universa] *for His own sake hath God worked*: therefore all things [omnia] are ordainable unto God: but it is fitting that one ordain every ordainable unto God; but by ordaining the ordainable towards God we use (it) in a upright manner: therefore, if it is fitting that one ordain all things [omnia], one is to use all things.

2. Likewise, 'being' [ens] and the good are convertible [convertuntur], as Dionysius maintains [vult];[2] but all things are beings: therefore all are good. But every good (is) to be loved: therefore every created (thing) is to be loved; but it is not to be loved for its own sake: therefore for the sake of another; but this is (what it means) "to use": therefore it is fitting that one use every created (thing).

3. Item, omni virtute contingit recte uti:[3] ergo opus omnis virtus est rectus usus; sed usus *alicuius* virtutis est respectu mali *poenae*, ut patientiae, *alicuius* respectu mali *culpae*, ut poenitentiae: ergo malis omnibus, scilicet culpae et ponae, contingit recte uti: ergo multo fortius bonis: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, it happens that one uses every virtue in an upright manner:[3] therefore the work of every virtue is an upright use; but the use of *any* virtue, in respect to the evil of *punishment*, is as patience, of *any* (virtue), in respect to the evil of *fault*, as penance [poenitentiam]: therefore it is fitting that one use all evils, that is, of fault and punishment, in an upright manner: therefore much more strongly (all) goods: ergo etc.

4. Item, « Opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem »;[4] sed omnibus contingit abuti: ergo omnibus contingit recte uti: ergo utendum est omni creato.

4. Likewise, « Opposites are naturally bound to be about the same thing »;[4] but it happens that one abuses all things: therefore it happens that one uses all things in an upright manner: therefore one is to use every created (thing).

Contra: 1. Caritas est, per quam recte utimur, quia omnia ordinantur in finem per caritatem quaecumque recte ordinantur; sed sicut dicit Augustinus de Doctrina christiana:[5] « Tantum quatuor diligenda sunt ex caritate et tria tantum creata, ut nos, proximus et corpus proprium »: ergo tantum tria referuntur sive ordinantur in finem per caritatem, cum non sit uti recte nisi per caritatem: ergo tantum tribus est utendum, non ergo omni creato.

On the contrary: 1. Charity is (that), through which we use (a thing) in an upright manner, because all things are ordained unto an end through charity, whatever is in an upright manner ordained; but as (St.) Augustine says On Christian Doctrine:[5] « Only four things are to be loved out of charity and only three (are) created, that is [ut] we, our neighbor and our own body »: therefore only three are referred or ordained unto (their) end through charity, since one does not use in an upright manner except through charity: therefore one is to use only three (things), therefore not every created (thing).

2. Item, omnia, quibus utimur, subiacent nostrae voluntati; sed quaedam sunt, quae non subiacent nostrae voluntati, ut necessaria et perpetua: ergo illis non est utendum.

2. Likewise, all the things, which we use, are subject [subiacent] to our will; but there are certain (things), which are not subject to our will, (such) as necessaries and perpetuals: therefore one is not to use these.

3. Item, omne illud, quo recte utimur, bono fine facimus; sed quaedam sunt, quae nullo bono fine possunt fieri, ut mentiri et talia, « quae mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo »:[6] ergo talibus non est utendum.

3. Likewise, all that, which we use in an upright manner, we do for a good end; but there are certain (things), which can be done for no good end, as lying and the such, « which as soon as named are conjoined with evil »:[6] therefore one is not to use such things.

4. Item, virtute non contingit male ut, sicut patet ex eius definitione:[7] ergo ab oppositis malo culpae sive vitiis non contingit recte uti: ergo non omnibus aliis a Deo est utendum.

4. Likewise, by virtue it does not happen that one uses in an evil manner [male], as is clear from its definition:[7] therefore contrariwise [ab oppositis] it does not happen that one uses the evil of fault or of vices in an upright manner: therefore one is not use all the other (things) from God.

CONCLUSIO.

CONCLUSION

Non omni re creata possumus uti ut intrumento neque ut habitu neque ut actu, omni tamen re uti possumus ut obiecto, sed quadrupliciter, vel operando, vel acceptando, vel tolerando, vel respuendo.

We can not use every thing as an instrument nor as a habit nor as an act, however we can use every thing as an object, but in a fourfold manner, by working, and/or accepting, and/or tolerating, and/or rejecting [respuendo]

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod *uti aliquo* dicitur quatuor modis: aut sicut *instrumento*, quo operamur, sicut aliquis utitur[8] instrumento vel organo; et sic non omnibus contingit uti, utpote potentiis, quae sunt pure naturales, accipiendo *uti* proprie, sicut accipit Augustinus;[9] aut sicut *habitu*, quo regulamur, utpote virtute; et sic non omnibus contingit recte uti, ut habitu vitii, quo potius contingit obliquari; aut sicut *actu*, quo movemur; et sic non omni actu contingit bene[10] uti, sicut illis / quae mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo; . . . .

I **RESPOND:** It must be said, that *to use anything* is said in four senses: either as an *instrument*, by which we work, as someone uses[8] an instrument or organ; and so it does not happen that one uses all (things), insofar as [utpote] (they are) powers, which are purely natural, when accepting *to use* in the proper sense, as (St.) Augustine accepts it;[9] or as a *habit*, by which we are regulated, insofar as (it is) a virtue; and thus it happens that one does not use all (things) in an upright manner, (such) as a vicious habit, by which it happens that one is rather turned aside; or as an *act*, by which we are moved; and so it happens that one does not use every act well,[10] like [sicut] those (things) / which as soon as named are conjoined with evil; . . .

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[1] Vers. 4, ubi Vulgata pro *Deus* legit *Dominus*. — Mox et pluries in seqq. argg. posuimus *contingit* loco *convenit*. Notamus hic et pro semper, quod codd. praesertim antiquiores saepissime ista duo vocabula eodem modo exhibeant abbreviata, ita ut sive *contingit* sive *convenit* legi possit. [Trans.: Utrum ista interpretatio possit decus argumentibus, agendum est de hac quaestione. Quod non videtur sic: In fundam. 1. opportet esse necessitas, ut argumentum moveatur de ordinabilibus ad utenda; sed si legitur *ordinabile in Deum contingit ordinare* loco *ordinabile in Deum convenit ordinare*, non esset necessitas, sed contingentia; ergo non opporteat legi *contingit* in omne loco ubi *convenit* legi possit. Et sic interpretatum est. Cfr. etiam p. 38 editionis cuius Sent. I d. 1 a. 3 q. 1, nota 1]

[2] Cap. 5. de Div. Nom., ubi secundum textum Graecum legitur: Non aliud dicit esse bonum et aliud ens. — Mox cod. cc *sed si omnia*.

[3] Elicitur ex definitione virtutis, quam August., II. de Lib Arb. c. 18. et 19. ponit: Bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur et nemo male utitur. — Mox multi codd, ut C G H K O P Q R S U etc. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 post *poenae* omittunt *ut patientiae*, quod tamen codd. praedicit postea male loco *ut poenitentiae* ponunt, editiones autem praeallegatae verbis *ut poenitentiae* praemittunt.

[4] Aristot., de Praedicam. ch. de Oppositis circa finem. Vide supra q. 1. fundam. 4.

[5] Lib. I. ch. 23. n. 22: Cum ergo quatuor sint diligenda: unum, quod supra est; alterum, quod nos sumus; tertium, quod iuxta nos est; quartum, quod infra nos est: de secundo et quarto nulla praecepta danda erant. — Et ibidem c. 26. n. 27: Quod si te

[1] Verse 4, where the Vulgate reads *the Lord* instead of *God*. — Next we have also very often in the following arguments placed *it happens that* [contingit] in place of *it is fitting that* [convenit]. We note here and throughout this work, that the codices, especially the more ancient ones, very often exhibit those two words in the same abbreviated manner, so that either *it happens* or *it is fitting* can be read. [Trans.: Whether that interpretation befits the arguments, must be dealt with. That it does not seem so: In the fundamental n. 1, it is proper that there be a necessity, to move the argument from the ordainable to that which is to be used; but if one reads *it happens that one ordains every ordainable unto God* instead of *it is fitting that one ordain every ordainable unto God* there would be no necessity, but only contingency; therefore it is not proper to read *it happens that* in every place where *it is fitting that* can likewise be read. And in this manner the translation proceeds. Cf. also here Sent., I, d.1, a. 3, q. 1, footnote 1]

[2] On the Divine Names, ch. 5, where according to the Greek text there is read: One does not say that one thing is good and another is a being. — Then codex cc reads *but if all things*.

[3] This is drawn from the definition of virtue, which (St.) Augustine posits in On Free Will, Bk. II, ch. 18 and 19: A good quality of mind, by which one lives in an upright manner and no one uses in an evil manner. — Then many codices, as C G H K O P Q R S U etc. and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 omit *as patience* after *of punishment*, which however the aforesaid codices afterwards badly replace with *as penance*; but the cited editions preface these words with *as*

totum intelligas, id est animum et corpus tuum et proximum tuum, id est animum et corpus eius. — Cod. W post *caritate* addit *scilicet Deus*. — Paulo ante fide codd. et ed. 1 addidimus *sicut*.

[6] Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6: Quaedam enim confestim nominata convoluta sunt cum malitia. (Translatio antiqua in ed. Operum S. Thomae a P. Fiaccadori 1866. tom. 21.)

[7] August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. et 19. n. 50. Vide paulo supra fundam. 3.

[8] Substituimus ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 *aliquis utitur* pro *utimur*. Cod. V *sicut aliquo utimur*. Mox ex plurimus codd. cum ed. 1 bis substituimus *utpote* loco *ut puta*.

[9] Quatenus *uti* est assumere aliquid in faculatem voluntatis. Vid. supra q. 1. Cfr. etiam Aristot., I. Ethic. c. ult., ubi agit de potentiis, quae non subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis.

[10] Vat. cum cod. cc male omittit *bene*, quod antiquiores mss. ac ed. 1 suppeditant, mutavimusque *convenit* in *contingit*.

penance.

[4] Aristotle, On the Predicamentals, ch. "On the Opposites about an end". See above, q. 1, fundament n. 4.

[5] Book I, ch. 23, n. 22: Therefore since there are four things to be loved: one, which is above; another, which we are; the third, which is next to us; the fourth, which is beneath us: of the second and the forth no precept is to be given. — And ibid., ch. 26, n. 27: Which if you understand the whole, that is your spirit and body and your neighbor, that is his spirit and body. — Codex W adds *namely God* after *out of charity*. — A little before on the testimony of the codices and edition 1, we have added *as*.

[6] Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. II, ch. 6: For certain (things) immediately as (they are) named are entwined with wickedness. (Ancient Translation in the edition of the Works of St. Thomas, by Fr. Fiaccadori, 1866, tom. 21)

[7] (St.) Augustine, On Free Will, Bk. II, ch. 18 and 19, n. 50. See a little above in fundament n.3.

[8] We have substituted from nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 *anyone uses* in place of *we use*. Codex V reads *as we use something*. Next from very many codices, together with edition 1, we have twice substituted *insofar as* [utpote] in place of considered as [ut puta].

[9] To the extend that "to use" is to assume something into the faculty of the will. See above, q. 1. Cf also Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, last chapter, where he deals with the powers, which are not subject to the imperium of the reason or of the will.

[10] The Vatican text, together with codex cc, badly omits *well*, which the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 have, and we have changed *it is fitting* into *it happens*.

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p. 33

quae mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo; aut sicut *obiecto*, ad quod inclinamur; et sic omnibus contingit *uti* et *abuti*. Omnia enim possunt sumi in facultatem voluntatis ad approbandum vel respuendum; et hoc patet per Augustinum libro octoginta trium Questionum:[1] « Utimur assumendis vel respuendis ad valetudinem, tolerandis ad patientiam, ordinandis ad iustitiam ».

which as soon as named are conjoined with evil; or as an *object*, toward which we are inclined; and so it happens that one *uses* and *abuses* all (things). For all (things) can be taken into the faculty of the will to be approved and/or rejected; and this is clear through (St.) Augustine, in the eightieth book of the Three Questions:[1] « We use by assuming and/or rejecting (a thing) according to (its) value [valetudinem], tolerating (it) according to (our) patience, ordaining (it) to justice ».

Item, Augustinus decimo de Trinitate:[2] « Voluntas totam intelligentiam capit, dum utor omni eo quod intelligo »; sed mala intelliguntur: ergo contingit uti malis.

Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the tenth (book) On the Trinity:[2] « My will seizes my whole intelligence, while I am using every thing [omni eo] that I understand »; but evils are understood: therefore it happens that one uses evils.

Aliter tamen utimur bonis, aliter malis. Ratio enim ordinationis in bonis non tantum est ex parte ordinantis, sed etiam ex parte ordinati, quia per se bona sunt utibilia et ordinabilia, et de sui natura; sed in malis ratio ordinationis non est ex parte ordinatorum, sed potius ex parte ordinantis; et ideo mala non dicuntur utibilia.

In one manner, however, we use goods, in another evils. For among goods the reason for being ordained [ordinatio] is not only on the part of the one ordaining, but also on the part of the one ordained, because good things are per se useable and ordainable, and (this they are) from their own nature; but among evils the reason for being ordained is not on the part of the (things) ordained, but rather on the part of the one ordaining; and for that reason evils are not called usables.

Unde nota, quod, cum uti sit assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, hoc potest esse quadrupliciter: vel in facultatem voluntatis *operantis*,[3] sicut est de his quae proprie pertinent ad usum humanum; vel in faculatem voluntatis *acceptantis*, sicut est dilectio proximi et huiusmodi; vel in faculatem voluntatis *tolerantis*, sicut sunt mala poenae; vel in facultatem voluntatis *respuentis*, et sic assumuntur mala culpae et ordinantur. Primis duobus modis intelligitur illud: « Cuius usus bonus etc. ».

Whence note, that, since "to use" is to assume something into the faculty of the will, this can be in a fourfold manner: into the faculty of the *working* will,[3] as concerns those (things) which properly pertain to human use; and/or into the faculty of the *accepting* will, as is love [dilectio] of (one's) neighbor and (things) of this kind [huiusmodi]; and/or into the faculty of the *tolerating* will, as are the evils of punishment; and/or into the faculty of the *rejecting* will, and thus the evils of fault are assumed and ordained. In the first two manners is understood that (which is said): « The use of which is good etc. ».

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de caritate, quod tantum tria creata[4] sunt diligenda; dicendum, quod *diligi aliquid ex caritate* hoc est ordinari in summum bonum, quod per se caritas diligit. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter: aut enim contingit ordinare quod natus est devenire in finem; et sic tantum tria creata diligenda sunt ex caritate; aut illud per quod devenire est in summum bonum; et quia hoc potest esse suo modo per omnem creaturam, omnis creatura potest diligi ex caritate, et omni creatura contingit uti.

1. Therefore, to that which is objected concerning charity, that only three created (things)[4] are to be loved; it must be said, that *that something be loved out of charity* this is (for it) to be ordained unto the most high Good, which charity loves per se. Moreover this happens in two manners: for either it happens that one ordains that which is naturally bound to arrive at (its) end; and thus only three created (things) are to be loved out of charity; or (one ordains) that through which one is to arrive at the most high Good; and because this can be through every creature in its own manner, every creature can be loved out of charity, and it happens that one uses every creature.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non omnia subiacent voluntati; dicendum, quod aliquid[5] dicitur subesse dominio voluntatis dupliciter: aut quantum ad *esse ipsius rei*; et sic non omnia subiacent; aut quantum ad *actum voluntatis*, qui est in respuendo

2. To that which is objected, that not all (things) are subject to the will, it must be said, that something[5] is said to be subject to the dominion of the will in a twofold manner: either as much as regards the *being of the thing itself* [esse ipsius rei]; and

ipsam rem vel approbando, et hoc[6] propter se vel propter aliud; et tali modo omnia subiacent voluntati nostrae, scilicet quantum ad actum appetitionis vel respuitionis, licet non primo modo.

thus all (things) are not subject; or as much as regards the *act of the will*, which is in rejecting and/or approving the thing itself, and this[6] for its own sake and/or for the sake of another; and in such a manner all (things) are subject to our will, that is as much as regards the act of desiring [appetitionis] and/or rejecting, though not in the first manner.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaedam nullo bono fine possunt fieri, *similiter*, quod semper vitiis abutimur; dicendum, quod obiicitur secundum viam, qua contingit uti aliquo ut *actu* medio; et sic non contingit[7] uti peccato; vel sicut *habitu* regulante, similiter; contingit tamen eo uti sicut *obiecto* recte per motum contritionis et detestationis.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that certain (things) can be done for no good end, *similarly*, that we always abuse vices; it must be said, that (this) is objected according to the way, by which it happens that one use something as a middle *act*; and so it happens[7] that one uses sin; and/or as a regulating *habit*, similarly; however it does happen that one uses (sin) in an upright manner as an *object*, through a movement of contrition and detestation.

SCHOLION.

I. Hanc et sequentem quaestionem antiqui doctores sub una questione et minus accurate tractare solent. — Ostensum iam supra est, quod *uti* in sensu *activo* sit solius voluntatis; in secunda hac quaestione inquiritur, ad quae *obiecta* se extendat usus voluntatis, sive quibus rebus uti *passive* conveniat. In responsione S. Doctor *primo* ponit quadruplicem distinctionem circa *obiecta* voluntatis *ordinanda* et resolvit quaestionem in *genere*. Quoad primum membrum huius distinctionis, patet quod voluntas non possit omnia assumere in facultatem suam, ut iis utatur sicut instrumento. Nam aliquae potentiae ipsius animae non subiacent imperio voluntatis; unde vocantur *pure naturales*, ut potentiae vegetativae. *Secundo*, incidendo in *specialem* quaestionem, scil. quo sensu quis malis uti possit, iterum quadrupliciter distinguit modum voluntatis *ordinantis*, scil. *operantis*, *acceptantis*, *tolerantis* et *respuentis*. Hic usus mali ex parte ordinantis est « usus per accidens », uti bene dicit Richard. (hic q. 2. ad ult.), « eo quod ordinatum aliunde accipit ordinabilitatem, scil. a voluntate ». — Circa hanc quaestionem de usu mali S. Thom. (hic loc. cit.) aliis verbis quam S. Bonaventura loquitur, sed in sententia nulla est differentia, immo in S. II. II. q. 78. a. 4.

SCHOLIUM

I. This and the following question the ancient doctors are accustomed to treat under one question and less accurately. — It has already been shown above, that *to use* in the *active* sense belongs to the will alone; in this second question there is inquired, to what *objects* does the use of the will extend itself, or which things it is suitable to use *passively*. In response the Seraphic Doctor *first* posits a fourfold distinction about the *objects* of the will to be ordained and resolves the question according to *genus*. As regards the first member of this distinction, it is clear that the will cannot assume all things into its faculty, to use them as an instrument. For some powers of the soul itself are not subject to the empire of the will; whence they are called *purely natural*, as the vegetative powers (are). *Second*, by discussing a *special* question, that is, in what sense one can use evils, he again distinguishes a fourfold manner of the ordaining will, that is, *working*, *accepting*, *tolerating*, *rejecting*. This use of evil on the part of the one ordaining is a « use per accidens », as Richard (of Middletown) well says (here in q. 2 at the end),) « for that which has been ordained to another accepts ordinability, that is, from the will ». — About this question concerning the use of evil, St. Thomas (loc. cit. at this question) speaks in

Angelicus etiam in modo loquendi cum illo convenit.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 3. et 5. et Quodlib., q. 17. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 16. a. 3. — B. Albert. M., hic a. 10 et 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. ita presse sequitur S. Doctorem, ut Dionys. Carth. de ipso dicat: « Petrus, qui scripsit post Bonaventuram, ex ipso Bonaventura suam responsionem videtur sumsisse ». — Richard., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 72. q. 3. n. 11. — Durand., hic. q. 4. — Dionys., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.

different words than St. Bonaventure, but there is no difference in opinion [sententia], indeed in Summa., II. II., q. 78. a. 4, the Angelic (Doctor) agrees also with him in (his) manner of speaking.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. III., q. 61, m. 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here at q. 3 and 5, and in the Quodlib., q. 17. — St. Thomas, here at q. 2, a. 3; Summa., I. II., q. 16, a. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, here at a. 10 and 11. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 1, a. 2. so closely follows the Seraphic Doctor, that (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian says of him: « Peter, who wrote after Bonaventure, seems to have taken his response from Bonaventure himself ». — Richard of Middletown, here at a. 1. q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here at 2, the beginning of q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 72, q. 3, n. 11. — Durandus, here at q. 4. — (Bl.) Denis (the Carthusian), here at q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel, here at q. 1.

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[1] Quaest. 30: Sic enim utitur suo corpore: quibusdam assumendis vel respuendis ad valitudinem, quibusdam tolerandis ad patientiam, quibusdam ordinandis ad iustititam, quibusdam considerandis ad aliquod veritatis documentum. — In quo textu plurimi codd. ut A B C D F G H I K S T W Z etc. omittunt *assumendis vel*, pro quo ed. 1 ponit *conferendis aut*.
[2] Cap. 11. n. 18: Voluntas etiam mea totam intelligentiam, *totam memoriam meam* capit, dum toto utor, quod intelligo *et memini*.
[3] Renitentibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 Vat. pro *operantis* ponit *imperantis*, sed mendose, quia hoc membrum non excludit alia membra divisionis. Eamdem distinctionem Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. breviter sic proponit: Potest aliquid assumi in facultatem voluntatis quadrupliciter: vel voluntatis operantis, ut bona nostra, vel approbantis, ut aliena bona, vel tolerantis, ut mala poenae propria et culpae alienae, vel respuentis, ut mala culpae propriae.
[4] Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *creata*, quod, ut certo subintelligendum, claritatis gratia retinuimus, praesertim cum et paulo post in mss. inveniatur. Mox Vat., post *caritate* omisso *hoc*, propositionem ipsam exhibet modo activo: *diligere, aliquid ex caritate est ordinare*, renitentibus tamen mss. et ed. 1. — Obiectionem, quam hic S. Doctor solvit, infra d. 17. p. 1. q. 2. sub alio respectu pertractat.
[5] Nullo sufffragante ms. nec ed. 1, Vat. *aliquis*.
[6] Cod. Z hic non male addit *vel*.
[7] Postulantibus fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *sic* pro *hoc modo*, et bis *contingit* loco *convenit*. Mox mendum Vat. *recto per modum* castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.

[1] Question 30: For thus does one use one's own body: assuming and/or rejecting certain things for (their) value [valitudinem], tolerating certain things according to (one's) patience, ordaining certain things to justice, considering certain things according to some pattern [documentum] of truth. — In which text very many codices, as A B C D F G H I K S T W Z etc. omit *assuming and/or*, in place of which edition 1 has *conferring or*.
[2] Chapter 11, n. 18: My will also seizes my whole intelligence, *my whole memory*, while I wholly use, what I understand *and remember*.
[3] Opposing the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, the Vatican text puts *of the commanding* in place of *of the working*, but faultily, because this member does not exclude the other members of the division. The same distinction Peter of Tarentaise thus briefly proposes here at q. 1, a. 2: One can assume something into the faculty of the will in a fourfold manner: of the working will, as our goods, and/or of the approving (will), as another's goods, and/or of the tolerating (will), as the evils of one's own [*propria* read as *propriae*] punishment and another's fault, and/or of the rejecting (will), as the evils of one's own fault.
[4] The codices together with edition 1 omit *created things* [creata], which, as certainly must be understood, we have retained for the sake of clarity, especially when it is also found a little later in the manuscripts. Next the Vatican text, after *out of charity*, having omitted *this*, exhibits that proposition in the active voice: *to love, is to ordain something out of charity*, however in opposition to the manuscripts and edition 1. The objection, which the Seraphic Doctor here solves, he treats in another respect below in d. 17, p. I., q. 2.
[5] With no supporting manuscript nor edition 1, the

Vatican text reads *someone*.
[6] Codex Z adds not badly here vel [Trans.: which does not alter the translation].
[7] As demanded by nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *in this manner* [hoc modo] with *thus* [sic], and twice *it happens* in place of *it is fitting*. Then we have corrected the fault of the Vatican text, *as an upright object through a movement* on the basis of the manuscripts and edition 1.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

ARTICULUS I.

QUAESTIO 3.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 34-35.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

QUAESTIO III.

Utrum solo bono creato utendum sit.

Tertio, ostenso, utrum omni creato sit utendum et[1] omni alio a Deo, est quaestio, utrum solo bono creato sit utendum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. « Omne bonum aut est finis, aut ad finem »;[2] sed solo bono, quod est ad finem, est

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK I

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

ARTICLE I

QUESTION 3

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 34-35.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUESTION 3

Whether one is to use only the created good.

Third, having shown, whether one is to use every thing created and[1] everything else (that is) from God, there is the question, whether one is to use only the created good. And it seems that (this is) so.

1. « Every good either is an end, or for an end [ad finem] »;[2] but one is to use only the

utendum, quia ratio utilis est ducere in finem: ergo cum solum bonum creatum sit ad finem, solo bono creato est utendum.

good, which is for an end, because the reason for use [ratio utilis] is to lead unto an end: therefore since the created good alone is for an end, one is to use only the created good.

2. Item, omne bonum aut est creatum, aut increatum. Sed si contingit uti bono increato, contingit illud referre ad aliud: aut ergo ad creatum, aut[3] increatum; sed non ad increatum, quia non est nisi unum increatum: ergo ad creatum. Sed sic refertur terminus ad viam et causa ad effectum; sed hoc est abusio, non usus: ergo solo bono creato sive creatura est utendum.

2. Likewise, every good either has been created, or is uncreated. But if it happens that one use the uncreated Good, it happens that one refers it to another: therefore either to a created thing, or[3] an uncreated one; but not to an uncreated, because there is naught but one uncreated thing. But thus is the terminus referred to the way and the cause to the effect; but this is an abuse, not a use; therefore one is to use the created good or creature alone.

3. Item, Augustinus in libro octoginta trium Questionum[4] dividit honestum contra utile: ergo nullum utile honestum vel e converso; sed Deus est honestum per essentiam: ergo Deo non est utendum.

3. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the eightieth book On The Three Questions[4] divides the honest against the useful: therefore no useful is honest and/or vice-versa; but God is essentially honest: therefore one is not to use God.

4. Item, videtur quod non solum non sit utendum Deo sive bono increato, sed uti eo semper sit peccatum mortale, quia Augustinus in libro octoginta trium Questionum[5] dicit: « Summa perversitas est frui utendis et uti fruendis »; sed qui utitur bono increato, utitur bono fruendo: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, it seems that one is not only not to use God or the uncreated Good, but to use it is always a mortal sin, because (St.) Augustine in the eightieth book On the Three Questions[5] says: « The most high perversity is enjoying what is to be used and using what is to be enjoyed »; but he who uses the uncreated Good, uses a good that is to be enjoyed: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Contingit Deo recte servire intuitu mercedis, quia multi sunt boni mercenarii, ut dicit Ambrosius;[6] sed non contingit Deo servire nisi amando: ergo contingit Deum recte amare intuitu mercedis; sed sic amans utitur Deo, quia refert ad aliud: ergo etc.

On the contrary: 1. It happens that one does serve God in an upright manner in consideration of a wage [intuitu mercedis], because there are many good mercenaries, as (St.) Ambrose says;[6] but it does not happen that one serves God except by loving (Him) [amando]: therefore it does happen that one loves God in an upright manner in consideration of a wage; but the one thus loving uses God, because he refers (Him) to another: ergo etc..

2. Item, sic summa bonitas habet se ad amorem, sicut[7] summa veritas ad cognitionem; sed contingit veritatem creatam cognoscere clarius sine praeiudicio summae veritatis et sine errore: ergo similiter contingit aliam bonitatem quam summam ardentius diligere sine praeiudicio summae bonitatis et deordinatione: ergo contingit amore ordinato aliud plus diligi quam Deum: ergo contingit Deum diligi propter aliud ordinate et ita uti eo.

2. Likewise, the most high Goodness so holds Itself to love, as[7] the most high Truth (does) to cognition; but it happens that one cognizes created truth more clearly without a pre-judgment of most high Truth and without error: therefore similarly it happens that one loves [diligere] another goodness more ardently than the most high One without pre-judgment of most high Goodness and without disorder: therefore it happens that another is loved with an

ordinate love [amore] more than God: therefore it happens that God is loved [diligi] in an ordinate manner for the sake of another and thus one uses Him.

3. Item, videtur quod nullum peccatum sit, cum quis utitur Deo propter suam salutem, quia « cuius finis bonus, ipsum bonum »;[8] sed huius usus bonus est, scilicet nostra salus: ergo usus Dei bonus: ergo non erit peccatum.

3. Likewise, it seems that there is no sin, when one uses God for the sake of his own salvation, because « whose end (is) good, (is) itself good »;[8] but the use of this is good, that is, our salvation: therefore the use of God (is) good: therefore it will not be a sin (to do such).

4. Item, usus Dei aut est bonus; et sic utendum Deo; aut est malus; et sic Deus malus, quia « cuius usus malus, ipsum malum »;[9] quod si Deus bonus, et eius usus bonus: ergo Deo est utendum.

4. Likewise, the use of God is either good; and thus one (is) to use God; or is evil; and thus God (is) evil, because « whose use (is) evil, (is) itself evil »;[9] whereas [quod] if God is good, the use of Him (is) also good: therefore one is to use God.

CONCLUSIO.

Solo bono creato est utendum, et bono increato uti est abuti.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod solo bono creato est utendum, quia, si bono increato utimur, semper est abusus, et abusus talis est mortale peccatum propter perversitatem in finem[10] cum delectatione, et propter voluntatis inordinationem, quae minus diligit ipsum *quo* utitur, quam *propter quod* utitur.

CONCLUSION

One is to use only the created good, and to use the uncreated Good is to abuse (It).

I respond: It must be said, that one is to use only the created good, because, if we use the uncreated Good, there is always an abuse, and such an abuse is a mortal sin on account of the perversity unto an end[10] with delectation, and on account of the inordinate act [inordinationem] of the will, which loves less That *which* it uses, than (that) *for the sake of which* it uses.

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[1] Codd. R et W *vel* pro *et*.
[2] Cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 1-7; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 3. et III. Topic. c. 1, ubi haec divisio diversimode insinuatur.
[3] Cod. A cum ed. 1 satis bene adiungit *ad*. Mox Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, post *unum* omittit *increatum*.
[4] Quest. 30: Honestum dicitur quod propter se ipsum expetendum est, utile autem quod ad aliud aliquid referendum est. — Mox ex multis codd. ut A F G H I K T U V aa bb ee ff cum ed. 1 posuimus *vel* pro *et*. Paulo infra Vat. ante *honestum* praemittit *quid*, quod tamen melius cum mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 omittitur, quia Deus est ipsum honestum per essentiam.
[5] Quest. 30: Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle atque utendis frui.
[6] In Evangel. S. Lucae c. 15, ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1748: At vero filius, qui habet Spiritus S. pignus in corde, saecularis mercedis lucella non quaerit, quibus serviat. Haeredes sunt etiam mercenarii, qui ducuntur ad vineam. Bonus mercenarius Petrus etc. — Codex autem, sub n. 507 Bibliothecae Laurentianae Florentiis, membr. in fol. saec. XI. fol. 116. recto, col. 2. ultimam partem sic exhibet: non quaerit, qui ius servat haeredis. Sunt etiam qui conducuntur ad vineam. Bonus etc. Cum quo

[1] Codices R and W have *and/or* [vel] in place of *and* [et].
[2] Cf. Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 1-7: [the work on morals by the Peripatetic School,] Magna Moralia, Bk. I, ch. 3 and [Aristotle's,] Topics, Bk. III, ch. 1, where this division is hinted at in diverse manners.
[3] Codex A together with edition 1 adds well enough *to*. Then the Vatican text, disagreeing with the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, omits *uncreated thing* after *one*.
[4] Question 30: What is to be sought out for its own sake is called honest, but what is to be referred to another thing (is called) useful. — Then from many codices, as A F G H I K T U V aa bb ee ff together with edition 1, we have put *and/or* [vel] in place of *and* [et]. A little below (this) the Vatican text reads *God is what (is) essentially honest.*
[5] Question 30: And thus every human perversion, which is also called a vice, is to want to use the things which are to be enjoyed [fruendis] and to enjoy the things which are to be used [utendis].
[6] In the Gospel of St. Luke, ch. 15, where according to the Venetian edition of 1748 (there is read): But in truth the son, who has the pledge of the Holy Spirit in (His) heart, does not seek the small profits of worldly pay, to which he is a slave. The heirs are also mercenaries, who are lead to the vineyard. The good

concordat cod. III. Plut. XIV. in fol. saec. XV. libr. VIII. c. 35. Lectio istius ed. in verbis et interpunctione errat.

[7] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1, invertendo comparationem, nempe *sicut summa bonitas, sic summa veritas*, argumentationem, ut ex subnexis patet, perturbat. Mox cod. X post *clarius* satis bene addit *veritate increata*. Dein, faventibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, expunxiumus *aliquam*, quod Vat. cum recentiori cod. cc praemittit voci *aliam*. In ultima propositione huius argumenti multi codd. C F G K L R S U V W aa bb cum ed. 1 ante *diligi* falso repetunt *plus*.

[8] Boeth., II. de Differentiis topicis. Locus a fine: Cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est. Vide supra q. 1. in corp. Propositio ista derivata esse videtur ex illa Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1: *Cuius finis melior, et ipsum melius*. Ad normam codd. et ed. 1 omisimus *est* et *quoque*, quod Vat. cum Boethio habet.

[9] Boeth., II. de Differentiis topicis. — Codd. F O X addunt post *malus* particulam *et*. Immediate post ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quod* loco *quia*, cod. R autem habet *ergo si Deus*.

[10] Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 reiecimus lectionem Vat. *aversionem a fine* tanquam minus rectam, quia talis abusus non dicit solum simplicem aversionem a fine, sed etiam directam perversionem ipsius finis, quatenus nempe ipse finis convertitur in medium. Cod. O post *perversitatem* addit *intentionis*. Cod. R totam propositionem sic exhibet: *et abusus talis semper est mortale peccatum, non* (forsan omissum: *solum*) *propter per / versitatem in finem cum delectione, sed propter voluntatis* etc. Mox maiorem partem codd. ut A C G I K L U V X etc. et ed. 1 secuti, bis pro *utimur* substituimus *utitur*, quod grammatice melius est; alii codd. primo loco habet *utitur*, secundo loco *utimur*. Propositio ista relativa a S. Doctore adducta, quae immediate referetur ad substantivum *voluntatis*, continet implicite rationem inordinationis in voluntate hic notatae; sensus enim est: voluntas ordinata minus diligit *ipsum quo utitur*, i. e. medium, quam *propter quod utitur*, i. e. finem; atqui in hoc casu habetur contrarium; ergo voluntas est inordinata.

mercenary Peter etc.. — But the Codex, (kept) under n. 507 in the Laurentian Library at Florence, a member of a folio from the 11th century, folio 116 right, column 2, thus exhibits the final part: he does not seek, who guards the right of an heir. There are those who are conducted to the vineyard. The good etc.. With this codex III. Plut. XIV, in a folio of the 15th century, Bk. VIII, ch. 35, agrees. The reading of that edition errs in its words and punctuation.

[7] The Vatican text, against the manuscripts and edition 1, by inverting the comparison, namely *as the Most High Good, so the Most High Truth*, confuses the argument, as is clear from the subjoined. Then codex X after *more clearly* adds, well enough, *by uncreated Truth*. Then, favoring the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged *some*, which the Vatican text together with the more recent codex cc has prefaced by the word *another*. In the last proposition of this argument many of the codices, C F G K L R S U V W aa bb together with edition 1, falsely repeat *more* after *is loved*.

[8] Boethius, On the Differences of Topic, Bk. II. In the place at the end: Whose end is good, is itself also good. See below q. 1 in the body. That proposition seems to be derived from that of Aristotle, Topics, Bk. III., ch. 1: *Whose end is better, (is) also itself better*. According to the norm of the codices and edition 1, we have omitted *is* [est] and *also* [quoque], which the Vatican text together with Boethius has.

[9] Boethius, On the Differences of Topics, Bk. II.. — Codices F O and X add after *evil* the particle *and/also* [et]. Immediately after, from nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *whereas* [quod] in place of *because* [quia], codex R however has *therefore if God*.

[10] On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have rejected the reading of the Vatican text *aversion from (its) end* as less right, because such an abuse does not mean only a simple aversion from (its) end, but also a direct perversion of its very end, namely to the extent that the end itself is converted into a means. Codex O after *perversity* adds *of intention*. Codex R exhibits the whole proposition thus: *and such an abuse is always a mortal sin, not* (perhaps *only* has been omitted here) *on account of the per- / -versity unto the end with delectation, but on account of the will* etc. Then having followed a greater pert of the codices, as A C G I K L U V X etc. and edition 1, we have twice substituted *uses* for *we use*, which is grammatically better; the other codices have in the first place *uses*, in the second place *we use*. This relative proposition adduced by the Seraphic Doctor, which is immediately referred to the substantive *of the will* [voluntatis], implicitly contains the reason for the inordinate state noted in willing this; for the sense is: the ordinate will loves less *that which it uses*, i.e. the means, which (is) *on account of that which it uses*, i.e. the end; but in fact the contrary is had in this case; therefore the will is inordinate.

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1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod contingit recte servire Deo intuitu mercedis; dicendum, quod illa merces aut est ipse Deus, sicut dixit Abrahae Genesis decimo quinto:[1] *Ego merce tua*; et sic intuens mercedem non utitur, quia non refert ad aliud; aut merces illa est *aliud*, et tunc potest eam quis intueri aut ut *causam moventem*; et sic est malus mercenarius;[2] aut ut *rationem inducentem*; et sic bonus, et hoc modo non utitur.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that it does happen that God is served in an upright manner in consideration of a wage; it must be said, that that wage either is God Himself, as He said to Abraham in the fifteenth (chapter) of Genesis:[1] *I (am) thy wage*; and the one thus considering a wage does not use, because he does not refer to another; or that wage is *another*, and then one can consider it either as *a moving cause*; and thus one is an evil mercenary;[2] or as an *inducing reason*; and so (one is) good, and in this manner one does not use.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod clarior cognitio creaturae non praeiudicat Creatori, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia claritas cognitionis non est in nostra potestate, sed ardor affectionis est in nostra potestate; ideo requiritur a nobis, quod istum ordinemus, non illam.[3] Aliquis tamen actus cognitionis est in nostra potestate, utpote actus fidei, quo si aliquis assentiat veritati primae propter aliud, bene praeiudicat veritati, sicut amare propter aliud, bonitati.

2. To that which is objected, that the more clearer cognition of a creature does not prejudge the Creator, ergo etc.; it must be said, that it is not similar, because the clarity of cognition is not in our power, but the ardor of affection is in our power; for that reason there is required from us, that we ordain this (love) of ours, not that (cognition).[3] However, there is some act of cognition in our power, insofar as [utpote] the act of faith (is such an act), whereby if one assents to prime Truth on account of another, he prejudges Truth in a good manner [bene], just as to love [amare] (prime Goodness) on account of another, (prejudges) Goodness (in a good manner).

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finis usus Dei est bonus; dicendum, quod finis dicitur bonus dupliciter: aut quantum ad *substantiam*, aut quantum ad *intentionem finiendi*; et propositio illa intelligitur quantum ad *intentionem finiendi*, et haec[4] consistit in recta ordinatione.

3. To that which is objected, that the end of the use of God is good; it must be said, that an end is called good in a twofold manner: either as much as regards (its) *substance*, or as much as regards the *intention of the one ordering it to the end* [finiendi]; and that proposition is understood as much as regards the *intention of the one ordering it to the end*, and this (intention)[4] consists in an upright ordering [in recta ordinatione].

4. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod illa propositio[5] intelligitur de habentibus ordinationem ad finem, sed non de ipso fine. — Vel intelligitur de actu naturali ipsarum rerum et proprio, qui frequentius ab ipsa re elicitur, non de ordinatione in[6] finem; et sic non valet propositio ad propositum.

4. To the last (objection) it must be said, that that proposition[5] is understood of those having an ordination to an end, but not of the end itself. — And/or it is understood of the natural act of the things themselves and the proper (act), which frequently is elicited from the thing itself, but not of (its) ordination unto[6] an end; and so the proposition is not valid for the (question) proposed.

SCHOLION.

I. In conclusione S. Doctor propositionem, quod bono increatu uti sit *abusus* et peccatum, duplici ratione probat, quae summitur tum ex parte *finis ultimi*, tum ex parte *voluntatis*. Ex parte *finis ultimi* est abusus, quia aversio a fine non fit sine contemtu eius et offensa Dei, uti probatur II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, et a. 3. q. 2; ex parte *voluntatis* propter inordinationem, quia voluntas, quando Deo utitur, in aliquo creato ponit finem; sed finis est melior his quae sunt ad finem (infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.) et « quantum est de se, dicit excessum bonitatis respectu eius, quod est ad finem » (ibid. ad 4.). Ex quo patet inordinatio in proposito. Voluntas enim in utendo minus diligit medium quam finem. Ad rem facit illud generalissimum principium Aristotelis, toties a S. Doctore repetitum: Propter quod unumquodque (tale) est, illud magis est. Cfr. etiam hic dub. 6, ubi dicit, quod omnis res sit aut finis, aut medium ad finem, aut perveniens ad finem. — Quoad solut. ad 1, nempe quomodo Deo servire possimus intuitu mercedis, cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2. et III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. — Quoad axioma: Cuius finis bonus, ipsum quoque bonum (ad 3.), cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 1.

II. Quoad ipsam quaestionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 60. m. 3. a. 1. et 2, et p. II. q. 142. m. 2. — Ceteros a uctores videsis in Scholio ad praecedentem questionem.

SCHOLIUM

I. In the conclusion the Seraphic Doctor proves the proposition, that to use the uncreated Good is an *abuse* and a sin, with a twofold reason, which is taken both from the part of the *last end*, and from the part of the *will*. On the part of the *end* it is an abuse, because an aversion from the end is not done without contempt for it and an offense to God, as is proven in Sent., Bk. II, d. 42, a. 2, q. 1. and a. 3, q. 2; on the part of the will on account of its inordinate state, because the will, when it uses God, places its end in another; but the end is better that those which are for the end (below in d. 29, a. 1, q. 1 in the body of the reply) and « as much as it concerns itself, it means an excess of goodness in respect to that, which is for the end » (ibid. at n. 4). From which the inordinate state (spoken of) in the proposition is clear. For the will in using loves [diligit] the means less than the end. To which one applies that most general of the principles of Aristotle, very often repeated by the Seraphic Doctor: That for the sake of which any single thing is (such), is greater. Cf. also here in doubt n. 6, where he says, that every thing is either an end, or a means to an end, or arriving at an end. — In regard to the solution to n.1, namely in which manner we can serve God in consideration of a wage, cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 38, a. 1, q. 3, reply to n. 2, and Sent., Bk. III, d. 27, a. 2, q. 2. — In regard to the axiom: Whose end (is) good, (is) also itself good (reply to n. 3), cf. Sent., d. 38, a. 1. q. 1.

II. In regard to that question: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. III, q. 60, m. 3, q. 1 and 2, and p. II, q. 142, m. 2. — You may have seen [*videsis* read as *videris*] the other authors in the Scholium to the preceding question.

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[1] Vers. 1. — Paulo ante exhibemus lectionem codd. R V W X Y Z aa bb; alii codd. autem, omisso *Deus*, ponunt *Dominus* post *Abrahae*, a quibus non multum dissidet Vat. legendo: *et ipse, sicut Dominus dixit ad Abraam*. Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 post *utitur* expunximus *Deo*.

[2] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1. hic addit *et sic utitur*.

[3] Vat. post *istum* addit *amorem* et post *illam* adiungit *cognitionem*, quae tamen auctoritate mss. et ed. 1. tanquam superflua expunximus.

[4] Cod. cc cum ed. 1 *hoc*. Mox antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 omittunt propositionem, quae habetur in Vat. et

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[1] Verse 1. — A little before this we have used the reading of codices R V W X Y Z aa and bb; the other codices however, having omitted *God*, put *the Lord* after *Abraham*, from which the Vatican text does not dissent much in its reading: *(is) also He, as the Lord said to Abram*. Then on the testimony of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged *God* after *does not use*.

[2] The Vatican text, contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, adds here *and thus one uses*.

[3] The Vatican text adds *love* after *this* and after *that* adjoins *cognition*, which however, on the authority of

cod. cc post *ordinatione*, scil.: *et illo modo non contingit uti Deo, quia non convenit ordinari*. — Fusius de hac re tractat S. Doctore II. Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 1.

[5] Scilicet, cuius usus bonus, et ipsum bonum. — Vat. cum cod. cc paulo ante post *ultimum* praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 addit *scilicet usus Dei aut est bonus aut malus* etc.

[6] Ex mss. et ed. 1 substutuimus *in* loco *ad*. — De hoc secundo responsionis membro vide supra q. 1. circa principium conclusionis.

the manuscripts and editions 1, we have expunged as superfluous [trans. -- But which are inserted here for the sake of the clarity of the English translation].

[4] Codex cc together with edition 1 reads *this* [trans. *hoc*, which presumably refers to the notion of intentionem finiendi as a whole]. Then the more ancient codices and edition 1 omit the proposition, which is had in the Vatican text and codex cc after *ordering* [ordinatione], that is: *and in that manner it does not happen that one uses God, because it is not fitting that He be ordained (to an end)*. — The Seraphic Doctor treats of this matter more extensively in II. Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 1.

[5] That is, whose use (is) good, (is) also itself good. — The Vatican text together with codex cc adds a little before this, after *to the last (objection)*, against the testimony of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, *that is, the use of God is either good or evil,* etc..

[6] From the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *unto* [in] in place of *to* [ad]. — Concerning this second member of the response, see above in q. 1, near the beginning of the conclusion.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

ARTICULUS II.

QUAESTIO UNICA.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 35-37.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK I

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

ARTICLE II

QUESTION SOLE

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 35-37.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

ARTICULUS II.

Quid sit frui.

Habito de *uti* et *utibili*, consequenter quaeritur de *frui* et *fruibili* et *primo*, quid sit frui per essentiam, utrum scilicet sit actus voluntatis, an aliarum virium.

ARTICLE II

What is it "to enjoy"?

With (the question) of *to use* and *the useable* having been considered, consequently there is asked, concerning *to enjoy* and *the enjoyable*, *first*, what is it "to enjoy" essentially [per essentiam], that is, whether it is an act of the will, or whether (it is an act) of the other powers (of the soul) [virium].

QUAESTIO UNICA.

Utrum frui sit actus voluntatis, an aliarum virium.

1. Quod sit actus voluntatis, videtur per primam definitionem, quae est: Frui est amore inhaerere etc.;[7] sed amor est voluntatis: ergo et *frui* similiter. *Si dicas*, quod amor sumitur ibi communiter, secundum quod est in qualibet vi respectu sui actus; *contra*: in omnibus aliis definitionibus idem dicitur. Unde dicitur in sequenti:[8] « Fruimur cognitis, in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit ». Quietatio / autem voluntatis est.

QUESTION 1

Whether "to enjoy" is an act of the will, or whether (it is an act) of the other powers (of the soul)

1. That it is an act of the will, seems by the first definition, which is: To enjoy is to inhere by love etc.;[7] but love belongs to the will: therefore also *to enjoy* similarly. *If you say*, that love is taken there in the common sense [communiter], according to which it is in any power [vi] in respect to its act; *on the contrary*: in all other definitions the same is said. Whence there is said in the following:[8] « We enjoy things cognized, in which the delighted will thoroughly rests [conquiescit] ». But resting / belongs to the will.

[7] Vide lit. Magistri, c. 2.
[8] Cfr. lit. Magistri, c. 2.

[7] See the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2.
[8] Cf. the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2.

autem voluntatis est. Et in alia[1] similiter: « Frui est uti cum gaudio ». Gaudium autem ad volunatem proprie pertinet.

But resting / belongs to the will. And in the other (definition)[1] similarly: « To enjoy is to use with joy ». But joy pertains properly to the will.

2. Item, ostenditur *ratione*,[2] secundum quod delectabile est differentia boni, cum sit bonum honestum, conferens et delectabile; bonum autem obiectum est voluntatis: ergo *frui* est solius voluntatis.

2. Likewise, it is shown *by reason*, because we take delight in enjoying,[2] according to which the delectable is a distinction [differentia] of the good, since it is an honest, conferring and delectable good; but the good is the object of the will: therefore *to enjoy* belongs only to the will.

3. Item, eo fruimur, quo quietamur; sed quietatio respicit rationem finis, « et finis rationem boni »,[3] et « bonum est obiectum

3. Likewise, we enjoy that, by which we rest; but resting respects the reason for the end [rationem finis], « and the end (respects)

voluntatis »: ergo fruitio, quae ordinat ad illud, similiter.

the reason for the good »[3] and « the good is the object of the will »: therefore enjoying, which is ordered to it, similarly.

Sed contra: 1. Omnis virtus appetit uniri suo obiecto, quo habito delectatur, si cognoscit, et quiescit: ergo motus cum quietatione et delectatione est omnium virium: ergo cum talis sit fruitio, fruitio erit in omnibus, non tantum in voluntate.

But on the contrary: 1. Every virtue aims [appetit] to be united to its object, in which when held, it takes delight, if it cognizes (this), and it rests: therefore a movement with resting and delectation belongs to every power: therefore since such is enjoying, enjoying will be in everything, not only in the will..

2. Item, absentia rei amatae potius contristat amantem, quam delectat;[4] quod enim delectat ipsum, hoc est, quia videt ipsam et habet. Si ergo motus fruitionis est cum delectatione vel est ipsa delectatio: ergo hoc[5] est, quia videt illud in quo est ipsa delectatio; sed visio respicit cognitivam: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, the absence of the thing loved thoroughly saddens the lover more than it delights (him);[4] for what delights him, is this, that he sees and has it. If therefore the movement of enjoying is with delectation and/or is the very delectation: therefore this[5] is, because he sees that in which is the very delectation; but vision respects the cognitive: therefore etc..

3. Item, Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana:[6] « Haec est summa merces, ut ipso perfruamur ». Sed super illud Psalmi: *Ostendam illi salutare* etc., dicit Glossa,[7] quod « visio est tota merces »: ergo si fruitio est merces, fruitio est visio per essentiam; sed visio est in cognitiva sive in ratione: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in (his) book <u>On Christian Doctrine</u>:[6] « This is the most high wage, that we thoroughly enjoy Him ». But on this (verse) of the Psalm: *I shall show him salvation* etc., the Gloss says,[7] that « vision is the whole wage » [tota merces]: therefore if enjoying is the wage, enjoying is essentially [per essentiam] vision; but vision is in the cognitive (part) or in the reason: therefore etc..

4. Item, fide et spe tendimus in Deum: aut ergo fruendo, aut utendo; sed non utendo, cum Deo non sit utendum: ergo fruendo: ergo fide et spe fruimur; sed fides est habitus rationis cognitivae; sed cuius est habitus, eius est actus: ergo actus fruitionis est actus[8] rationis; similiter videtur de irascibili: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, by faith and hope we tend into God: therefore either by enjoying, or by using; but not by using, since one is not to use God: therefore by enjoying: therefore by faith and hope we enjoy; but faith is a habit of the cognitive reason; but to whom belongs the habit, to him belongs the act: therefore the act of enjoying is an act[8] of the reason; it seems similarly concerning the irascible (part): therefore etc..

CONCLUSIO.

Frui sumtum essentialiter est actus voluntatis, sumtum dispositive est actus etiam aliarum potentiarum.

CONCLUSION

"To enjoy", taken essentially, is an act of the will; taken dispositively, it is an act also of the other powers

Respondeo: Secundum aliquos[9] *frui* pertinet ad omnes vires; et hoc dicunt, quia omnes vires remunerabuntur; qui dicut

I respond: According to some[9] *to enjoy* pertains to all powers; and they say this, because all powers will be remunerated;

etiam, quod[10] in gloria erit magis proprie rationis, qiua immediatius se habet ad delectationem.

these also say, that[10] in glory it shall more properly belong to reason, because it holds itself more immediately to delectation.

Sed aliter videtur dicendum secundum Augustinum, scilicet quod sit actus ipsius voluntatis. Cum enim tres dentur definitiones de *frui*, omnes dantur penes actum voluntatis, quem tripliciter est considerare. *Primo* modo *communiter*, prout dicit motum cum delectatione; et sic definit Augustinus:[11] « Frui est uti cum gaudio ». *Secundo* modo, prout dicit motum cum quietatione; et hoc modo definitur ab Augustino de Doctrina christiana: « Frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se ipsam »; et hoc modo accipitur *proprie*. *Tertio* modo accipitur, prout complectitur utrumque, scilicet quietationem et delectationem; et hoc modo definitur ab Augustino decimo de Trinitate: « Frui est quiescere in cognitis, voluntate propter se delectata », et sic accipitur *propriissime*.

But it seems that it must be said otherwise according to (St.) Augustine, namely that it is an act of the will itself. For though three definitions are given for *to enjoy*, they are all given from within [penes] the act of the will, the considering of which is threefold. *In the first* manner (it is said) *commonly*, insofar as it means [prout dicit] movement with delectation; and thus does (St.) Augustine define (it):[11] « "To enjoy" is to use with joy ». *In the second* manner, insofar as it means movement with rest; and in this manner it is defined by (St.) Augustine in On Christian Doctrine: « "To enjoy" is to inhere by love to another thing for its own sake » and in this manner it is accepted *properly*. *In the third* manner it is accepted, insofar as it embraces both, that is resting and delectation; and in this manner it is defined by (St.) Augustine in the tenth (book) of On the Trinity: « "To enjoy" is to rest in things known, the will having taken delight for its own sake », and thus it is accepted *most properly*.

Quia ergo *frui* secundum omnem acceptionem dicit delectationem vel quietem vel utrumque, et omne tale habet rationem boni, et hoc est objiectum voluntatis: ideo loquendo *essentialiter*, frui est actus voluntatis. Sed quia voluntas nec delectatur nec quietatur nisi in eo, quod cognoscit vel per fidem vel per speciem,[12] et in eo, quod habet per spem vel in re, ideo actus aliarum virium ad hunc disponunt, non tamen sunt ipsum *frui*, essentialiter loquendo.

Therefore because *to enjoy* according to every acceptation means delectation and/or rest and/or both of these, and every such has a reckoning of the good, and this is the object of the will: for that reason, speaking *essentially* [essentialiter], "to enjoy" is an act of the will. But because the will neither delights nor rests except in that, which it cognizes through faith and/or appearance [speciem],[12] and in that, which it holds through faith and/or in reality, for that reason acts of the other powers dispose to this, (but) they are not, however, *enjoying* itself, essentially speaking.

Ex hoc patet solutio[13] ad illud quod communiter solet quaeri, quare *frui* non definitur per actum cognitionis, sicut delectationis. Tamen[14] haec quae- / -stio fundata est super falsum.

From this the solution[13] to that which is commonly accustomed to be asked, why *to enjoy* is not defined by an act of cognition, as (is) of delectation. However[14] this que- / -stion has been founded upon a false (assertion).

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[1] In Vat. hic additur *definitione probatur idipsum*, quod tamen abest a mss. et ed. 1. — De hac definitione vide lit. Magistri, c. 3.
[2] Concinnius mss. cum sex primis edd., omittendo hic a Vat. additum *sed delectabile*.
[3] Aristot., I. Magnor. Moral. c.2: Absolutus namque finis bonum est nec non finis bonum. — Et de

[1] In the Vatican text there is here added *definition the very same is proven*, which however is absent from the manuscripts and edition 1. Concerning this definition see the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3.
[2] The manuscripts together with the six first editions, by omitting here what has been added by the Vatican text, *but the delectable*, (are) more carefully

sequenti propositione ait I. Rhetor. c. 10. (in ed. Stoer, c. 25.): Est autem voluntas quidem appetitio boni cum ratione coniuncta; nemo enim vult, nisi quando aliquid bonum esse putaverit. Vide etiam I. Ethic., c. 1. — Mox cod. 1 *ordinatur* pro *ordinat*.
4 Sequimur maiorem partem codd. ut A C F G I K L O R S U V W X Y Z etc. et edd. 1, 2, 3 6 substituendo *delectat* loco *delectet*, ac mox (exceptis edd. 2, 3 et 6) *quia* loco *quod*.
5 Perturbatam lectionem Vat., quae hic addit *delectare*, castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.
6 Libr. I. c. 32. n. 35.
7 August., in Expos. Psalmi 90, 16.
8 Plures codd. ut A G H I K M V W Y Z etc. cum ed. 1 omittunt *actus*.
9 Huius opinionis fertur fuisse Antisiodorensis, sive melius Autisiodorensis, test Dionysio Carthusiano, hic. q. 3.
10 Cod. X satis bene hic addit *frui*. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc non ita bene *immediate* pro *immediatius*.
11 De tribus sequentibus definitionibus fruitionis ex Augustino sumti vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. 3. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc post *Secundo* omittit *modo*.
12 Mendosam lectionem Vat. ponentis *spem* loco *speciem* correximus ope codd. F H I ee gg hh ii et ed. 1; error multorum codd., qui cum Vat. habent *spem*, provenit ex modo consimili ista duo verba abbreviandi. Sumta est haec locutio ex verbis Apostoli II. Cor. 5, 7: Per fidem enim abulamus, et non per speciem. Cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5. — Mox cod. R post *tamen* addit *ipsi*.
13 Contra mss. et sex primas edd. habet Vat. *resolutio*, et paulo post contra maiorem partem mss. ut A C F G H K L R S T U V etc. et ed. 1 *consuevit* pro *solet*. Dein multi codd. cum ed. 1 *dilectionis* loco *delectationis*, sed non bene, sicuti ex corp. questionis patet..
14 Vat. cum cod. cc, mutata interpunctione et posito *cum* pro *Tamen*, legit *delectationis, cum haec questio fundata sit super falsum*; sed minus apte, quia responsio cum ipsa questione incongrue coniungitur contra morem Seraphici; insuper est contra omnes antiquiores mss. et ed. 1.

edited.
3 Aristotle, The Greater Morals, Bk. I, ch. 2: For the absolute end is the Good nor (is) the non-end the Good. — And concerning the following proposition, he says in Rhetorics, Bk. I, ch. 10 (in the Stoer edition, ch. 25): But the will is indeed the aiming [appetitio] for the good together with a conjoined reason; for no one wants, except when he has thought something is good. See also Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 1. Then codex 1 has is ordered in place of it orders.
4 We follow the greater part of the codices, as A C F G I K L O R S U V W X Y Z etc., and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6 by substituting *it delights (him)* in place of *it may delight (him)*, and then (excepting editions 2, 3 and 6) *that* [quia] in place of *that* [quod].
5 The confused reading of the Vatican text, which adds at this point *delighting*, we have corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1.
6 Bk. I, ch. 32, n. 35.
7 (St.) Augustine, Exposition of the Psalms, n. 90, 16.
8 Very many of the codices, as A G H I K M V W Y Z etc., together with edition 1 omit *act*.
9 This is thought to have been the opinion of Antisiodorensis, or rather Autisiodorensis, as testified by (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here at q. 3.
10 Codex X here adds, well enough, *to enjoy*. Then the Vatican text together with codex cc has, not so well, *immediately* for *more immediately*.
11 Concerning the three following definitions of enjoying, taken from (St.) Augustine, see here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2 and 3. — Then the Vatican text together with codex cc omits *manner* after *In the second*.
12 The faulty reading of the Vatican text (of putting *hope* in place of *appearance*) we have corrected with the help of codices F H I ee gg hh and ii and edition 1; the error of many codices, who together with the Vatican text have *hope*, comes from the very same manner of abbreviating these two words. This saying is taken from the words of the Apostle, 2 Cor. 5:7: For we walk through faith, and not through appearance. Cf. also Sent., Bk. III, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, reply to n. 5. — Then codex R has *(but) these are not* instead of *(but) they are not*.
13 Against the manuscripts and the six first editions, the Vatican text has *resolution*, and a little after this against a greater part of the manuscripts, as A C F G H K L R S T U V etc. and edition 1, it has *is accustomed* [consuevit] for *is accustomed* [solet]. Then many codices together with edition 1 have *of love* [dilectionis] in place of *of delectation* [delectationis], but not well, as it clear from the body of the question.
14 The Vatican text together with codex cc, having changed the punctuation and put *since* [cum] in place of *however*, reads *of delectation, since this question is founded upon a false (assertion)*; but lest aptly, because the response together with this question is incongruously conjoined against the custom of the Seraphic (Doctor); besides it is against all the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1.

quae- / stio fundata est super falsum. Augustinus enim ponit in notificatione una, quod est cognitionis, cum dicit: « Frui est quiescere in cognitis » cadit tamen ibi sicut dispositio.

que- / -stion is founded upon a false (assertion). For (St.) Augustine puts in one note, what belongs to cognition, when he says: « To enjoy is to rest in things known » it is defined [cadit] there, however, as a disposition.

Ex hoc etiam patet, quare non definitur per fidem et[1] spem, sicut per caritatem, quia caritas informat concupiscibilem, cuius est *frui*. Tamen ista quaestio similiter fundata est super falsum, quia amor, quo definitur *frui*, est communis ad amorem castum et libidinosum,[2] quo avarus fruitur auro, non proprius ispius caritatis.

From this it is also clear, why it is not defined by faith and[1] hope, as by charity, because charity informs the concupiscible (part), to which belongs *enjoying*. However this question is similarly founded upon a false (assertion), because love [amor], by which *enjoying* is defined, is common to love, chaste and libidinous,[2] by which the avaricious enjoys gold, (it does) not properly (belong) to charity itself.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod omnis virtus habet delectari et quietari,[3] cum unitur suo obiecto; dicendum, quod ipsa voluntas, ut vult Augustinus,[4] amat sibi et aliis. Et sicut etiam dicit Anselmus:[5] « Voluntas inclinat alias vires et aliis meretur », ideo eius quietatio et delectatio redundat in alias vires. Unde sicut voluntas non sibi cognoscit, sed ratio cognoscit sibi et voluntati, ita voluntas sibi et rationi delectatur et ipsam quiescere facit.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that every virtue has to delight and take rest,[3] when it is united with its object; it must be said, that the will itself, as (St.) Augustine maintains,[4] loves itself and others. And as (St.) Anselm also says:[5] « The will inclines the other powers and merits by them », for that reason its resting and delectation redound in the other powers. Whence just as the will does not cognize itself, but reason cognizes itself and the will, so the will takes delight in itself and in reason and causes it to rest.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amans non fruitur, nisi videat vel habeat; dicendum, quod *videre* et *habere* requiruntur ad *frui*, similiter et *amare*. Nam si quis videt aliquid et habet, nunquam delectatur, nisi amet; aliter tamen requiritur visio quam amor. Nam visio disponit, similiter et tentio, sed amor delicias suggerit. Unde est quasi acumen penetrans,[6] et ideo ei maxime convenit unire et per consequens delectare et quietare: ideo essentialiter, non dispositive, est fruitio. Propter quod est intelligendum, quod actus voluntatis potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet per modum *appetitus* et[7] *complacentiae*. Primo modo antecedere potest ipsam visionem; secundo vero consequitur, et in hoc est perfecta ratio ipsius fruitionis, scilicet in complacentia rei visae et habitae.

2. To that which is objected, that the lover does not enjoy, unless he sees and/or has; it must be said, that *seeing* and *having* are required for *enjoying*, similarly also *loving* [amare]. For is one sees and has anything, he never takes delight (in it), unless he loves it; however vision is required in another manner than love. For vision disposes, similarly also holding, but love supplies delights. Whence it is like a penetrating acumen,[6] and for that reason it is most fitting for it to unite and, as a consequence, to take delight and rest: for that reason essentially, not dispositively, it is enjoying. On account of which it is to be understood, that the act of the will can be considered in a twofold manner, that is, in the manner of an *appetite* and[7] of a *complacence*. In the first manner it can go before antecede the vision itself; but in the second it follows it, and in this is the perfect

reckoning of enjoying itself, that is, in complacence in the thing seen and had.

3. Ad illud: Viso est tota merces; dicendum, quod illud non dicitur proprie, sed per concomitantiam,[8] quia visio et complacentia, in qua est perfecta ratio fruitionis, inseparabiliter se habent.

3. To that (which is objected): Vision is the whole wage; it must be said that that is not said properly, but through concomitance,[8] because vision and complacence, in which there is a perfect reckoning of enjoying, hold themselves inseparably.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fide et spe fuimur; dicendum, quod illud non est verum per se, quia quaelibet harum accipit rationem tendentiae[9] a caritate; unde fruitio non est ex istis nisi per caritatem. Sola enim caritas considerat finem in ratione finis et obiecti. Unde non dicitur aliquis sperare Deum, sicut amare.

4. To that which is objected, that by faith and hope we enjoy, it must be said, that that is not true per se, because each of these accepts a reason for holding[9] from charity; whence enjoying is not from these except through charity. For only charity considers the end in the reason for the end and the object. Whence one is not said to hope God, as (he is) to love (Him).

SCHOLION.

I. In solutione principali huius questionis, scil. quod *fruitio sit actus voluntatis*, omnes antiqui doctores cum Seraphico conveniunt; attamen iam istis temporibus circa quasdam subtiles de hac re questiones erant controversiae.

Primo quoad *ipsum conceptum fruitionis* S. Bonaventura docet, fruitionem praesupponere quidem cognitionem sive visionem tanquam dispositionem, tamen, essentialiter loquendo, ipsam esse actum voluntatis, qui importet tum dilectionem tum delectatione, sive esse formaliter actionem voluntatis, nempe amorosam eius inhaesionem, ad quam *sequitur* inseparabiliter passio delectationis; cfr. hic ad 2. et dub. 12; III. Sent. d. 29. a. 1. q. 2, et ibid. d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.; II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. Haexaë. Serm. 12. in fine. Idem docet Scotus cum suis, Richard. a Med., B. Albert. M., Petr. a Tar., Henr. Gand. — Alii vero doctores volunt, fruitionem esse formaliter ipsam *delectationem*, non quidem qualemcumque, sed *ultimatam*, seu quae coniuncta est cum quietatione; ipsam vero non esse *amorem* nisi connotative et causaliter; ita discipuli S. Thomae, test. *Caietano* (ad S. I. II. q. 1. a. 1.), Dionys. Carth. aliique.

SCHOLIUM

I. In the solution of the principle part of the question, that is, that *to enjoy is an act of the will*, all the ancient doctors agree with the Seraphic (Doctor); but there were, however, already in those times questions of controversy about certain subtle points of this matter.

First as regards *the concept itself of enjoying*, St. Bonaventure teaches, that enjoying presupposes a certain cognition or vision as (its) disposition, however, essentially speaking, it itself is an act of the will, which imports both dilection and delectation, or is formally the action of the will, namely its amorous inhesion, according to which *there follows* inseparably the passion of delectation; cf. here in the reply to n. 2 and in doubt 12; Sent., Bk. III, d. 29, a. 1, q. 2, and ibid., d. 35, a. 1, q. 1 in the body; Sent., Bk. II, d. 38, a. 1, a. 2 in reply to n. 4; On the Hexaëmeron, Sermon 12, at the end. Likewise (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, together with his (disciples), Richard of Middletown, Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Henry of Ghent. — But other doctors hold, that enjoying is formally *delectation* itself, not indeed whatever kind, but *the last* (kind), or which has be conjoined with resting; but this is not *love* [amorem] except connotatively and causally; thus the disciples of St. Thomas, as *Cajetan* testifies {commenting on the Summa., I. II., q. 1, a. 1}, (Bl.) Denis the

Carthusian and others.

Secundo, quoad *actum*, in quo fruitio formaliter consistit, docet S. Bonav., hic ad 1. et 2; II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1: omnem delectationem spiritualem ortum habere ex amore voluntatis, praesupposita perceptione convenientis. Consentiunt Alex. Hal., Henr. Gand., Richard. a Med. qui inter alia dicit: « Actum cognitivae non sequitur delectatio nisi mediate actu appetitivae. » Hoc negatur ab auctoribus secundae sententiae.

Second, as regards the *act*, in which enjoying formally consists, St. Bonaventure teaches, here in reply to n. 1 and 2; Sent., Bk. II, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1: that every spiritual delectation has its rise from the love of the will, presupposing the perception of something agreeable. Alexander of Hales, Henry of Ghent, and Richard of Middletown agree, who among others says: « An act of the cognitive (part) does not follow delectation except by means of an act of the appetitive (part). » This is denied by the authors of the second opinion.

Tertio, hinc orta est celebris controversia, praecipus inter asseclas S. Thomae et Scoti agitata, utrum scil. *beatitudo* in patria formaliter consistat in actu *intellectus* sive in visione, qui tum amorem tum delecationem inseparabiliter habet annexa, immo « virtualiter continet et causaliter exerit » (Caietanus), an potius, ut vult Scotus cum aliis multis, in actu *voluntatis*, qui visionem supponit et delectatione completur. Haec questionem tangit S. Bonav., hic ad 3.; plura vide IV. Sent. d. 49. p. 1, a. 5. Haec controversia cohaeret cum doctrinis psychologicis praecipue de relatione inter intellectum et voluntatem.

Third, here rises the celebrated controversy, chiefly promoted among the followers of St. Thomas and (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, whether, that is, *beatitude* in our fatherland formally consists in an act of the *intellect* or in the vision, which has inseparably annexed both love and delectation, nay rather « it virtually contains and causally passes away » (Cajetan), or rather, as (Bl.) Scotus holds with many others, in an act of the *will*, which supposes vision and is completed by delectation. St. Bonaventure touches upon this question, here in reply to n. 3; see more in Sent., Bk. IV, d. 49, p. 1, a. 5. This controversy is chiefly founded upon the psychological doctrines concerning the relation among the intellect and the will.

II. De questione hic proposita: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 26. m. 4. — Scot., hic q. 3. in Oxon. et Report. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 11. a. 1. et 2. — B. Albert. M., hic a. 12. et 17. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 49. q. 6. n. 26.; de delectatione etiam agit S. a. 50. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. 2.

II. On the question here proposed: Alexander of Hales, Sent., Bk. IV, q. 26, m. 4. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 3, in the Oxford Lectures and the Reportatio. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I. II., q. 11, a. 1 and 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, here in a. 12 and 17. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middletown, here in a. 2, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in Bk. I, beginning of q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 49, q. 6, n. 26.; he also deals with delectation in Summa., a. 50, q. 2. — Durandus, here in q. 1. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 3. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 2.

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[1] Cod. W *vel*.

[2] Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 removimus particulam *vel*, quae hic a Vat. male additur, quia verbum *libidinosum* large acceptum etiam concupiscentiam oculorum complectitur. Codd. P et Q post *caritas* addunt *est*; cod. X autem legit: *ideo non est proprius ipsius caritatis.*

[3] Licet multi mss. ut A C G K L O S T U V W X Y Z

[1] Codex W has *and/or* [vel].

[2] On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have removed the particle *and/or* [vel], which has been badly added by the Vatican text, because the word *libidinous* broadly accepted comprises even the concupiscence of the eyes. Codices P and Q add *it does belong* [est] before *to charity* [trans. -- which is retained in the English for clarity]; but codex X reads:

omittant *et quietari*, retinendum tamen duximus, tum quia in aliquibus antiquioribus mss. ut F H I etc. invenitur, tum quia superius in ipsa obiectione exhibetur.

[4] Colligitur ex XV. de Trin. c. 22, ubi ostendit, quod memoria, intellectus et amor seu voluntas non sint sua nec sibi, sed supposito agant, quiquid agunt. Et in praecedentibus capitulis trinitatem in anima repertam cum Trinitate divina comparando, c. 17 de Spiritu S. ait: ipse autem et sibi et illis non nisi diligit. — Plurimi codd. *ut vult* pro *ut dicit*.

[5] Libr. de Concordia praescientiae Dei cum libero arb. c. 11. et 12, ubi dicit, quod voluntas movet omnia instrumenta, quae in nobis sunt, ut manus etc.; et quod ex ipsa « descendit omne meritum hominis ». — De doctrina hic posita vide II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.

[6] Hic loquendi modus sumtus est ex Hugonis de S. Victore Expos. in Dionysii libr. de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 7.

[7] Cod. X hic repetit *per modum*.

[8] Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 magis usitatum verbum *concomitantiam* loco *concomitationem*.

[9] Cod. X *tendentis*. In fine responsionis cod. R addit *et propter hoc non valet*.

for that reason it does not properly belong to charity itself.

[3] Though many manuscripts, as A C G K L O S T U V W X Y Z, omit *and to take rest*, we have however decided to retain it, both because it is found in the other more ancient manuscripts, as F H I etc., and because it is exhibited above in the very objection.

[4] This is gathered from On the Trinity, Bk. XV, ch. 22, where it is shown, that memory, intellect, and love or will are not their own nor for themselves, but drive, whatever the drive, for the subject. And in the preceding chapters, by comparing the trinity discovered in the soul with the divine Trinity, he says in ch. 17 "On the Holy Spirit": but He himself naught but loves [diligit] both Himself and them. — Very many of the codices have *as (St.) Augustine holds* [ut vult] for *as (St.) Augustine says* [ut dicit].

[5] On the Harmony of the Prescience of God with Free Will, ch. 11 and 12, where he says, that the will moves all instruments, which are in us, such as the hands, etc.; and that from it « descends a man's every merit ». — On the doctrine here proposed see Sent., Bk. II, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1.

[6] Here the manner of speaking is taken from Hugo of St. Victor, Exposition upon the Celestial Hierarchy of (St.) Denis, ch. 7.

[7] Codex X here repeats *in the manner*.

[8] We have restored from the manuscripts and edition 1 the more common *concomitance* in place of *concomitation* [concomitationem].

[9] Codex X *of holding*. At the end of the response, codex R adds *an on account of this it is not valid.*.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis

S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio

Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK I

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

ARTICULUS III.
QUAESTIO I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 38-39.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

ARTICLE III
QUESTION 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 38-39.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

ARTICULUS III.

De fruibili.

Ostenso, quid sit *frui* per essentiam, quaestio est de fruibili, et

primo, utrum Deo contingat frui;
secundo, utrum fruendum sit ipso solo.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum Deo sit fruendum.

Circa primum, quod sit Deo fruendum, ostenditur sic.

1. « Eo fruendum est, quod beatos nos facit »,[1] quia in beatitudine est recta fruitio; sed Deo beati efficimur, quia ipse est nostra beatitudo: ergo Deo est fruendum.

2. Item, bonum est amabile; ergo magis bonum magis amabile et summe bonum summe amabile;[2] sed eo fruimur, quod summe amamus: ergo etc.

3. Item, pulcrum delectat et[3] magis pulcrum magis delectat, ergo summe pulchrum summe delectat; sed eo fruimur, in quo summe delectamur: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Ubi est fruitio, ibi est delectatio; « sed delectatio est coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti »;[4] Dei autem ad creaturam nulla est convenientiae, immo summa distantia: ergo nec delectatio, ergo nec fruitio.

2. Item, excellens sensible corrumpit sensum vel saltem contristat, quia delectatio est in mediis:[5] ergo pari ratione excellens intelligibile corrumpit vel contristat intellectum. Sed Deus est excellentissima lux: ergo contristat, non

ARTICLE III

On the enjoyable.

With it shown, what it is *to enjoy* essentially [per essentiam], the question (now) concerns the enjoyable, and

first, whether it is fitting that one enjoy God;
second, whether one is to enjoy Him alone.

QUESTION 1

Whether one is to enjoy God.

About the first, that one is to enjoy God, it is thus shown:

1. « One is to enjoy that, which makes us blessed »,[1] because in beatitude there is an upright enjoying; but we become blessed by God, because He is our beatitude: therefore one is to enjoy God.

2. Likewise, the good is lovable [amabile]; therefore the greater the good, the greater (it is) lovable and the most highly Good (is) the most highly lovable;[2] but we enjoy that, which we love most highly: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, beauty delights and[3] the greater the beauty, the greater it delights, therefore the most highly Beautiful most highly delights; but we enjoy that, in which we delight most highly: ergo etc..

On the contrary: 1. Where there is enjoying, there is delectation; « but delectation is the conjunction of convenient with convenient »;[4] But there is no convening [nulla convenientiae] of God with the creature; nay rather a most high distance: therefore neither a delectation, therefore neither an enjoying.

2. Likewise, an excellent sensible corrupts the sense and/or at least saddens it, because delectation is in the means:[5] therefore for an equal reason the excellent intelligible corrupts and/or saddens the intellect. But God is the most excellent

delectat, ergo etc. *Si dicas*, quod sensibilis potentia est corruptibilis, non intellectus; hoc non solvit, quia intellectus, dum est in carne, fatigatur et impeditur in actu, corpore corrupto.

3. Item, ubi fruitio, ibi quietatio; sed in infinito non est quietatio, « quia semper est aliquid extra accipere »:[6] ergo cum Deus sit infinitus, in Deo non est quietatio, ergo nec fruitio.

CONCLUSIO.

Deo proprie est fruendum.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod Deo fruendum est, eo quod ipse solus perfecte *finit*[7] et *delectat* ipsam animam propter se et super omnia.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod delectatio est coniunctio convenientis etc.; dicendum, quod est convenientia per *unius naturae partcipationem* vel per *comparationem communem*.[8] Prima convenientia facit communitatem *univocationis*, secunda communitatem *analogiae* sive proportionis. Et haec est secundum triplicem differentiam: aut secundum *similem* comparationem *durorum ad duo*, ut sicut homo[9] ad animal, ita albedo se habet ad colorem; aut secundum *dissimilem* comparationem *duorum ad unum*, ut animalis et cibi ad sanitatem; vel / . . .

Light: therefore He saddens, not delights, ergo etc.. *If you say*, that the sensible potency is corruptible, not the intellect; this does not solve (the matter), because the intellect, while it is in the flesh, is fatigued and impeded in act, by the corrupt body.

3. Likewise, where (there is) enjoying, there (is) resting; but in the infinite there is no resting, « because there is always something extra to accept »:[6] therefore since God is infinite, in God there is no resting, therefore neither enjoying.

CONCLUSION

Properly (speaking), one is to enjoy God.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that one is to enjoy God, for the reason that He alone perfectly *finishes*[7] and *delights* the soul itself on His own account and above all things.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that delectation is a conjunction of the convenient etc.; it must be said, that there is a convening through *a participation of one nature* and/or through *a common comparison*.[8] The first convening causes a community of *univocation*, the second a community of *analogy* or of proportion. And this is according to a threefold difference: either according to a *similar* comparison *of two things to two*, just as man[9] to animal, so whiteness is related [se habere] to color; or according to a *dissimilar* comparison *of two things to one*, as of animal and food to health; and/or / . . .

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[1] August., I. De Doctr. christ. c. 33. n. 37: Illo enim frueris, quo efficieris beatus. — In quo textu cod. R post *Illo* addit *solo*. [Trans. Nota: Supra in divisione articuli Quaracchorum editorum legit *contigat* pro *conveniat* secundum explicatio eorum exhibitur hic in p. 32, Sent. I a. 1 q. 2 nota 1: secundum eandem rationem exhibitam traductio sequitur lectio *conveniat* pro *contigat*.]
[2] Simile argumentum reperitur in Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 7, ubi agit de felicitate, quae est bonum optimum, ideoque et maxime exoptandum ac amandum. Cfr. II. Topic. c. 1. seq.
[3] Supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 particulam *et*.
[4] Haec *delectationis* definitio est S. Doctori ceterisque Scholasticis familiaris et convenit cum ea, quam exhibet Avicenna in fine VIII. Metaph. c. 7. circa finem: Delectatio non est nisi apprehensio convenientis, secundum quod conveniens est. — Quae ab Avicenna data definitio fundari videtur in illa, quam Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. 11. tradit: Est autem

[1] (St.) Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Bk. I, ch. 33, n. 37: For you enjoy Him, by whom you shall be made blessed. In which text, codex R adds *alone* after *Him*. [Trans. Note.: Above this in the division of the article the Quaracchi editors have *primo, utrum Deo contigat frui*, here reading *contingat* in place of *conveniat*, according to their explanation set forth on p. 32, Sent., I, a. 1, q. 2, footnote 1: for the same reason set forth there the English translation takes the contrary sense and reads *it be fitting* in place of *it happens.*]
[2] A similar argument is found in Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 7, where he speaks of the felicity, which is the best good, and for that reason both most greatly to be longed for [exoptandum] and loved [amandum]. Cf. Topics, Bk. II, ch. 1 ff..
[3] We have supplied from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 the particle *and*.
[4] This definition of *delectation* is the Seraphic Doctor's and akin to the other Scholastics, and it agrees with that, which Avicenna exhibits at the end

delectatio motus quidam animae et constitutio simul tota, sensibilis, in existentem naturam (haec definitio explicatur ab Henr. Gand., S. a. 50 q. 2.). Ed. Paris. 1878 sic Aristot. interpretatur: Positum sit igitur nobis, voluptatem esse motionem quandam animi et constitutionem subitam sensuque percipiendam in statu conveniente naturae. Cfr. etiam VII. Ethic. c. 11. seq. et praecipue X. Ethic., c. 1-5. ac II. Magnor. Moral. c. 7, ubi plura ad delectationem (voluptatem) pertinentia explicantur. — Mox, contradicentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, habet Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc *facturam* pro *creaturam*. Paulo post cod. R *infinita* loco *summa*.

[5] Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 123. (ed. Paris. Firmin-Didot, III. c. 2.), ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1489 legitur: Manifestum autem ex his, et propter quid excellentiae sensibilium corrumpunt sensitiva. . . . Et manifesta est ex hoc causa, propter quam sensibilia intensa corrumpunt instrumenta sensuum. Et tex. 124. (ed. Paris. loc. cit.): Proportio autem est symphonia. . . unde et delectabilia quidem sunt, dum dicuntur sincera et mixta entia ad rationem . . . excellentia autem contristant aut corrumpunt. Tandem libr. III. text. 29: Et est delectari aut tristari agere sensitiva medietate ad bonum et malum in quantum talia. — Vat. rationem additam contra mss. et ed. 1 ita exhibet: *quia vera delectatio non est nisi in mediis*. Cod. X circa finem huius argumenti loco *in carne* ponit *in corpore*.

[6] Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63. (c. 6): Infinitum igitur id est, cuius secundum quantitatem accipientibus semper aliquid accipere extra est; cuius autem nihil est extra, id est perfectum et totum. — Mox praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 non ita bene Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc *ergo non fruitio*.

[7] Id est, quietat.

[8] Corruptam lectionem Vat. et recentioris cod. cc, in qua ponitur *et* pro *vel* et omittitur *communem*, restauravimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. Paulo ante cod. X *dicendum, quod convenientia dicitur vel per*. — De convenientia vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 1. et VII. Phys. text. 21-34. (c. 4.).

[9] Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *se habet*, quod Vat. cum aliquibus tantum codd. hic addit.

of Metaphysics, Bk. VIII., ch. 7, near the end: There is no delectation unless (there is) apprehension of the convenient, according to what is convenient. — Which definition given by Avicenna seems to be founded upon that, which Aristotle, Rhetorics, Bk. I, ch. 11, hands down: But delectation is a certain movement of the soul and an entire settling at once, of the sensible, in the existent nature (this definition is explained by Henry of Ghent, Summa., A. 50, q. 2). The Parisian Edition of 1878 thus interprets Aristotle: It is therefore posited for us, that pleasure is a certain motion of the spirit and a sudden and perceived-by-the-sense settling in a state convenient to nature. Cf. also Ethics, Bk. VII, ch. 11 ff. and chiefly Ethics, Bk. X, ch. 1-5 and The Greater Morals, Bk. II, ch. 7, where very many things pertaining to delectation (pleasure) are explained. Then, contradicting the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text together with the more recent codex cc has *facture* [facturam] for *creature*. A little afterwards codex R has *infinite* in place of *a most high*.

[5] Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text. 123 (in the Parisian Edition of Firmin-Didot, Bk. III, ch. 2), where according to the Venetian edition of 1489 there is read: But (it is) manifest from these, and on account of that excellent sensibles corrupt the sensitive (part) . . . And the cause is manifest from this, on account of which intense sensibles corrupt the instruments of sense. And text 124 (Parisian Edition, loc. cit.): But the proportion is a symphony . . . wherefore there are even certain delectables, while they are called sincere and mixed beings according to reason . . . but (things) excellent sadden or corrupt. Finally, in Book III., text 29: And to be delighted or saddened is to set (oneself) in motion [agere] toward good and evil, inasmuch as (they are) such things. — The Vatican text, against the manuscripts and edition 1, exhibits an additional reason: *because true delectation is not but in means*. Codex X about the end of this argument puts *in the body* in place of *in the flesh*.

[6] Aristotle, Physics, Bk. III, text 63, (ch. 6): Therefore the Infinite is that, according to the quantity of which for those accepting there is always something extra to accept; but of which there is nothing extra, that is perfect and whole. — Then not trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text together with the more recent codex cc has, not so well, *therefore no enjoying*.

[7] That is, *rests*.

[8] The corrupted reading of the Vatican text and the more recent codex cc, in which there is placed *and* in place of *and/or* and there is omitted *common*, we have restored from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1. A little before this codex X has *it must be said, that convening is said either through*. — On convenience see Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. 1, and Physics, Bk. VII, text 21-34, (ch. 4).

[9] Very many of the codices together with edition 1 omit *is related* [se habet], which the Vatican text together with only some of the codices adds here.

vel / secundum comparationem *duorum ad invicem*, ut puta cum unum est imitatio vel similitudo alterius. Similitudo enim non convenit cum consimili[1] in tertio, sed se ipsa. Sic est in proposito, quia anima est expressa similitudo Dei. Haec convenientia in uno extremo ponit inclinationem et indigentiam, in alio quietationem et sufficientiam, quia unum factum est propter alterum, unde[2] ordinatur ad alterum. Et quoniam ad inclinationis quietationem et indigentiae suppletionem, ubi est sensus,[3] est delectatio sive sequitur, ideo anima cum tali modo quietatur a Deo, fruitur eo.

and/or / according to a comparison of *two things to one another*, as, for example, when one thing is the imitation or similitude of the other. For a similitude does not convene with something very similar[1] in the third (manner), but with itself. So it is in the proposed (objection), because the soul is the expressed similitude of God. This convening in one extreme posits inclination and indigence, in the other resting and sufficiency, because the one has been made for the sake of the Other, whence (the one)[2] is ordered to the Other. And since at the resting of inclination and the supplementation of indigence, where there is sense,[3] there is delectation or (it soon) follows, for that reason the soul, when it rests in God [quitetatur a Deo] in such a manner, enjoys Him.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod excellentia sensibilis corrumpit sensum: ergo etc., dicendum, quod non est simile de *intelligere* et *sentire*. Et ad hoc est triplex ratio: una est ex parte *virtutis* apprehensivae, alia ex parte *apprehensi* sive obiecti, tertia est ex parte *modi* apprehendendi.

2. To that which is objected, that the excellence of the sensible corrupts sense: ergo etc., it must be said, that it is not similar concerning *understanding* and *sensing*. And there is a threefold reason for this: one is on the part of apprehensive *virtue*, another on the part of *the thing apprehended* or the object, the third is on the part of *the manner* of apprehending.

Ex parte *virtutis* apprehensivae, quia sensus potest corrumpi, intellectus autem non. Cuius ratio est, quia sensus dependet ab organo, in quo est quaedam medietas et harmonia, quae non tantum corrumpitur per contrarium, sed[4] per excellens; sed intellectus non dependet ab organo, quia est vis immaterialis, ideo non tristatur in excellenti.[5]

On the part of apprehensive *virtue*, because sense can be corrupted, but not the intellect. The reason for this is, because sense depends upon an organ, in which there is a certain mediacy [medietas] and harmony, which is not only corrupted through a contrary, but (also)[4] by the excellent; but the intellect does not depend on an organ, because it is an immaterial power, for that reason it is not saddened in the excellent.[5]

Ex parte *obiecti* non est simile, quia obiectum intelligibile[6] excellens iuvat et confortat, quia influentia talis cognoscibilis procedit ab intimis et intrat ipsam potentiam, et ideo ipsam confortat et corroborat. Sicut si magnus mons daret virtutem portandi se, facilius ferretur quam parvus; sic est in intelligibili, quod Deus est. Sensibile autem obiectum tantum extra excitat, et ideo hoc corrumpit, illud autem

On the part of *the object* it is not similar, because the excellent, intelligible object[6] helps and comforts, because the influence of such a cognoscible proceeds from the most interior and enters the power itself, and for that reason it comforts and thoroughly strengthens itself. Just as if a great mountain would give the virtue of carrying itself, more easily would it be borne than a small one (that gave not such

non.

virtue); so it is in the Intelligible, which is God. But the sensible object only excites outside itself [extra], and for that reason it corrupts this, but He (does) not.

Ex parte *modi* apprehendendi similiter est disimilitudo, quia sensus in apprehensione sui obiecti tendit ad exterius, unde percipiendo[7] illud dispergitur exterius nec fortificatur interius, ideo debilitatur. Sed obiectum intellectus cum sit intimum ipsi intellectui, in eius perceptione virtus non dispergitur, sed colligitur, et quanto virtus est magis unita, tanto fortior.

On the part of *the manner* of apprehending there is similarly a dissimilitude, because sense in the apprehension of its own object tends to the exterior, wherefore, by percieving[7] that, it disperses the exterior and does not fortify the interior, for that reason it is debilitated. But the object of the intellect, since it is most interior to the intellect itself, is not dispersed in the perception of its virtue, but is gathered together, and as much as the virtue is more united, so much more (is it) stronger.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de infinito; dicendum, quod infinitum dicitur dupliciter, scilicet per *privationem perfectionis*; et sic materia dicitur infinita, et talis infiniti non est finire, sed potius finiri indiget, secundum quod[8] est possibile. Alio modo infinitum dicitur per *privationem limitationis*; et quod sic infinitum est, proprie habet finire, quoniam ultra ipsum, cum non sit maius cogitare, non contingit aliquid appetere. Unde talis infinitas convenit ultimo fini, quae[9] maxime habet finiendi rationem.

3. To that which is objected concerning the infinite; it must be said, that the infinite is spoken in a twofold manner, that is through a *privation of perfection*; and thus matter is said to be infinite, and for such an infinite there is no finishing, but it rather needs to be finished, according to which[8] it is a possible. In another manner the infinite is said through a *privation of limitation*; and what is thus infinite, properly has to end, since beyond itself, when there is nothing greater to think, it does not happen to aim for anything. Whence such an infinity, which[9] has the greatest reason to be finished, is agreeable to the last End.

SCHOLION.

I. Hanc et sequentem quaestionem alii antiqui commentatores Lombardi sub una quaestione tractant. — Circa *analogiam* eiusque differentias, de qua sermo est in solut. ad 1, fusius S. Doctor loquitur infra d. 14. q. 2; d. 29. a. 1. q. 2; d. 7. q. 4. in corp.; d. 25. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — De comparationem duorum ad duo etc. infra d. 46. q. 5. in corp. — De analogia proportionis et proportionalitatis cfr. infra d. 48. q. 1; d. 35. a. 1. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 1. a.1. q. 1. ad 4; et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2; IV. Sent. d. 1. dub. 3.

II. De ipsa hac quaestione: Scot., hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 11. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic q. 12. et seqq. — Petr. a Tar.,

SCHOLIUM

I. This and the following question the other ancient commentators on (Peter) Lombard treat under one question. — About *analogy* and its differences, of which there is a discussion in the solution to n. 1, the Seraphic Doctor speaks more fully below in d. 14, q. 2; d. 29, a. 1, q. 2; d. 7, q. 4, in the body of the question.; d. 25, a. 2, q. 2. in the body of the question. — Concerning the comparison of two things to two etc, see below in d. 46, a. 1, q. 5, in the body of the question. — Concerning the analogy of proportion and proportionality cf. below in d. 48, a. 1, q. 1; d. 35, a. 1, a. 1; Sent., Bk. III, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1 at n. 4; and in d. 29, a. 1, q. 1 at n. 2; Sent., Bk. IV, d. 1, dubium 3.

II. On this question: (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 3. — St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 1; Summa., I. II., q. 11, a. 3. — Bl. (now St.)

hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 72. q. 3, n. 11. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. Biel, hic q. 4.

Albert (the Great), here in q. 12 ff. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middletown, here in a. 2, q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 72, q. 3, n. 11. — Durandus, here in q. 2. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 4. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 4.

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[1] Plures mss. ut A F G H K S T Y etc. cum ed. 1 *simili*. Mox mendum Vat., quae post *se ipsa* addit *anima*, castigamus ex mss. et ed. 1; cod. X *sed est se ipsa similis*. In lectione in textum recepta *similitudo* sumitur concrete et sensus est: simile ratione similitudinis convenit immediate cum consimili. — Paulo post cod. T *homo* pro *anima*; plures vero codd. ut C L T S U omittunt *anima*, sed non bene.
[2] Cod. X hic repetit *unum*.
[3] Cod. W X Z adiungunt *ibi*, et mox cod. A post *sequitur* repetit *delectatio*.
[4] Cod. X addit *etiam*. Paulo post codd. aa bb *spiritualis* loco *immaterialis*. Mox codd. inter se non conveniunt; nam codd. A C G I L S T U V post *tristatur* omittunt *in*; codd. R et ff ponunt *ab*; cod. bb vero *ex*; plures autem ut F H K etc. cum ed. 1 *in*.
[5] De hac differentia inter sensum et intellectum vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 123. et 143. Paulo supra relatos, et libr. III. text. 4. (ed. Paris. c. 4.): Necesse est itaque, quoniam (intellectus) omnia intelligit, immixtum esse; et text. 7: Quod autem non similis sit impassibilitas sensitivi et intellectivi, manifestum est ex sensoriis et sensu. Sensus enim non potest sentire ex vehementi sensibili . . . sed intellectus cum aliquid intellexerit valde intelligibile, non minus intelligit inferiora, sed et magis; sensitivum enim non sine corpore est, hic (intellectus) autem separabilis est.
[6] Auctoritate antiquiorum mss. substitutimus *intelligibile* loco *intelligentiae*.
[7] Ita codd. C H K O S T U Y aa bb et ed. 1, sed codd. A F I L M R V W X Z *participando*; Vat. autem cum cod. cc *per*. Mox codd. X et Y *confortatur* loco *fortificatur*.
[8] Cod. cc *scilicet quantum* pro *secundum quod*.
[9] Codd. F et I *qui*, satis bene, et conveniunt quoad sensum cum cod. T, qui habet *quia*.

[1] Very many of the manuscripts, as A F G H K S T Y etc, together with edition 1 have *similar* [trans. -- simili instead of *very similar* (consimili)]. Then the error of the Vatican text, which adds *itself to itself* [se ipsa] after *the soul*, we have corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1; codex X reads *but it is similar to itself*. In the reading received in the text *similitude* is taken concretely and the sense is: by a similar reason of similitude it agrees immediately with something very similar. — A little afterward codex T has *man* in place of *soul*; but very many codices, as C L T S U, omit *the soul*, but not well.
[2] Codex X here repeats *one*.
[3] Codices W X and Z adjoin *here*, and then codex A repeats *delectation* before *follows*.
[4] Codex X adds *also*. A little afterwards codices aa and bb have *spiritual* in place of *immaterial*. Then the codices do not agree among themselves; for codices A C G I L S T UV omit *in* after *are saddened* [trans. -- thus rendering it as *are saddened by*]; codices R and FF have *are saddened by* [ab]; but codex bb has *from* [ex]; but very many as F H K etc. together with edition 1 have *are saddened in*.
[5] On this difference among sense and intellect see Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 123 and 143. A little above these, there is also Bk. III, text 4 (Parisian Edition, ch. 4): Therefore it is necessary, that (the intellect) understands all things, to be intermixed; and text 7: But that there is no similar impassibility of the sensitive and intellective, is manifest from sensors and sense. For sense can not sense from the vehement sensible . . . but the intellect when it understands anything very intelligible, does not understand inferiors less, but even more; for the sensitive is not without a body, this (intellect) however is separable.
[6] On the authority of the more ancient manuscripts we have substituted *intelligible* in place of *of the intelligence*.
[7] Thus reads codices C H K O S TU Y aa bb and edition 1, but codices A F I L M R V W X Z read *by participating*; but the Vatican text together with codex cc has *through*. Then codices X and Y have *comfort* in place of *fortify*.
[8] Codex cc has *that is as much as* in place of *according to what*.
[9] Codex F and I read *to the last End which* [qui etc.], well enough, and they agree according to sense with codex T, which has *the last End, because . . .* [quia etc.].

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square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

ARTICULUS III.

QUAESTIO II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 39-42.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum solo Deo sive bono increato fruendum sit.

Ultimo quaeritur, utrum solo Deo sive bono increato sit fruendum; et quod sic, videtur.

1. Illo solo est fruendum, quod est propter se diligendum; sed illud solum[10] est propter se diligendum, quod est propter se bonum; illud autem propter se est bonum, quod bonitatem, quam ha- / -bet, nec habet *ab alio*, nec bonitas illa est *ad aliud*; . . .

[10] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *solum*, quod male abest a Vat. et recentiore cod. cc. — De hac propositione minore argum. cfr. Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 5: Quod enim absolute bonum ac iucundum est, amabile est atque eligibile; unicuique vero quod unicuique est tale. Cfr. etiam I. Ethic. c. 1. 2. et 8, ubi de ultimo fine; et I. Magnor. Moral. c. 2, ubi de bono in communi agitur.

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK I

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

ARTICLE III

QUESTION 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 39-42.
Notes by the Quarrachi Editors.

QUESTION 2

Whether one is to enjoy God alone or the uncreated Good?

Finally there is asked, whether one is to enjoy God alone or the uncreated Good; and that it is, seems (from the following):

1. One is to enjoy that alone, which is to be loved for its own sake; but that alone[10] is to be loved for its own sake, which is good on its own account [propter se]; but that is good on its own account, which has the goodness, which it ha- / -s, not *from an other*, nor is that goodness *for an other*; . . .

[10] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted *alone*, which is badly absent from the Vatican text and the more recent codex cc. — On this minor proposition of the argument cf. Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. VIII, ch. 5: For what is absolutely good and jocund, is lovable and eligible; but to each (it is) such as it is to each. Cf. also Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 1, 2 and 8, where it concerns the last End; and On the Greater Morals, Bk. I, ch. 2, where it deals with the common

good.

p. 40

ha- / -bet, nec habet *ab alio*, nec bonitas illa est *ad aliud*; hoc autem est solus Deus: ergo etc.

which it ha- / -s, not *from an other*, nor is that goodness *for an other*; but this is God alone: ergo etc..

2. Item, illo solo est fruendum, quod quietat animae appetitum; sed animae appetitus non quietatur sufficienter nisi in eo quod est illa perfectius et maius bonum; hoc autem est solus Deus: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, one is to enjoy that alone, which quiets [quietat] the appetite of the soul; but the appetite of the soul is not quieted sufficiently except in that which is more perfect than it and a greater good; but this is God alone: ergo etc..

3. Item, appetitus non sufficienter quietatur nisi per aliquid, quod animam implet, quia ex ea parte anima deficit in quiete, qua deficit in plenitudine; sed[1] est capax Dei secundum appetitum: ergo si omne creatum est in infinitum minus illo, nullum supplet animae appetitum. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus:[2] « Animam totius Trinitatis capacem nihil minus quam Trinitas potest implere ».

3. Likewise, the appetite is not sufficiently quieted except through something, which fills the soul, because for its own part the soul is lacking in the quiet, which it lacks in (its) fullness; but (the soul)[1] it is capable [capax] of God according to (its) appetite: therefore if every created thing is to be infinitely [est in infinitum] less than Him, no (created thing) fulfils the appetite of the soul. And this is what (St.) Augustine says:[2] « The soul capable of the whole Trinity: nothing less than the Trinity can fill it ».

4. Item, bonum, quod potest cogitari, potest appeti: ergo si aliquo maius bonum potest cogitari, maius illo potest appeti; sed omni finito maius potest cogitari: ergo maius potest appeti: ergo nullum finitum terminat animae appetitum sufficienter: ergo solo bono infinito, quod Deus est, est fruendum, quo habito, non potest amplius cogitari nec desiderari.

4. Likewise, the good, which can be thought, can be desired [appeti]: therefore if a good greater than something can be thought, it can be desired more than it; but the greater-than-every-finite can be thought: therefore it can be desired more: therefore no finite thing terminates the appetite of the soul sufficiently: therefore one is to enjoy only the infinite Good, which is God, whom when had, nothing more [amplius] can be thought or desired.

Contra: 1. Videtur, quod bono creato contingat frui, quia, quamvis appetitus materiae sit infinitus, tamen per formam creatam incorruptibilem[3] sufficienter finitur: ergo similiter videtur, quod sit aliquod bonum creatum, quod sufficienter finiet animae appetitum; sed omni tali est fruendum: ergo aliquo bono creato est fruendum.

On the contrary: 1. It seems, that one happens to enjoy the created good, because, although the appetite for matter be infinite, however through the incorruptible,[3] created form it is sufficiently ended: therefore it similarly seems, that there is some created good, which will sufficiently end the appetite of the soul; but one is to enjoy every such (thing): therefore one is to enjoy some created good.

2. Item, appetitus humanus est finitae

2. Likewise, the human appetite is of a finite

capacitatis, ergo non capit nisi finitum, vel si capiat infinitum, capit finite: ergo si finiatur per aliud quod capit, finitur per bonum finitum: ergo videtur, quod aliquo bono finito sit fruendum.

capacity, therefore it captures naught but the finite, and/or if it captures the infinite, it captures it finitely: therefore if it is ended through something which it captures, it is ended through a finite good: therefore it seems, that one is to enjoy some finite good.

3. Item, specialiter videtur, quod *homine* sit fruendum, quia omni eo est fruendum, quod Deus fruitur; sed Deus homine fruitur, quia hominem amat; sed amore illo, quo amat se, amat hominem, quia non est in eo[4] duplex amor; sed primus est fruitionis: ergo et secundus.

3. Likewise, it especially seems, that one is to enjoy *man*, because one is to enjoy every thing, which God enjoys; but God enjoys man, because He loves man; but by that love [amore], by which He loves [amat] Himself, He loves man, because there is in Him[4] no twofold love; but the first belongs to enjoying: therefore also the second.

4. Item, videtur specialiter de *virtute*; quia omni eo est fruendum, quod est propter se appetendum; haec est manifesta per se; sed omne bonum honestum est propter se appetendum, « quia honestum est quod sua vi nos trahibt et dignitate sua nos allicit », sicut dicit Tullius,[5] et Augustinus dividit honestum contra utile; sed virtus cadit in genere honesti: ergo virtute est fruendum.

4. Likewise, it especially seems (so) from *virtue*; because one is to enjoy every thing, which is to be desired [appetendum] for its own sake; this is self-manifest [manifest per se]; but every honest good is to be desired for its own sake, « because the honest is that which draws us by its own power and allures us by its own dignity »; as (Marcus) Tullius (Cicero) says,[5] and (St.) Augustine divides the honest against the useful; but virtue falls in the genus of the honest: therefore one is to enjoy virtue.

5. Item, videtur specialiter de *beatitudine*. Omni eo est fruendum, quo habito animus quiescit et delectatur et nihil ultra potest quaerere; sed beatitudo creata est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

5. Likewise, it especially seems (so) from *beatitude*. One is to enjoy every thing, by which when had the spirit rests [quiescit] and delights and can seek nothing beyond (it); but created beatitude is of this kind: therefore etc..

CONCLUSIO.

Solo Deo proprie est fruendum; improprie frui licit bonis spiritualibus, quae delectant et fini sunt coniuncta.

CONCLUSION

Properly (speaking), one is to enjoy God alone; improperly (speaking) it is licit to enjoy the spiritual goods, which delight and have been conjoined to (one's) End.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod solo Deo est fruendum, *proprie* accepto *frui*, prout dicit motum cum delectatione et quietatione. Sed *communiter* accepto *frui*, prout dicit motum cum delectatione tantum,[6] omnibus, quae spiritualiter delectant et coniuncta sunt fini, cuiusmodi sunt fructus, dona et beatitudines, potest frui homo non indebite; sed primo modo solo Deo.

I respond: It must be said, that one is to enjoy God alone, in the *proper* acceptation of *to enjoy*, insofar as it means [prout dicit] a movement with delectation and resting. But in the *common* acceptation of *to enjoy*, inasmuch as it means a movement with only delectation,[6] all things, which spiritually delight and have been conjoined with (one's) End, of which kind are fruits, gifts and beatitudes, a man can not-unduly

Et ratio huius est, quia nihil potest animam sufficienter *finire* nisi bonum, ad quod est.[7] Hoc autem est bonum summum, quod superius est anima, et bonum infinitium, quod excedit animae vires. *Cognitio* enim animae naturalis[8] est cognitio non arctata; unde nata est quodam modo omnia cognoscere, unde non impletur cognitio eius aliquo cognoscibili, nisi quod habet in se omnia cognoscibilia et quo cognito omnia cognoscuntur. Similiter *affectio* eius nata est diligere omne bonum; ergo nullo bono sufficienter finitur affectus, nisi quod[9] est bonum omnis boni et quod est omnia in omnibus. De quo / bono Exodi trigesimo tertio: . . .

enjoy; but in the first manner God alone. And the reason for this is, that nothing can sufficiently *finish* [finire] the soul except the good, for which it is.[7] But this is the most high Good, which is higher than the soul, and (is) the infinite Good, which exceeds the powers [vires] of the soul. For the soul's natural *cognition*[8] is an unconstrained [non arctata] cognition; whence it is naturally bound [nata sunt] in a certain manner to cognize all things, whence its cognition is not filled with anything cognizable, unless because it has in itself all cognizables and with this cognized all things are cognized. Similarly its *affection* [affectio] is naturally bound to love [diligere] every good; therefore by no good is (its) affection [affectus] sufficiently ended, unless that (good)[9] is the Good of every good and the All in all. Of which / Good (there is said) in the thirty-third (chapter) of Exodus: . . .

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[1] Supple cum cod. I *anima*. Paulo infra fide codd. cum ed. 1 post *nullum* expunximus *creatum*; cod. W ponit *implet* pro *supplet*.
[2] Potius auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 27, ubi sic habetur: Animam tamen hominis, id est mentum, nulla creatura iuxta substantiam implere potest, nisi sola Trinitas. Et paulo inferius: Solius enim Trinitatis est intrare et implere naturam sive substantiam, quam creavit.
[3] Vat. et cod. K *creatam corporalem et incorruptibilem*; omnes fere codd. omittunt *corporalem et*; melioris notae codd. ut F G H T W aa bb ee ff et ed. 1 retinent solummodo *incorruptibilem*; alii ut A habent *incorporalem*; solummodo V *corporalem*, X *corruptibilem*; edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *incorporalem et incorruptibilem*. Praeter auctoritatem codd. pro nostra lectione facit eiusdem convenientia tum cum solutione huius obiectionis, tum cum doctrina nostri Doctoris. Intelligi enim potest assertio hic posita tum de *caelo empyreo*, sicut cod. aa intelligit, addendo: *ut patet in corporibus caelestibus*, tum de ipsa *anima*, quae iuxta Seraphicum, licet sit spiritualis et incorporea, non omnino expers est compositionis ex forma et materia; et II. Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. explicite de ipsa affirmatur, quod appetitum materiae perfecte satiet et quietet. Quoad caelum empyreum Scholastici iuxta Aristotelem communiter asserebant, ipsum esse et incorruptibile et immobile. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 1 et III. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6. — Mox cod. T *finiat* loco *finiet*.
[4] Cod. K *Deo* pro *eo*.
[5] Libr. II. Rhetor. c. 53. (ed. Taurin. 1823): Nam (honestum) est quiddam, quod sua vi nos allicit ad se, non emolumento captans aliquo, sed trahens sua dignitate. — De divisione boni, quae ex August. affertur, vide ipsius lib. 83 Qq. a. 30. — Immediate post mendum Vat. *dividitur* loco *dividit* castigamus

[1] Supply with codex I *the soul*. A little below on the testimony of the codices and edition 1 we have expunged *created* after *no*; codex W has *fills* [implet] in place of *fulfills* [supplet].
[2] Or rather the author of the book On the Spirit and soul, ch. 27, where it is put thus: However the soul of man, that is the mind, can be filled by no creature according to substance, except the Trinity alone. And a little below this: For it belongs to the Trinity alone to enter and fill the nature or substance, which It created.
[3] The Vatican text and codex K has *the created, corporal and incorruptible*; nearly all the codices omit *corporal and*; the codices of better note, as F G H T W aa bb ee ff and edition 1 retain only *incorruptible*; others as A have *incorporeal and incorruptible*; only V has *corporal*, X *corruptible*; editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 have *incorporeal and incorruptible*. Besides the authority of the codices, the convenience of our reading both with the solution of this objection, and with the doctrine of our Doctor, argues on its own behalf. For the assertion here posited can be understood both of the *empyrean heaven*, as codex aa understands it, by adding *as is clear in celestial bodies*, and of the *soul* itself, which according to the Seraphic (Doctor), though it is spiritual and incorporeal, it is not entirely destitute [expers] of composition of form and matter; and in Sent., Bk. II, d. 19, a. 1. q. 1 in the body of the reply there is an explicit affirmation of the same, that the appetite for matter is perfectly satisfied and quieted. As regards the empyrean heaven the Scholastics, following Aristotle, commonly asserted, that it is both incorruptible and immobile. Cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 12, a. 2. q. 1, and d. 14, p. I, a. 3. q. 1 and Sent., Bk. III, d. 13, a. 1. q. 3 at n. 6. — Then codex T has *does . . . end* in place of *will . . . end*.
[4] Codex K has *God* in place of *Him*.

ex mss. et primis edd.
[6] Cod. K hic addit *sic*. Mox multi codd. ut A F G H K W X Y Z ee etc. cum ed. 1 pro *fini* habent *frui*.
[7] Vat. addit *creata*, quod tamen deest in mss. et ed. 1.
[8] *Naturalis* refertur ad *cognitio*, ita ut sensus sit: Si inspicias naturam cognitionis, quae animae competit, ipsa non est arctata. — Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, *rationalis* loco *naturalis*, sed non ita bene. — De propositione, quae deinde sequitur, vide Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 4. in q. praeced. cit.
[9] Cod. K adiungit *per illud*, quae additio videtur adiuncta, quia suplemendum est *eo* sive *illo*.

[5] Rhetorics, Bk. II, ch. 53 (Turin: 1823): For (the honest) is a certain thing, which allures us to itself by its own power, not capturing by any emolument, but drawing by its own dignity. — On the division of the good, which is cited from (St.) Augustine, see his own book 83 Questions, a. 30. — Immediately after this we have corrected the error of the Vatican text, which has *is divided* in place of *divides*, from the manuscripts and the first editions.
[6] Codex K here adds *in this manner* [sic]. Then many of the codices as A F G H K W X Y Z ee etc. together with edition 1 have *enjoying* [frui] in place of *(one's) End* [fini].
[7] The Vatican text adds at this point *created*, which however is lacking in the manuscripts and edition 1.
[8] *Natural* refers to *cognition*, so that the sense is: If you inspect the nature of cognition, which befits the soul, it is not constrained. — The Vatican text, contradicting the manuscripts and edition 1, has *rational* in place of *natural*, but not so well. — On the proposition, which then follows, see Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 4, cited in the previous question.
[9] Codex K adjoins *through that* [per illud: rendering the reading, *unless through that which is the Good*], which seems to have been adjoined, because one must supply *by Him* [eo] or *by that* [illo] [trans. -- perhaps the editors here are unaware of the substantive use of the relative adj. quod, meaning *that*; the English follows this latter usage].

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p. 41

De quo / bono Exodi trigesimo tertio:[1] *Ostendam tibi omne bonum*. Hoc autem est summum bonum: ergo etc.

Of which / Good (there is said) in the thirty-third (chapter) of Exodus:[1] *I shall show you every good*. But this is the most high Good: ergo etc..

Item,[2] nihil sufficientur *finit* animam nisi bonum *infinitum*, quia ad hoc, ut finiatur, necesse est, ipsam finiri secundum aestimationem; alioquin non esset beata, nisi se existimaret beatam. Aestimatio autem supergreditur omne finitum, quia omni finito potest maius cogitari aliquid: ergo cum affectio possit[3] se extendere ubi et aestimatio, necessario affectio animae supergreditur omne finitum; et si hoc, nullo bono finito sufficienter finitur. Fruendum est ergo solo Deo, quia summum bonum et infinitum.

Likewise,[2] nothing sufficiently *finishes* the soul except the *infinite* Good, because for this, that it be finished, it is necessary, that it be finished according to (its) estimation; otherwise it would not be blessed, unless it considered [existimaret] itself (to be) blessed. But estimation oversteps every finite, because something greater than every finite can be thought: therefore since affection can[3] extend itself where (there is) also estimation, the affection of the soul necessarily oversteps every finite; and if this (is so), (then) by no finite good is it sufficiently finished. Therefore one is to enjoy God alone, because (He is) the most high Good and the Infinite One.

Et non solum Deo fruendum propter perfectam finitionem, sed etiam propter perfectam *delectationem*. Ad delectationem

And one (is) not only to enjoy God on account of perfect finishing, but also on account of perfect *delectation*. For, for

enim concurrit[4] *delectabile* et *coniunctio* eius cum eo quod *delectatur*. Omne autem, quod delectat animam, delectat in ratione boni et pulcri; et quoniam solus Deus est ipsa[5] bonitas et pulcritudo, ideo in Deo solo est perfecta delectatio.

delectation there concurrs[4] the *delectable* and its *conjunction* with that which *is delighted*. But everything, which delights the soul, delights it in the reckoning of good and beauty; and since God alone is Goodness and Beauty Itself[5], for that reason only in God is there perfect delectation.

Item, quia ibi est *coniunctio*; solus autem Deus est qui perfectissime coniungitur. Nam coniungitur secundum[6] veritatem et intimitatem. Solus enim Deus propter summam simplicitatem et spiritualitem illabitur animae, ita quod secundum veritatem est in anima et intimior animae quam ipsa sibi.

Likewise, because there is a *conjunction*; but only God is the one who is most perfectly conjoined. For He is conjoined according to[6] truth and deepest interiority [intimitatem]. For only God according to (His) most high simplicity and spirituality glides into the soul, so that in [secundum] truth He is in the soul and more interior to the soul than it (is) to itself.

Omnes enim[7] hae quatuor rationes ad unam reducuntur, scilicet ad hanc: quia nata est anima ad percipiendum bonum infinitum, quod Deus est, ideo in eo solo debet quiescere et eo frui.

For[7] all these four reasons are reduced to one, that is to this: because the soul is naturally bound to perceive the infinite Good, which is God, for that reason in Him alone ought it rest and Him enjoy.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de appetitu materiae; dicendum, quod appetitus materiae ordinatur ad formam tanquam ad perfectionem substantialem, ex qua[8] et materia fit unum; et ideo necesse est formam esse eiusdem generis cum materia, nec est omnino supra materiam: ideo finita est omnis talis forma. Talis autem, si sit incorruptibilis, propter necessariam sui[9] unionem arctat appetitum materiae et arctatum finit; unde non finitur in sua amplitudine. Appetitus autem animae non sic arctatur propter unionem cum appetibili, immo dilatatur; et ideo oportet, quod perficiatur aliquo omnino summo.

1. But to that which is objected concerning the appetite for matter; it must be said, that the appetite for matter is ordered to form as to substantial perfection, out of which (form)[8] and matter there is made one thing; and for that reason it is necessary that the form be of the same genus with the matter, nor is (the form) entirely above the matter: for that reason every such form is finite. But such, if it be incorruptible, on account of the necessary union of itself[9] constrains (its) appetite for matter and finishes (what has been) constrained; whence it is not ended in its fullness. But the appetite of the soul is not thus constrained on account of (its) union with a desirable [appetibili], nay rather it is dilated; and for that reason it is proper, that it be perfected by something entirely most high.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod[10] non capit nisi finite; dicendum, quod infinitum bonum finite capit, quoniam ipsa est finita. Sed quoniam bonum illud est infinitum, ideo ab ipso totaliter absorbetur, ut iam eius capacitas undique terminetur. Unde non tantum gaudebit, sed sicut dicit Anselmus,[11] *in gaudium Domini introibit*. Quod si tantum caperet et non vinceretur nec absorberetur,

2. To that which is objected, that (the appetite of the soul)[10] does not capture except in a finite manner; it must be said, that it captures the infinite Good in a finite manner, since it itself is finite. But since that Good is infinite, for that reason it is totally absorbed by It, so that its capacity is already terminated on all sides. Whence it not only rejoices, but as (St.) Anselm says,[11]

adhuc posset insurgere appetitus ad amplius aliquid capiendum. Patet igitur, quod ad hoc quod anima compleatur, quamvis capacitatem habeat finitam,[12] tamen necesse est adesse bonum infinitum.

it shall enter into joy of the Lord. Because if it only captured and was not conquered nor was absorbed, the appetite could still rise up to capture something more. Therefore it is clear, that for this, that the soul be thoroughly filled [compleatur], although it has a finite capacity,[12] it is however necessary that the infinite Good be present [adesse].

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de homine; dicendum, quod Deus diligit hominem, et amor Dei est amor fruitionis; tamen hominem non fuitur, quia diligendo se diligit hominem, id est, fruendo se utitur homine. Quod patet sic: quia dilectio Dei ad creaturam non est affectio, sed effectus[13] communicatio. Communicatio autem secundum rationem *habitualem* attenditur secundum bonitatem; quia bonum est quod natum est se communicare. Secundum rationem vero *actualem* attenditur sive respicit voluntatem; quia enim vult, ideo facit. Ratio ergo communicandi venit ex voluntate et bonitate, sicut ratio cognoscendi ab exemplari et intelligentia. Quia igitur ex conversione voluntatis supra suam bonitatem nos diligit,[14] ideo se fruendo nos diligt.

3. But to that which is objected concerning man; it must be said, that God loves [diligit] man, and the love [amor] of God is a love of enjoying; however He does not enjoy man, because by loving [diligendo] Himself He loves man, that is, by enjoying Himself He uses man. Which is thus clear: because the love [dilectio] of God for a creature is not an affection, but the effect[13] (is) a communication. But a communication according to a *habitual* reason is attended according to goodness; because the good is what is naturally bound to communicate itself. According to a reason truly *actual* it is attended or respects the will; for because He wants, for that reason He does. Therefore the reason for communicating comes from (His) will and goodness, just as the reason for knowing from the exemplar and intelligence. Therefore because He[14] loves us from a conversion of (His) will upon His own goodness, for that reason by enjoying Himself He loves us.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de virtute, quod virtus est bonum honestum; dicendum, quod bonum honestum dicitur dupliciter: aut quod est *pure bonum*, aut in quo relucet eius *similitudo*. Primo modo honesto est fruendum, *proprie* accepto frui, quia hoc solum terminat et quietat. Secundo modo non, nisi *communiter* accipiatur, prout dicit dele- / -ctationem. . . .

4. To that which is objected concerning virtue, that virtue is an honest good; it must be said, that a honest good is said in a twofold manner: either what is *purely good*, or in that which glitters its *similitude*. In the first manner one is to enjoy the honest, in the *proper* acceptation of "to enjoy", because this alone terminates and quiets. In the second manner (it is) not, unless one accepts (the term) *in a common sense*, insofar as it means dele- / -ctation. . . .

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[1] Vers. 19.
[2] Vat. contra fere omnes mss.: *Similiter* pro *Item* et paulo post ter *existimatio* loco *aestimatio*.
[3] Vat. contra codd. A T aa bb etc. *posset*, sed minus apte, quia agitur hic de naturali consecutione, quae subiecto semper inest. Hinc et immediate post Vat., obnitente maiore parte mss. ut A G K L O T V W X Y Z etc. et ed. 1, minus bene *extendere eo, ubi est*

[1] Verse 19.
[2] The Vatican text against nearly all the manuscripts: *Similarly* in place of *Likewise* and a little afterwards it has *consideration* [existimatio] in place of *estimation* [aestimatio].
[3] The Vatican text against codices A T aa bb etc. has *could*, but less aptly, because there one deals with natural consequence, which is always in a subject.

existimatio. Cod. cc. *ut* loco *ubi*. Paulo infra auctoritate plurimorum codd. ut A C F G H K L O S T U V W Z etc. cum ed. 1 post *et si* substituimus *hoc* pro *haec*. Cod. K planius *et si hoc, ergo*.
[4] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *concurrit* loco *concernitur* et paulo post castigavimus mendum Vat., quae cum recentiore cod. cc habet *delectat* pro *delectatur*. — Cfr. supra a. 3. q. 1 arg. 1. ad opp.
[5] Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *ipsa*, quod Vat. indebite omittit.
[6] Cod. W *per*.
[7] Cod. R *autem*.
[8] Supple hic, sicuti et paulo infra, post *omnimo* cum cod. T *forma*.
[9] Multi codd. antiquiores et meliores ut A C F G L O R S T U X Y Z etc. ponunt *sibi* pro *sui*. Mox cod. T post *unde* falso omittit *non*. — Sententiam hic positam S. Doctor breviter complectitur III. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6. his verbis: Sicut dicimus de forma caeli, quod complet appetitum materiae, quia materia eius non appetit esse sub ulteriori forma, adeo forma ipsam statuit in actualitate complete. Cfr. Scot., II Physc., q. 4. n. 4. et 15.
[10] Subaudi cum cod. X *anima humana*. Mox cod. A post *bonum finite* addit *anima*.
[11] Proslog. c. 26: « Non ergo totum illud gaudium intrabit in guadentes, sed toti gaudentes intrabunt in gaudium ». Alludit ad Matth. 25, 21. — Immediate post Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *totum* pro *tantum*.
[12] Plures antiquiorum codd. ut A C G O S T U X bb ee ff cum ed. 1, sensu eodem remanente, *quamvis capacitate habeat finitatem, necesse est*.
[13] Vat., quae habet *affectus*, emendatur ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.
[14] Ed. 1 hic addit *Deus*, quod certe subaudiendum est.

From this point and immediately afterwards, the Vatican text disagreeing with the greater part of the manuscripts as A G K L O T V W X Y Z etc. and edition 1, has less well *extend itself to that, where there is esteem*. Codex cc has *as also estimation* [ut et . . .] in place of *where (there is)]* [ubi et . . .]. A little below this on the authority of very many of the codices, as A C F G H K L O S T U V W Z etc., together with edition 1 we have substituted *this* [hoc] in place of *this* [haec]. Codex K more plainly reads: *and if this (is so), therefore*.
[4] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *concurs* [concurrit] in place of *combined* [concernitur] and a little after this we have corrected the error of the Vatican text, which together with the more recent codex cc has *delights* in place of *is delighted*. — Cf. above in a. 3, q. 1, sed contra n. 1.
[5] We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 *Itself*, which the Vatican text unduly omits.
[6] Codex W has *through* [per].
[7] Codex R has *but* [autem].
[8] Supply here, just as a little below this, with codex T after *entirely*, *form*.
[9] Many of the more ancient and better codices as A C F G L O R S T U X Y Z etc. have *to itself* [sibi] in place of *of itself* [sui]. Then codex T falsely omits *not* after *whence*. — The sentence here posited by the Seraphic Doctor is briefly comprised in Sent., Bk. III, d. 13, a. 1. q. 3 at n. 6 with these words: As we speak of the form of the heaven, which completes the appetite for matter, because its matter does not aim [appetit] to be under an ulterior form, to the extent it establishes the very form completely in actuality. Cf. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Physics, Bk. II, q. 4, n. 4 and 15.
[10] Understand with codex X *the human soul* [trans. more exactly *the appetite of the soul*]. Then codex A reads *the soul* before *captures the infinite Good in a finite manner*.
[11] Prologion, ch. 26: « Therefore that whole joy will not enter into those rejoicing, but the whole of those rejoicing will enter into joy ». He alludes to Mt. 25:21. — Immediately afterwards the Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, has *the whole* in place of *only*.
[12] Very many of the more ancient codices as A C G O S T U X bb ee ff together with edition 1, retaining the same sense, have *although it has a finitude in (its) capacity, it is necessary that*. [13] The Vatican text, which has *the affection*, is emended from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, and 6.
[14] Edition 1 has *God*, which certainly must be understood.

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p. 42

prout dicit dele- / -ctationem. Huiusmodiinsofar as it means dele- / -ctation. For enim[1] propter assimilationem ad Deum(virtues)[1] of this kind on account of (their) habent pulcritudinem, qua nos delectant etassimilation to God have beauty, by which alliciunt; tamen in ipsis non estthey delight and allure us; however one is quiescendum, quia tunc amittuntnot to rest in them, because then they lose

pulcritudinem, quia « virtutes, cum ad se referuntur, superbae sunt et inflatae ».[2]

their beauty, because « the virtues, when they are referred to themselves, are proud and puffed up ».[2]

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de beatitudine; dicendum, quod beatitudo creata non finit appetitum per se, sed per coniunctionem cum increata: unde anima ipsam[3] diligit propter Deum, non propter se.

5. To that which is objected concerning beatitude; it must be said, that created beatitude does not end the appetite by itself, but through a conjunction with uncreated (Beatitude): whence the soul loves [diligit] itself[3] for God's sake, not for its own sake.

SCHOLION.

I. Omnes antiqui doctores, excepto Durando, conveniunt in ea sententia, quod solo Deo *obiective* et *materialiter* sit fruendum, beatitudine vero creata sive beatitudine *subiective* sumta (ut moderni loquuntur), *formaliter* tantum. Seraphicus Doctor in solut. ad 5. iam reprobaverat Durandi (hic. q. 2.) singularem et falsam opinionem, quod actus mentis, quo Deus immediate attingitur, sit fruitionis obiectum immediatum, Deus vero eiusdem obiectum remotum.

II. Quomodo quis improprie frui possit *virtutibus*, magis explicatur II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, ubi etiam exponitur, quomodo dona, fructus et beatitudines *coniuncta sint fini*, qui secundum Scripturam est caritas. — Valde notanda sunt profunda et copiosa argumenta, quibus Seraphicus probat, quod in Deo solo sit perfecta delectatio et quietatio, de quo etiam egregie loquitur II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. Cfr. etiam S. Thom. S. c. Gent. I. c. 43; III. c. 48. 50. — Quoad illapsum Dei in animam cfr. II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

Quoad quaestionem principalem vide auctores in Scholio praecedenti.

SCHOLIUM

I. All the ancient doctors, except Durandus, agree in that sentence, that one is to enjoy only God *objectively* and *materially*, but created beatitude or beatitude taken *subjectively* (as the moderns speak), only *formally*. The Seraphic Doctor in his solution to n. 5 already reproved Durandus' (here at q. 2) singular and false opinion, that the act of the mind, by which God is immediately attained, it the immediate object of fruition, but God its remote object.

II. How anyone can improperly enjoy *virtues*, is explained at greater length in Sent., Bk. II, d. 38, a. 1, a. 2, in reply to n. 3, where there is also expounded, how gifts, fruits and beatitudes *are conjoined with (their) End*, which according to Scripture is charity. — Well noted are the profound and copious arguments, by which the Seraphic (Doctor) proves, that in God alone is there perfect delectation and rest, of which he also speaks egregiously in Sent., Bk. II, d. 16, a. 1. q. 1. Cf. also St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. I, ch. 43; Bk. III, ch. 48 and 50. — As regards God's sliding into the soul cf. Sent., Bk. II, p. II, a. 1. q. 2.

As regards the principal question see the authors (cited) in the preceding Scholium.

[1] Subintellige cum cod. R *virtutes*. Mox plures antiquiores codd. ut A C F G K L O R S U T Z ee post *pulritudinem* loco *qua* habent *quia*.
[2] August., XIX de Civ. Dei, c. 25: Virtutes, cum ad se ipsas referuntur nec propter aliud expetuntur, etiam tunc inflatae ac superbae sunt.
[3] Lapsum librariorum Vat. ponentium *ipsa* pro *ipsam* correximus ope mss. et ed. 1.

[1] Understand with codex R *virtues*. Then very many of the more ancient codices as A C F G K L O R S U T Z and ee have *because* in place of *by which*.
[2] (St.) Augustine, The City of God, Bk. XIX, ch. 25: The virtues, when they are referred to themselves and are not sought out on account of another, are then also puffed up and proud.
[3] The lapsus of the compilers of the Vatican text of placing *itself* [ipsa] in place of *itself* [ipsam] we have corrected with the help of the manuscripts and edition 1.

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S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 42-45.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 42-45.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Dub. I.

In parte ista circa litteram quaeruntur plura, et primo de hoc quod dicit: *Eorum vero quaedam sunt, quorum usus omnis est in significando, non in iustificando*. Sed contra: Omnia Sacramenta sunt medicinae, quia secundum Hugonem de sancto Victore[4] Sacramenta omni tempore fuerunt medicinae; sed omnis medicina habet effectum in curando: ergo et Sacramenta similiter; sed ista curatio est iustificatio: ergo omni tempore Sacramenta habuerunt iustificare.

Doubt I

In this part of my (commentary), very many things are asked about the text (of Master Peter), and first concerning this which he says: *But of these there are* certain ones, *whose every use is in signifying, not in justifying*. On the contrary: All the Sacraments are medicines, because according to Hugo of St. Victor[4] the Sacraments were in every season [omni tempore] medicines; but every medicine has an effect in curing: therefore also the Sacraments similarly; but this curing of theirs is justification: therefore the Sacraments have to justify in every season.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dupliciter est considerare Sacramenta veteris Legis, scilicet *in se* sive ratione operis operati; et sic erant tantum ad significandum; vel *ratione fidei annexae* sive caritatis sive ratione operis operantis; et sic erant ad iustificandum Sacramenta legalia, praeter

I respond: It must be said, that there is a twofold manner of considering the Sacraments of the old Law, that is *in themselves* or by reason of the work worked [ratione operis operati]; and thus they were only for signifying; and/or *by reason of annexed faith* or of charity or by reason of

Circumcisionem.[5]

the work of the worker [ratione operis operantis]; and thus the Sacraments of the Law [legalia], in addition to [praeter] Circumcision, were for justifying.[5]

Dub. II.

Omne *igitur signum res est aliqua*. Opponitur de ista divisione. Videtur enim Magister male dividere, quia superius non dividutur contra suum inferius; sed res est superius ad signum: ergo etc.

Doubt II.

T*herefore every sign is . . . some thing*. There is an objection [opponitur] concerning this division of his. For Master (Peter) seems to have divided badly, because the superior is not divided against its inferior; but the thing is superior to the sign: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod verum est, quod superius in sua generalitate acceptum non dividitur contra suum inferius; sed contractum[6] bene potest dividi. Hic autem *res*[7] contrahitur ad standum pro re non significante.

I respond: It must be said, that it is true, that the superior accepted in its general sense [in sua generalitate] is not divided against its inferior; but what is contracted [contractum][6] can well be divided. But this *thing*[7] is contracted to stand for a thing not signifying.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister: *Non autem e converso omnis res signum*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia signum est quod ducit in aliud cognoscendum; sed omnis res ducit in aliud, quia omnis res est causa, vel effectus. Causa autem ducit in cognitionem effectus,[8] et e converso. *Si tu dicas*, quod non omne, quod ducit, est signum, sed quod ducit in prius; tunc omnis creatura est signum, cum ducat in Deum.

Doubt III.

Likewise there is asked of this which Master (Peter) says: *But not every thing is a sign*. For he seems to speak badly, because a sign is that which leads unto cognizing another; but every thing leads unto another, because every thing is a cause, and/or an effect. But a cause leads unto the cognition of the effect,[8] and conversely. *If you say*, that not every thing, which leads, is a sign, but that what leads unto the first; then every creature is a sign, since it leads unto God.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod duplex est signum, scilicet *naturale* et *institutum*. De primo non intenditur hic, sed de secundo; unde non valet obiectio ad propositum, quoiam hic[9] intenditur de signo ex institutione, sicut sunt signa vocalia et sacramentalia.

I respond: It must be said, that a sign is twofold; that is *natural* and *instituted*. The first kind is not intended here, but the second (is); whence the objection to the proposition is not valid, since here[9] there is intended the sign from institution, as are the verbal [vocalia] and sacramental signs.

Dub. IV.

Item videtur Magister male dicere in hoc quod dicit: *Primum de rebus, postea de signis*. Videtur enim dicere[10] debuisse potius e converso, quia signum ducit in cognitionem rei: ergo prius esset agendum vel dicendum de signis quam de rebus.

Doubt IV.

Likewise the Master seems to speak badly in this which he says: *First . . . things, afterwards signs*. For he seems that he ought to have said[10] rather conversely, because the sign leads unto the cognition of the thing: therefore one is to deal and/or speak of signs before things.

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[4] Libr. I. de Sacram. p. 8. c. 12. (ed. Paris. 1526): Si quis igitur quaerat tempus institutionis Sacramentorum, sciat, quia quamdiu morbus est, tempus medicinae est.
[5] Cod. Z addit: *supple, quae non tantum erat ad significandum ratione operis operati, sed ad iustificandum*.

[4] On the Sacraments, Bk. I, p. 8, ch. 12 (Paris: 1526): Therefore if one asks the time for the institution of the Sacraments, let him know, that as long as there is disease, it is the time for medicine.
[5] Codex Z adds: *supply, which not only was to signify by reason of the work worked, but (also) to justify*.
[6] That is, if the genus is contracted by a difference to

[6] Hoc est, si genus per differentiam ad speciem contrahitur.
[7] Codd. L O satis bene: *Sic est hic, et res contrahitur*.
[8] Plures codd. ut A C L O R T W X etc. indebite omittunt: *causa autem ducit in cognitionem effectus*.
[9] Contradicentibus codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, perperam Vat. loco *hic* habet *hoc* et post *sacramentalia* superflue addit *tale ergo signum non est omnis res; licet omnis res sit signum primo modo*.
[10] Multi codd. ut A C F G K L O U W X etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 *dixisse*.

the species.
[7] Codices L and O have well enough: *So it is here, and the thing is contracted . . .*.
[8] Very many of the codices as A C L O R T W Z etc. unduly omit: *But a cause leads unto the cognition of the effect*.
[9] Having falsely contradicted the codices and editions 1, 2 and 3, the Vatican text has *this* [hoc] in place of *here* [hic] and after *sacramental signs* it superfluously adds *therefore every thing is not such a sign; though every this is a sign in the first manner*.
[10] Many of the codices as A C F G K L O U W X etc together with editions 1, 2, 3 and 6, have *ought to had said* [debuisse dixisse].

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod prior est cognitio signi quam rei, respectu cuius est signum; sed non oportet, quod omnis rei. Unde ipse primo agit de rebus, quarum sacramenta non sunt signa.

I respond: It must be said, that the cognition of the sign is prior to (that) of the thing, in which respect the sign is; but it is not proper, that (this be the case) for every thing. Whence he first deals with the things, of which the sacraments are not signs.

Dub. V.

Item videtur, quod ista divisio rerum: *Aliae sunt quibus fruendum* etc., sit male assignata respectu *divisi*, quia divisum simplicius est dividentibus et dividentibus aliquid est[1] commune; sed Deo nihil est simplicius nec est aliquid commune Deo et creaturae: ergo etc.

Doubt V.

Likewise it seems, that this division of things: *some things which one is to enjoy* etc., is badly assigned in respect to the *divided*, because the divided is more simple than the ones being divided [dividentibus] and there is[1] something common to the ones being divided; but there is nothing more simple than God nor is there anything common to God and a creature: ergo etc..

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est divisio unius communis secundum *nomen tantum*; et sic est divisio aequivoci; est alia divisio communis secundum *nomen* et *rem*; et haec est divisio univoci; est etiam tertia *medio modo*; et ista est analogi, ubi non est communitas secundum unitatem naturae,[2] sed secundum similitudinem proportionis; et haec communitas est rationis.

I respond: It must be said, that there is a division of the one thing common according to *name only*; and thus there is a division of the equivocal; there is another division of the common according to *name* and *thing*; and this is the division of the univocal; there is also a third (division) *by a middle manner*; and that is of the analogue, where there is no community according to unity of nature[2] but according to similitude of proportion; and this community belongs to reason.

Dub. VI.

Item videtur mala diviso quantum ad *membra*: videtur enim, quod tertium membrum sit superfluum. Omni enim re aut est utendum, aut fruendum: ergo tertium superfluit.

Item, sicut est res, quae fruitur et utitur, ita est res, qua fruendum est et utendum, ut Christus: ergo qua ratione ponitur[3] tertium membrum, deberet poni quartum.

Doubt VI.

Likewise the division seems bad as much as regards its *members*: for it seems, that the third member is superfluous. For every thing either is to be used, or to be enjoyed: therefore the third is superfluous.

Likewise, as there is a thing, which enjoys and uses, so there is a thing, which one is to enjoy and to use, as (is) Christ: therefore by the reason by which there is posited[3] a third

member, there ought to be posited a fourth.

Respondeo: Omnis res, quae est natura aliqua, aut est *finis*; et sic est res, qua fruendum; aut *deducens ad finem*; et sic est res, qua utendum; aut *ad finem perveniens*; et sic est res, quae fruitur et utitur, ut homo: et sic accipiuntur membra. Et est ista divisio satis conveniens huic scientiae, quia cum theologia sit de Creatore et de creaturis, utile est, ut theologus doceat, quomodo homo per alias res tendat in Deum.

I respond: Every thing, which is in someway a nature, either is an *end*; and thus is a thing, which (one is) to enjoy; or *leading toward an end*; and thus is a thing, which (one is) to use; or *arriving at an end*; and thus is a thing, which enjoys and uses, as (is) man: and in this manner the members are accepted. And that division is sufficiently convenient to this science, because since theology is of the Creator and of creatures, it is useful, that the theologian teach, in what manner a man tends through other things unto God.

Dub. VII.

Item opponitur de hoc quod dicit: *Res, quibus fruendum*; quia si[4] tres sunt res per se et non per accidens, et a diversitate rerum est diversitas sive multiplicitas fruitionis: ergo sicut sunt tres res, sic erunt tres fruitiones.

Item, tres articuli sunt, quia[5] de tribus personis: ergo a simili et tres fruitiones.

Respondeo: Quod *res* accipitur hic communiter ad essentiam et personam propter sui generalitatem; et quia sumtum[6] est hoc vocabulum *res* ab actu animae, ideo *tres* dicuntur *res*, quia tres personae, sed tamen *una res*, quia una bonitas est in eis. Quia ergo una bonitas, ideo et una fruitio, quamvis tres res. — Et quoniam *articulus* dicit quid a parte animae distinguentis, scilicet intellectus, et fruitio respicit ipsam[7] divinam essentiam et bonitatem et unionem affectus communiter, ideo fruitio est una.

Doubt VII.

Likewise there is an objection concerning this which he says: *The things therefore, which one is to enjoy*; because if[4] there are Three per se and not per accidens, and by a diversity of things there is a diversity or multiplicity of enjoying: therefore as there are Three things, so there will be three fruitions.

Likewise, there are three articles, because[5] (there are) Three Persons: therefore by a similar (reason) also three fruitions.

I respond: That ‘*thing’* is accepted here commonly as regards essence and person on account of its generality; and because this word, ‘thing’, is taken[6] by an act of the soul, for that reason the *Three* are said (to be) ‘*things’*, because (there are) Three Persons, but however *one Thing*, because there is one Goodness in Them. Therefore because (there is) one Goodness, for that reason (there is) also one enjoying, although (there are) Three things. — And since *article* signifies a ‘what’ [dicit quid] on the part of the soul that distinguishes, that is the intellect, and (since) enjoying respects the very[7] divine Essence and Goodness and Union of the affection commonly (speaking), for that reason enjoying is one.

Dub. VIII.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit: *Omnis, qui fruitur, utitur*; quia videtur falsum, quoniam stulti[8] homines similiter et bestiae fruuntur, quia propter se delectantur in delectabili, sed non utuntur. *Si dicas*, quod dicitur translative; quare no similiter transfertur verbum *utendi*?

Doubt VIII.

Likewise it is objected concerning this which he says: *Everyone, who enjoys, uses*; because it seems false, since foolish[8] men and beasts similarly enjoy, because they delight for their own sake in the delectable, but they do not use it. *If you say*, that it is said in a transferred manner [translative]; why is the word *to use* not similarly

transferred?

RESPONDEO: *Uti* importat libertatem in sua generali acceptione, in speciali importat libertatem cum relatione ad aliud; *frui* importat libertatem cum delectatione; et licet nec libertas nec collatio[9] conveniat brutis, convenit eis tamen delectatio. Ideo *uti* nullo modo convenit brutis; *frui* autem convenit eis aliquo modo, licet improprie.[10]

I RESPOND: *To use* presupposes [importat] liberty in its general acceptation, in a special manner it presupposes liberty with a relation to another; *to enjoy* presupposes liberty with delectation; and though neither liberty nor conference [collatio][9] belong [conveniat] to beasts, delectation however does belong to them. For that reason *to use* in no manner belongs to beasts; but *to enjoy* does belong to them in some manner, though improperly.[10]

DUB. IX.

Item videtur male dicere, quod *in homine spes ponenda non est*, quia[11] de beata Virgine cantatur *Vita, dulcedo et spes* ab Ecclesia, quae non errat.

DOUBT IX.

Likewise it seems he badly says, that *in man hope is not to be placed*, because[11] of the Blessed Virgin there is sung '*Our life, our sweetness and our hope'* by the Church, which does not err.

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[1] Praeferimus lectionem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 lectioni Vat. *divisum debet esse* loco *aliquid est*, utpote subnexis conformiorem.
[2] Ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1, 2, 3 emendavimus interpolationem Vat.: *est tertia medio modo, et ista est analogi, sicut ista est, ubi non est communitas creaturae et Creatori secundum naturae participationem, sed*. Deinde in fine responsionis codd. D I X Y ee addunt *et per hoc patet responsio, quia obiectio procedit de divisione univoci; haec autem divisio est analogi*. Placet haec addititio, utpote continens applicationem principii. Cfr. supra a. 3. q. 1. ad 1.
[3] Refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, habet Vat. *ponit*. Cod. dd omittit *ut Christus* et deinde legit *ergo tertium superfluit, vel qua ratione*.
[4] Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *si*. Paulo post cod. R *ad diversitatem* loco *a diversitate*.
[5] Contra codd. omittit Vat. *quia*.
[6] Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *assumtum* et paulo infra post *tamen* addit *aeque bene*.
[7] Fide fere omnium codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 suffecimus *ipsam* et paulo infra pro *effectus* posuimus *affectus*.
[8] Codd. inter se non conveniunt; nam alii, ut A C G K L O R S U V W X etc. cum ed. 1 loco *stulti* ponunt *multi*, qui et dein fere omnes omittunt *similiter et bestiae*, dum e contra aliii ut F H (T a secunda manu correctus), omissis verbis *stulti homines similiter et*, retinent *bestiae*, (codd. H T *bruta*); edd. 4, 5, 6 loco *multi* habet *mali*. Verba Augustini, in quibus obiectio fundatur, sunt: Et frui quidem cibo et qualibet corporali voluptate non adeo absurde existimantur et bestiae; uti autem aliqua re non potest nisi animal, quod rationis est particeps. Scire namque, quo quidque referendum sit, non datum est rationis expertibus, sed neque ipsis rationalibus stultis (83 Qq. q. 30.).
[9] Substituimus ex plurimis mss. ut A C F G H I K O S T U V W X Z etc. et ed. 1 *collatio* pro *relatio*; cod. R legit *delectio*. Paulo supra cod. O post *relatione* addit *vel collatione*.

[1] We prefer the reading of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, to the reading of the Vatican text: i.e. *and there ought to be a common divided among the ones being divided* in place of *and there is something common to the ones being divided*, as it is more conformable to what is subjoined.
[2] From nearly all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3, we have emended the interpolation of the Vatican text: *the third (division) is by a middle manner, and that is of the analogue, as is that, where there is not a community of the creature and God according to a participation of nature, but*. Then at the end of the response codices D I X Y and ee add *and through this the response is clear, because the objection proceeds from a division of the univocal; but this division is of the analogue*. This addition is pleasing, as it contains an application of the principle. Cf. above in a. 3, q. 1, in reply to n. 1.
[3] Breaking again with the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text has *he posits*. Codex dd omits *as (is) Christ* and then reads *therefore the third is superfluous, and/or by the reason*.
[4] We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 *if*. A little afterwards codex R has *for a diversity* in place of *by a diversity*.
[5] Against the codices the Vatican text omits *because*
[6] The Vatican text against the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3 has *assumed* and a little below this after *however* it adds *equally well*.
[7] Trusting in nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2, and 3, we have supplied *the very* [ipsam] and a little below this we have put *the affection* [affectus] in place of *effect* [effectus].
[8] The codices do not agree among themselves; for some, as A C G K L O R S U V W X etc. together with edition 1 put *many* in place of *foolish*, and then nearly all of them omit *and beasts similarly*, while on the other hand the others as F H (T as corrected by a second hand), having omitted *foolish men and . . . similarly*, retain *beasts*, (codices H T have *a brute* [bruta]); editions 4, 5 and 6 have *evil* in place of

[10] Cfr. August. loc. cit.; insuper B. Albert., hic a. 17. ad 2. — Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1 et S. I. II. q. 11. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 5. — Richard., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3.
[11] Ope codd. et ed. 1 expunximus particulam *et*, quam Vat. ponit post *quia*.

many. The words of (St.) Augustine, upon which the objection is founded, are: And indeed to that extent they are not judged harshly to enjoy food any corporal pleasure; but none, except the animal, which is a sharer in reason, can use any thing. For to know, that to which anything is to be referred, is not given to the ones who have no share in reason [rationis expertibus], but neither to those rational fools (Eighty-three Questions, q. 30).
[9] We have substituted from very many of the manuscripts as A C F G H I K O S T U V W X Z etc. and edition 1 *conference* [collation — Trans. Note: here in the sense of "ability to confer meaning or purpose on another"] in place of *relation*; codex R reads *love* [delectio]. A little above this codex O after *relation* adds *and/or conference*.
[10] Cf. (St.) Augustine, loc. cit.; in addition Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 17, in reply to n. 2. — (St.) Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1, and in Summa., I, II, q. 11, a. 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 5. — Richard (of Middletown), here in a. 2, q. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3.
[11] With the help of the codices and edition 1 we have expunged the particle *also* [et], which the Vatican text places after *because*.

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p. 44

Item, Ionae primo:[1] *Accessit ad eum gubernator*; Glossa: « Naturale est homini magis de aliis quam de se in periculis confidere ».

Likewise, (as there is said) in the first (chapter) of Jonas:[1] *There came to him the governor*; the Gloss (reads): « It is natural for a man in dangers to confide more in others than in himself ».

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod sperare de aliquo est dupliciter, aut sicut de *adiutore*, aut sicut de *salvatore*. Prima spes potest esse in homine, secunda non. — Vel est sperare finale praemium; et hoc debet esse tantum in Deo; vel temporale beneficium; et hoc potest esse in homine. Primum si ponitur[2] in homine, meretur maledictionem, secundum vero non.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that to hope in something is (said) in a twofold manner, either as in a *helper*, or as in a *savior*. The first hope can be (placed) in a man, the second not. — There is hoping for a final reward; and this ought to be only in God; and/or for a temporal benefice; and this can be in a man. The first, if it is placed[2] in a man, merits a curse, but the second does not.

DUB. X.

Item quaeritur, quare dicit de homine: *Itaque frater, ego fruar te in Domino*, magis quam de asino vel de alia creatura, cum in omnibus creaturis reluceat vestigium divinae bonitatis.

RESPONDEO: Quod dicatur[3] aliquis aliquo frui in Deo, non facit repraesentatio, sed magis inhabitatio. Unde conversa est propria, videlicet haec: *Ego fruar Domino in te*, dum per opera sciam, Deum habitare in te; et est figurativa locutio.

DOUBT X.

Likewise there is asked, why he says of man: *And thus, brother do I enjoy you in the Lord*, more than of the ass and/or of another creature, since in all creatures there glitters the vestige of the divine Goodness.

I RESPOND: That someone be said[3] to enjoy another in God, the cause is not [non facit] representation, but rather inhabitation. Whence the converse is proper, namely the (words): *I enjoy the Lord in you*, since through (your) works I know, that God

dwells in you; and (this) is figurative speech.

DUB. XI.

Item quaeritur de hac solutione Augustini, qua solvit auctoritatem praedictam per illam determinationem *in Domino*. Sed Ecclesiastici octavo[4] simpliciter dicitur: *Fruere magnatis*. Item, Deuteronomii vigesimo octavo:[5] *Filios generabis et filias, et non frueris eis*; ex hoc implicat, quod, si non peccarent, fruerentur.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod praedicta solutio non est generalis, sed solum ad propositam auctoritatem. Et ideo recurrendum est ad solutionem praedictam extra litteram in quaestionibus,[6] quod, cum *frui* accipiatur communiter et proprie, in praedictis locutionibus accipitur communiter tantum.

DOUBT XI.

Likewise there is asked of this solution of (St) Augustine, by which he resolves the aforesaid authority through that determination *in the Lord*. But in the eighth (chapter) of Ecclesiasticus[4] there is simply said: *Enjoy the great*. Likewise, in the twenty-eighth (chapter) of Deuteronomy:[5] *Sons and daughters you shall beget, and you shall not enjoy them.*; from this there is implied, that, if they had not sinned, they would enjoy (them).

I RESPOND: It must be said, that the aforesaid solution is not a general one, but only for the proposed authority. And for that reason one must recur to the aforesaid solution outside the text in the questions,[6] because, though *to enjoy* is accepted commonly and properly, in the aforesaid discourses [locutionibus] it is accepted only commonly.

DUB. XII.

Item non videtur valere quod dicit Magister: *Si enim nec fruitur, nec utitur* etc., quia Deus diligit se, non tamen utitur, quia non diligit se propter aliud; nec fruitur, quia ubi fruitio, ibi est inhaerentia et indigentia, ut dicit Augustinus;[7] Deus autem utroque caret etc.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod *fruitio* de sui generali ratione dicit amoris unionem, scilicet fruibilis cum fruente. Quoniam igitur contingit aliquid uniri sibi et alii, contingit non tantum frui alio, sed etiam se ipso; sed ubi est unio ad alterum, ibi est dependentia, inhaerentia et indigentia; ubi vero ad se ipsum, si ipsum est summum bonum, ibi[8] non est inhaerentia nec dependentia vel indigentia, sed omnimoda sufficientia. Si vero ipsum bonum deficiens est, indiget; et inde est, quod solus Deus se ipso perfecte fruitur, nihil autem aliud ab ipso potest perfecte se ipso frui. Solus enim Deus est summum bonum et diligit se fruendo se, diliget etiam alia fruendo se: et ita nec fruitio Dei nec usus est cum indigentia, sicut nostra fruitio et usus.

DOUBT XII.

Likewise what Master (Peter) says does not seem valid: *For if one neither enjoys, nor uses* etc., because God loves Himself, he does not however use (Himself), because He does not love Himself for the sake of an other; nor does He enjoy (Himself), because where (there is) enjoying; there is inherence and indigence, as (St.) Augustine says;[7] but God lacks both (: ergo) etc.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that *enjoying* in its general reckoning means a union of love [amoris], that is of the enjoyable with the one enjoying. Therefore since it happens that something is united to itself and to an other, it happens that it not only enjoys the other, but also its very self; but where there is union to the other, there is dependency, inherence and indigence; but where (there is union) to its very self, if it is the most high Good, there[8] is no inherence nor dependency and/or indigence, but (rather) sufficiency in every manner [omnimoda]. But if that good is deficient, it is lacking; and hence it is, that only God perfectly enjoys His very self, but nothing other by itself can perfectly enjoy its very self. For God alone is the most high Good and He loves Himself by enjoying Himself, (and) He also loves others by enjoying Himself: and thus neither the enjoying of God nor the use is with

indigence, as our enjoying and use (are).

Dub. XIII.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit: *Quia bonus est, sumus*: ergo quia ab aeterno bonus est, ab aeterno sumus.

Respondeo: Dicendum breviter, quod hoc est, quia *bonus* dicit causam.[9] Sed est causa *naturalis* et necessaria, et causa *voluntaria*. Bonitas autem divina est causa nostri *esse* et *boni esse* per modum voluntatis, non naturae; haec autem causa non ponit effectum statim, cum est.

Doubt XIII.

Likewise it is objected concerning that which he says: *Because He is good, we are*: therefore because He is good from eternity, we are good from eternity.

I respond: It must be briefly said, that this is, because *good* means a cause.[9] But there is a *natural* and a necessary cause, and a *voluntary* cause. But the divine Goodness is the Cause of our *being* [esse] and of (our) *being good* [boni esse] through the manner of a will, not of nature; but this (kind of) cause does not posit its effect immediately, when it is.

Dub. XIV.

Item, adhuc obiicitur, quare similiter non sequitur; quia iustus est, iusti sumus?[10] *Si dicas*, quod iustitia non est eius dispositio in quantum causa; *contra*: sapientia est dispositio Dei in quantum causa: ergo pari ratione, quia sapiens est, sapientes sumus. *Si tu dicas*, quod non est dispositio immediata, sicut bonitas; obiicitur de voluntate, quae est immediatissima, et tamen non sequitur: quia volens est, volentes sumus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ratio huius consequentiae triplex est. Una est, quia bonitas est conditio causae in quantum causa; secunda est, quia / est proxima ad actum; . . .

Doubt XIV.

Likewise, it is still objected, why it similarly does not follow; because He is just, are we just?[10] *If (you) say*, that justice is not a disposition for Him inasmuch as (He is) a cause; *on the contrary*: wisdom is the disposition of God inasmuch as (He is) a cause: therefore by an equal reason, because He is wise, we are wise. *If you say*, that it is not an immediate disposition, as (is) goodness; it is objected concerning the will, which is most immediate, and however it does not follow: because He is willing, we are willing.

I respond: It must be said, that the reason for this consequence is threefold. One is, because goodness is a condition of a cause inasmuch as (it is) a cause; the second is, because / it is proximate to the act; . . .

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[1] Vers. 6. Textus Glossae interlinearis apud Lyranum est: Naturale est, unumquemque in suo periculo plus de alio quam de se sperare.
[2] Vat. contra multos codd. ut A F G K T W X etc. et sex primas edd. *ponatur*.
[3] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *dicitur*. Paulo infra Vat. contra codd. C I S T V W X Z etc. et ed 1 post *conversa* supervacanee addit *per consequens*.
[4] Vers. 10. Ita codd. et ed. 1 ac Hugo de S. Charo in hunc locum; Vulgata vero *servire magnatis*; Vat. autem citando Ecclesiasten 7, 15. legit *fruere bonis*.
[5] Vers. 41. — Mox post *fruerentur* in Vat. additur *eis*.
[6] Hic, a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Deinde Vat. praeter fidem omnium codd. et sex primar. edd. post *quod* omittit *cum* et post *praedictis* contra antiquiores mss. loco *locutionibus* ponit *auctoritatibus*.
[7] Libr. I. de Doctr. christ. c. 31. n. 34: Sed si fruitur, eget bono nostro, quod nemo sanus dixerit. Ex antiquioribus codd. cum ed. 1 post *ibi* adiecimus *est*.
[8] Auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ibi*. Paulo infra cod. dd post *dependentia* habet *nec* pro *vel*.
[9] Vat. *quod hoc quia bonus est dicit causam*, sed

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[1] Verse 6. The text of the interlinear Gloss according to (Nicholas) Lyra is: It is natural for each one in danger to hope more in another than in himself.
[2] The Vatican text against many codices, as A F G K T W X etc. and the six first editions, has (the subjunctive) *it be placed*. [Trans. Note: here 'first' and 'second' refer not to the division in the first sentence of the paragraph, but to that of the third.]
[3] The Vatican text against the manuscripts and edition 1 has (the indicative) *is said* [dicitur]. A little below this the Vatican text against the codices C I S T V W X Z etc. and edition 1 superfluously adds *consequently* [per consequens] after *the converse is*.
[4] Verse 10. Thus the codices and edition 1 and Hugo of St. Charo at this place; but the Vulgate has *to serve the great*; but the Vatican text by citing Ecclesiastes 7:15 reads *enjoy the good things*.
[5] Verse 41 — Then after *they would enjoy* in the Vatican text there is added *them*.
[6] Here, in a. 2. q. 1. in the body of the reply. — Then the Vatican text not trusting in all the codices and six first editions, after *because* omits *though* [cum] and

secuti sumus auctoritatem mss. et ed. 1. Mox lectio Vat. minus recta *sed est aliqua causa naturalis etiam necessaria et est aliqua causa voluntaria* castigatur ex codd. et ed. 1. Paulo infra Vat. post *naturae*, contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, addit *et necessitatis*.

[10] Ope mss. et ed. 1 expunximus verba, quae Vat. hic addit *sicut quia bonus est, boni sumus*.

after *aforesaid* against the more ancient manuscripts puts *authorities* in place of *discourses*.

[7] On Christian Doctrine, Bk. I, ch. 31, n. 34: But if He enjoys, He is in want of our good, which no one sane would have said. From the more ancient codices together with edition 1 we have inserted *is* before *inherence*.

[8] On the authority of the codices and edition 1 we have supplied *there*. A little below this codex dd has *nor* in place of *and/or* after *dependence*.

[9] The Vatican text reads *that this (is) because "He is good" means a cause*, but we have followed the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1. Then the reading of the Vatican text, (which) less rightly has *but there is some natural, even necessary, cause and there is some voluntary cause*, is corrected from the codices and edition 1. A little below this the Vatican text, after *of nature*, contradicting the manuscripts and edition 1, adds *and necessity*.

[10] With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged the words, which the Vatican text here adds: *just as because He is good, we are good*.

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p. 45

secunda est, quia / est proxima ad actum;[1] tertia, quia dispositio generalis, in qua consistit vestigii ratio: dicit enim respectum ad finem. Unde sicut Deus unus imprimit unitate, ita bonus bonitatem.

the second is, because / it is proximate to the act;[1] the third, because (it is) a general disposition, in which consists the reason for the vestige: for it signifies [dicit] a looking-back [respectum] to the end. Whence as the one God impresses unity, so the good (God impresses) goodness.

Dub. XV.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicitur: *Ut scilicet ametur propter se ipsam tantum*, quia sicut *per se* ad *per accidens*, ita *propter se* ad *propter aliud*. Sed nihil, quod convenit alicui per accidens, convenit per se: ergo nihil, quod convenit alicui propter aliud, convenit propter se. Si ergo virtutes sunt appetendae propter aliud, non ergo propter se.

Doubt XV.

Likewise it is objected of this which is said: *that, namely, it is to be loved for its own sake only*, because as *per se* (is) to *per accidens*, so *for its own sake* (is) to *for the sake of an other*. But nothing, which convenes with someone per accidens, convenes per se: therefore nothing, which convenes someone for an other's sake, convenes for its own sake. If therefore the virtues are to be desired [appentendae] for an other's sake, therefore not for their own sake.

Respondeo: Sicut dicit Philosophus,[2] « Idem est finis et *propter quod* ». Finis autem dupliciter est: uno modo finis *ultimus*, qui propriisime est finis, in quo est status; alio modo *finis sub fine*, qui[3] dicitur proprie terminus. Sic et *propter quod* diversificatur; unde uno modo excludit finem, alio modo non, ut dicit Magister.

I respond: As the Philosopher says,[2] « The same is the end and the *for the sake of which* ». But the end is twofold: in one manner (it is) the *last* end, which most properly is the End, in which there is a standing still [status]; in another manner (it is) *an end under the end*, which[3] is properly called the terminus. So also the *for the sake of which* is diversified; whence in one manner it excludes the end, in another manner (it does) not, as Master (Peter) says.

Quod ergo obiicitur de *per se*; dico, quod, sicut *per se* uno modo opponitur ei quod est *per aliud* — et sic idem est *per se* et *secundum quod ipsum*, sive primum universale[4] — alio modo opponitur ei quod est *per accidens*: sic et *propter se* dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo opponitur ei quod est *proper aliud*, alio modo ei quod est *per accidens*, quia[5] ad illud accidentaliter ordinatur. Secundum hoc distinguit Magister *propter se*, et consequenter honestum sive fruibile, et ipsam denique fruitionem.[6]

Therefore what is objected concerning *per se*; I say, that, as *per se* in one manner is opposed to that which is *through an other* [per aliud] — and thus *per se* is also the same as *according to what it itself (is)* [secundum quod ipsum], or the prime universal[4] — in another manner it is opposed to that which is *per accidens*: thus *for its own sake* is also accepted in a twofold manner. In one manner it is opposed to that which is *for the sake of an other*, in another manner to that which is *per accidens*, because[5] it is ordered to that accidentally. According to this Master (Peter) distinguishes *for its own sake*, and consequently the honest or enjoyable, and then enjoying itself.[6]

Dub. XVI.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit: *Et quaedam sunt res, per quas fruimur, ut virtutes*. Videtur quod solis potentiis possit frui anima.[7] Sine omni enim virtute potest frui bono creato; ergo cum magis sit fruibile bonum increatum, et anima magis ad hoc nata est, poterit eo frui solis potentiis.

Doubt XVI.

Likewise it is objected of this which he says: *And there are* certain things, *through which we enjoy, as (are) the virtues*. It seems that the soul can enjoy powers themselves [solis].[7] For without any virtue one can enjoy a created good; therefore since the uncreated good is more enjoyable, and the soul is more naturally bound to (do) this, by this logic [eo] it can enjoy powers by themselves.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod summum bonum est quod supra nos est; ad hoc ergo, quod illi uniamur, necessario intervenit duplex medium: medium unum, per quod anima nata est uniri alii a se diverso; et hoc est potentia; aliud speciale[8] supra hoc, quod ipsam sublevet; et hoc est virtus. Quod obiicitur non est simile, quia potentia per se potest deficere et inclinari, sed non per se elevari.[9]

I respond: It must be said, that the most high Good is what is above us; therefore for this, that we be united to It, a twofold medium necessarily intervenes: one medium, through which the soul is naturally bound to be united to an other diverse from itself; and this is power; the other a special one[8] above this, which lifts it up; and this is virtue. What is objected is not similar, because power per se can fail and be inclined, but not per se be elevated.[9]

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[1] Absque ulla auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 hic Vat. addit: *quia cum bonum sit sui communicativum, de sui ratione importat communicabilitatem, importat etiam voluntatem, quae duo ponunt effectum in actu*. Paulo ante, obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, ponit Vat. *dispositio* pro *conditio* et paulo infra post *dicit* omittit *enim*. Hoc et praecedens dubium fuse ab Alex. Hal. explicantur S. I. q. 17. m. 9. — De ratione *vestigii* cfr. infra d. 3. p. 1. q. 2. in fine et ibidem dub. 6.

[2] Libr. II. Phys. text. 298. (c. 3.), ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1489: Dicitur etiam (causa) secundum finem intentum, et hoc est illud propter quod.

[3] Vat. cum pluribus codd. F G K etc. *et* pro *qui*.

[4] Propositio haec, ex Aristot., I. Poster. text. 11. (c. 4.) sumta, iuxta antiquam versionem (ed. Venet. apud Octavianum Scotum, 1538) sic exhibetur: « Per

[1] Without any authority from the codices and edition 1 the Vatican text here adds: *because since the good is communicative of itself, from its own reckoning it presupposes [importat] communicability, it also presupposes a will, which two things put an effect in act.* A little before this (on the previous page), disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text puts *disposition* in place of *condition* and a little below this before *it signifies* it omits *for*. This and the previous dubium is explained at length by Alexander of Hales, Summa., I, q. 17, m. 9. — On the reason for *the vestige* cf. below in d. 3, p. 1, q. 2 at the end and in dubium 6.

[2] Physics, Bk. II, text 298, (ch. 3), where according to the Venetian edition of 1489 (there is read): (A cause) is also said according to the intended end,

se autem et secundum quod ipsum, idem, ut per se lineae inest punctus et rectum: etenim secundum quod linea ». Et paulo ante: « Universale autem dico, quod utique et de omni sit et per se et secundum quod ipsum...Universale autem est tunc, quando in quolibet et primo monstretur ». — S. Thomas in Commentario ad hunc locum observat, quod hic « universale non hoc modo accipitur, prout omne quod praedicatur de pluribus dicitur universale, secundum quod Porphyrius determinat de quinque universalibus; sed dicitur hic universale secundum quandam adaptionem vel adequationem praedicati ad subiectu, cum scilicet neque praedicatum invenitur extra subiectum neque subiectum sine praedicato...Primo dicit, quod universale, scilicet praedicatum, est etiam quod de omni est, id est, universaliter praedicatur de subiecto; et etiam per se, scilicet inest ei, convenit subiecto, secundum quod ipsum subiectum est. Multa enim de aliquibus praedicantur universaliter, quae non conveniunt ei per se et secundum quod ipsum est. Sicut omnis lapis coloratus est, non tamen secundum quod lapis, sed secundum quod ipsum est superficiem habens » (ed. Parmae 1865). — Vocatur illud *primum* universale, quando universale pradicatum non solum in quolibet est, de quo praedicatur, sed et *primo* demonstratur in esse ei, de quo praedicatur; sic, ut in exemplo ab Aristotele persistamus, habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis non convenit *primo* isosceli, sed triangulo (quia isosceli convenit in quantum triangulus est), adeoque et *primum universale* trianguli, non isoscelis est. Plura videsis apud S. Thomam loc. cit. et Scot. in I. Poster. q. 15-39. — Ad normam ed. operum Aristot. et codd. nec non ed. 1 substituimus in propositione praedicta post *per se* particulam *et* pro *quod*.

[5] Praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. hic Vat. addit *aliud*.

[6] In solutione huius dubii concordat Richard., hic a. 2. q. 3. ad 1.

[7] Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 delevimus verba hic a Vat. adiecta *sine omni virtute*, utpote quae iam satis indicantur particula exclusiva *solis*.

[8] Additur hic a Vat. *vel spirituale*, quod deest in fere omnibus codd. et ed. 1; pauci codd., ut H R W cc loco *speciale* ponunt minus recte *spirituale*. Paulo ante cod. R pro *intervenit* habet *concurrit*, et cod. X loco *unum* satis bene legit *generale*.

[9] Quo sensu virtutibus sit fruendum, vide supra a. 3. a. 2 et II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 21. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2.

and this is that-for-the-sake-of-which.

[3] The Vatican text together with very many codices, F G K etc., has *and it* [et] in place of *which* [qui].

[4] This proposition, taken from Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, text 11 (ch. 4), according to the ancient version (Venice: Octavianus Scotus, 1538), is thus exhibited: But per se and "according to what it itself (is)" (is) the same thing, just as per se there is in a line (both) the point and straightness [rectum]: and indeed [etenim] according to which (it is) a line ». And a little before this: « But I call a universal, what is both thus and from every, both per se and "according to what it itself (is)" . . .But there is then a universal, when it is shown [monstraretur] (to be) in any and in the first ». — St. Thomas observes in his Commentary at this point, that here « a universal is not accepted in this manner, insofar as everything which is predicated of very many is called a universal, according to what Porphyry determines of the five universals; but it a universal is said here according to a certain adaptation and/or adequation of the predicate to the subject, when, that is, neither is the predicate found outside the subject nor the subject without the predicate . . . First he says, that the universal, that is the predicate, is also that which is from all, that is, it is universally predicated of the subject; and also per se, that is it is in it, it convenes with the subject, according to which it itself is a subject. For many things are predicated universally of somethings, which do not convene with it per se and "according to which it itself is". As every stone is colored, not however according to which (it is) a stone, but according to which it itself is a thing having a surface » (Parma: 1865). — It is called *the first* universal, when the universal predicated is not only in anything, of which it is predicated, but also is demonstrated (to be) *first* in the being [in esse] of that, of which it is predicated; thus, to keep the example by Aristotle, to have three angles equal to two right (angles) does not convene *first* to an isosceles (triangle), but (rather) to a triangle (simply speaking) {because it convenes with an isosceles inasmuch as it is a triangle), and to that extent it is also the *first universal* of a triangle, not of an isosceles. See the very many things pertaining to this matter [plura vide eis] in St. Thomas, loc. cit., and in (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, q. 15-39. — According to the norm of the edition of the works of Aristotle and the codices, not excepting edition 1, we have substituted in the aforesaid proposition after per se the particle *and* [et] in place of *what* [quod].

[5] Not trusting in the manuscripts and the six first editions the Vatican text here adds *the other*.

[6] In the solution of this doubt Richard (of Middletown) agrees, here in a. 2, q. 3 in reply to n. 1.

[7] On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have deleted the words here inserted by the Vatican text *without any virtue*, which are able to be already, sufficiently indicated by the exclusive *themselves* [solis].

[8] Here there is added by the Vatican text *and/or spiritual one*, which is lacking in nearly all the codices and edition 1; a few of the codices, as H R W

and cc put, less rightly, *spiritual one* in place of *special one*. A little before this codex R has *concurs* for *intervenes*, and codex X reads, well enough, *a general medium* in place of *one medium*.

[9] In which sense one is to enjoy the virtues, see above in a. 3. q. 2 and in Sent., d. 18, a. 1. q. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 21. — Giles the Roman, here at the beginning of n. 1, q. 2.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.